

DRYLANDS PASTORAL MISSION SUDAN

**ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**THE NATURE, EXTENT AND IMPACT OF LRA  
INSURGENCE IN OLUBOLAND**

**COMPILED BY PAUL PITIA YUGUSUK  
DPMS FIELD COORDINATOR**

DECEMBER 2004

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This assessment was funded by Pax Christi Netherlands – thanks to Edwin Ruigrok, the Pax Christi Netherlands representative who flagged off the study after hearing various concerns by the people of Lomega Payam during the Juba Peace Preparedness workshop conducted in Katigri in Juba County in December 2004. Special tribute goes to the Drylands Pastoral Mission field Coordinator Rev. Paul Pitia Yugusuk whose advice and direction was indeed helpful. Also appreciated are the community leaders, chiefs and SPLM administrators who even without notice gave us the much-needed information.

Special tribute goes to Mr. Steve Pande who was the assessment consultant and the peace mobilizers who were engaged as research assistants. They were indeed instrumental. James Ladu, Mogga, all of you deserve appreciation for collecting data with a lot of interest and some even did so in very insecure and far off areas.

Mr. Thomas Lowi the Lomega Payam Administrator provided a lot of information both during this assessment and during the Juba county preparedness workshop at which the need to carry out the assessment was proposed. We as well appreciate the efforts - the cooks, those who provided security and all others who contributed to this study in one way or the other.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At least every village, every family and actually every body in Oluboland has in one way or the other been affected by the LRA Insurgence. Some have lost relatives, some have been separated from their family members, some lost valuable property and many do not have a home. These were among the many facts established by this study which sought to find out the nature, extent and impact of the LRA insurgence in Oluboland. It also established that one hundred and forty five known people have been killed by the LRA since November 1995, when the terrorist squad were first noticed in Oluboland. Several other unknown people have been killed.

Yet one is likely to ask: what has been the reaction of the villagers?

According to the assessment, all these years, the villagers who to date continue to live in what looks like a permanent state of fear have had only two options. One, to run away into IDP camps, neighboring countries and other safer settlements - and two, to move and live in strategic positions on the mountain tops from where they can readily spot the enemy (LRA).

The thesis of the assessment is that Oluboland is one of the most marginalized parts of Southern Sudan, and the reason is likely to be the LRA threat.

The study considers it appropriate to describe the LRA as a terrorist squad or a cult. It established that the use of the word “Lord” portrays a cultic factor in the movement and speculates that human blood and sacrifice is part and parcel of the philosophical agenda of the cult, a philosophical agenda which is yet to be known.

The call of the assessment is that something must be done, and done now. Otherwise the situation in Oluboland is likely to deteriorate. The assessment places the responsibility of intervention in the hands of the Sudan Government, the Uganda Government, the SPLM, Eastern African Countries, IGAD, African Union, the UN, Humanitarian NGO, peace movements and all those who value human life. It challenges them to a mission of Policy Influence, Lobbying, relief distribution, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and conciliation, and above all the study recommends that a dissemination workshop of key stakeholders at which the findings of this assessment would be discussed to be held as soon as possible to chart out the way forward.

The study was conducted in the month of December 2004. The information contained in this report was sourced using assessment guidelines and this was done by a team of ten Peace mobilizers who were specifically trained to carry out the assessment. A total of hundred people living in various IDP camps and other settlements were interviewed. Twenty-one people who live in the deep villages of Lomega were also interviewed. Most of those who provided important information in this assessment were chiefs, community leaders and a few SPLM officials.

The study specifically targeted the Olubo community in whose land the LRA have settled since 1995 and who have been victims of the LRA since then.

The report is a condensed presentation of the assessment finding. In it are speculative analysis of the findings mostly reached by use of the obvious logical conclusion method of data analysis. The presentation of data is descriptive and a historical perspective has been used abundantly. At the end of the report is a summary of the findings and the recommendations, some of which were made by the interviewees.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

This assessment was conducted in the month of December 2004. The need to conduct it was suggested at the Juba County Peace preparedness conference conducted in Katigri in December 2004

During the conference, delegates from Lomega complained elaborately about the LRA problem in Oluboland and the conference recommended that more facts about the LRA insurgence in Oluboland should be established.

#### 1.1 GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

a) Goal:

- The goal of the assessment was to establish the Nature, Extend and Impact of the LRA Insurgence in Oluboland in Southern Sudan.

b) Objectives:

- To find out the main atrocities committed by the LRA in Oluboland.
- To establish the patterns of LRA attacks in Oluboland
- To find out the most viable solution(s) to the LRA problem in Oluboland

#### 1.2 METHODOLOGY

The following research methods were used:

a) Assessment guidelines

A team of ten research assistants was trained on how to collect data using assessment guidelines. The team comprised of youth who had initially been trained as peace mobilizers.<sup>1</sup> The assessment guidelines were simple structured questions, which the research assistants were to ask the interviewees. The research assistants were instructed on how to use this method when sourcing information from:

- Village elders
- Peace committee
- Community opinion leaders
- Elders responsible for maintaining social order in IDP camps
- SPLM leaders

---

<sup>1</sup> Pax Christi supported the training of peace mobilisers for an early warning and response system in Equatoria

Each of the ten research assistants managed to source information from ten interviewees mostly in the IDP camps. Each interviewed two villagers who live in the sparsely populated Lomega payam of Juba County

#### b) Data Presentation and Consultation Workshop

The information sourced by each of the ten research assistants was presented during a one-day presentation and consultation workshop. The assessment consultant who accompanied the research assistants to the field listened to each research assistant's findings. The unclear perspectives were further discussed during the workshop (i.e. the research assistants who were involved in data collection).

#### c) Collation Of Data

The assessment consultant collated the data presented during the above said workshop. He simply put together the like terms and tabulated the data.

#### d) Data Analysis And Presentation

In this assessment, data was analyzed speculatively. The obvious logical conclusion method of data analysis was used. The presentation is descriptive. Data presentation method was used. The findings were divided into three main categories: what happened in the first six months, what happened between Feb. 1995 and 1999 and what happened between the year 2000 and 2004.

## 1.2 SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

This assessment was conducted in:

- Nimule West
- Motoyo
- Motoyo West
- Anzara
- Jelei
- Mugale II displaced camp
- Masindi displaced camp
- Rei
- Lomega

It specifically targeted the Olubo Community. The Olubo are a central Sudanese Linguistic group who live in the area South East of Juba town. The area described as Oluboland is approximately 1700 square kilometers. According to the 1982 Sudan government census the Olubo are approximated to be 32,823, a figure that is actually incorrect as the census did not include many who then lived at the foot of the mountains. It is today said that the Olubo can be approximated to be sixty thousand. The

interviewees were mostly those who have been displaced by the LRA insurgence from their original home in Lomega. Most of the areas mentioned above are either IDP camps or new settlements. They are managed by chiefs and other community leaders. The camps and settlement areas are densely populated with each comprising of between four thousand and ten thousand people. The IDP camps in particular are in a pathetic state. Lack of or very little food, no medicine and proper hygiene. Consequently many have died in these camps as a result of elementary diseases like malaria and typhoid. Others have died of malnutrition.

### **1.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE ASSESSMENT**

- Very few villagers living on the mountaintops in Lomega were interviewed. Instead, most of the interviewees were those displaced by the LRA.( mountain tops in Lomega 20 -IDP camps 100)
- The research assistants interviewed very few SPLM leaders. Perhaps because the SPLM leadership is absent in the assessment target area.
- Most of that interviewed hail from the SPLM controlled side of Juba and not the government-controlled side. A lot more information could have been sourced if the assessment was extended to the government-controlled side of Juba County.
- The research assistants traveled long distances by bicycle and were definitely very tired by the time they began the data collection endeavor. This fact coupled with security threats must have reduced their effectiveness.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

#### **2.1 THE GENESIS OF THE LRA INSURGENCE IN OLUBOLAND (A SYNOPSIS OF THE FIRST SIX MONTH)**

Below are some quotations by those who first noticed the presence of the LRA in Oluboland in 1995.

“The Acholi speaking rebels settled among us and initially we did not have any problem with them...but whenever I met them, I had a strange feeling streaming in my blood..... and I thought that they were not good people.” *said Abednego Tombe, 60 years, village elder.*

*Maryanne Foni, 49 Years:* “We first thought that they had been displaced by the war in Northern Uganda ... because they spoke the Uganda Acholi... they began some kind of market and were selling cassava, simsim and potatoes and we bought from them.”

*Johnson Ladu Luka, 40 Years:* “ ...They looked strange, their eyes were red.... they were not clean but they had a lot of foodstuff some of which they were selling in a self made market.... and we were ready to welcome them, but they disappeared shortly thereafter.”

#### A BIT OF HISTORY

The LRA were first noticed in Oluboland on the 17<sup>th</sup> of November 1995. This was in a place called Kubi. They had a lot of foodstuff part of which they sold in a market that they began themselves. Two days after they were first noticed, a well-known village boy, Wakoyangu Mohamed, mysteriously disappeared. Shortly thereafter they (the LRA) also left Kubi, which they had christened New Gulu, a name which continues to be used today.

The sudden disappearance of the newcomers and that of Wakoyangu Mohamed became the talk of the village. This made everybody to be suspicious of the newcomers. It is indeed sad that Wakoyangu Mohamed has never been seen to date and is said to have been killed.

Worth noting is that the strangers were so many in number- about 2000. They left Kubi and moved to Agome and, after a short while, some moved to Odemo. They had began to spread up in the various villages of Oluboland.

It did not take long before this group began to openly engage in acts of terror. First, a person who went to buy cassava from them was openly shot to death, and then a major village was attacked and two people, Jenario Ladu and Tombe Nyingilo, were killed. Also, a pregnant woman called Owe Foni was shot.

In the words of a village elder who was an instrumental information source in this study...“It was then that we realized that an enemy had settled among us ..... and we reported this to the SPLA leaders.” (*Abednego Tombe, 60 years*)

The insurgence continued on a daily basis. Reports of abductions and killings became the order of the day. A young man who was abducted but was lucky to escape from the terrorists was the one who made the village elders actually know that this group of strangers was part of the terrorist Lords Resistance Army from Northern Uganda



“He told us how he was tortured and forced to drink blood from his wounds... and how he was beaten mercilessly... but he understood the Acholi language and heard them say that they are part of the Lords Resistance Army – and that they were out to look for a safe base from where they could hit the Uganda government.” (*Abednego Tombe*)

### KILLINGS AND OTHER ATTROCITIES COMMITTED IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

The matrix below shows the names of the earliest victims of LRA insurgence in Oluboland in the first six months from the time the rebels were first noticed in Oluboland. It indicates who was killed when, where and how.

Who Was Killed, Where, When and How:

NAME OF PERSON KILLED	WHEN	WHERE	HOW
Wakoyangu Mohamed	19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Kubi	Taken captive and has not been seen to-date (was said to have been killed.)
Owe Foni (A pregnant woman)	19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Ligi village	Was shot while digging in her farm
Jane Wani Jaralam	19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Kubi	Not explained
Julius Wani Nyarsuk	19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Kubi	Shot in broad daylight
Tombe Morbe (A catholic catechist)	20 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Mbibia	Not explained
James Jada	25 <sup>th</sup> Nov. 1995	Odemo	Shot
Lomonyi Pitia	25 <sup>th</sup> Nov 1995	Odemo	Burnt by grass after shooting
Emiland Ladu Legge	10 <sup>th</sup> Feb 1996	Odemo area of Monyoro village	Cut to death after shooting
Abelino Ladu	Feb 1996 (date not shown)	ARU	Shot to death
Iriana Lenyiro	Feb 1996 (date not indicated)	Ademo in Mukari	Not indicated

### SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

- The LRA’s earliest attacks were abrupt, disorganized and extremely merciless.
- They mostly killed by shooting
- If the LRA had a reason for their earliest attacks then the reason was to scared the villagers away so as to displace and make the villagers leave room for them (LRA) to settle and establish a base. It is most likely that the LRA were initially interested in a base which is not far from the Uganda – Sudan boarder.

- The LRA expressed a lot of confidence when they first appeared in Oluboland. They conducted their business openly. This rare confidence made the village elders to raise eyebrows.
- It was not easy for the large number of the LRA who first appeared in Oluboland to have a hideout since the area where the LRA first settled does not have thick forests.
- The LRA must have moved to Southern Sudan in such a large number (the first to be seen were about 2,000) because of immense pressure from the Uganda government.
- The LRA tried to integrate with the community but on realizing that they risked being known, they began to spread out into the bush and far off villages.

## 2.2 ...AND THE DUST DID NOT SETTLE

Over 289 people were displaced from Mukari (where the LRA almost settled when they left Kubi) in 1995. People lived in fear and had no formula of protecting themselves. The only option was to seek refuge far away. This fear has since not ceased.

To this date the people of Oluboland continue to live in fear. Yet curiosity is mother of all inventions – they had some kind of an alternative, crude though it was, it has helped, at least to some extent. The alternative was to move to the mountain tops, where the villagers could easily spot the enemy and either shoot at them or run for their lives.

Actually, the LRA risked attacking the villagers in the strategic positions.

“We went to live on the hilltops... but it is not easy to cultivate on the hilltops.... and eventually so many had to go to IDP camps.” (*Johnson, 47 years* )

There was much harm done to the people of Oluboland by this rebel group. The killings, torching of farms, looting of property and abductions continued as the LRA presence in Southern Sudan slowly began to trigger the curiosity of the international community.

### KILLINGS AND OTHER ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE LRA BETWEEN 1996 AND 1999

Below is a synopsis of the killings and other atrocities committed between November 1996 and the year 1999.

YEAR AND/OR MONTH/DAT E	NAME OF PERSON KILLED	1995 – MANNER OF KILLING	2000 LOCATIO N	OTHER ATROCITIES COMMITTED
1996 (25 <sup>th</sup> Nov)	James Jada Lumoyi Pitia	Shot by automatic gun when escaping	Odemo village in Mukare	Entire village torched

The Nature, Extent and Impact of LRA Insurgence in Oluboland; Assessment Report

		from a touched house		
(November)	Simon Okende	Cut to pieces by panga	Langabu village	Four people abducted
(April)	Margaret Ile	Shot by gun	Kuduo camp	Granaries looted
	Falamine John	Not mentioned	Langabu	
26 <sup>th</sup> Nov	Nyaluka Obua and 17 others	Shot by gun	Langabu	7 people wounded, 3 abducted (onelater released)
	Jane Wani Okot	Shot using PKM machine gun	Tibure	- One person (Achu chukuria) wounded - Ten houses torched
	Dominic Tombe Kenyi	Shot using PKM machine gun	Lomega	Food stores burnt
	Charles Wani Anjelo	Shot using PKM machine gun	Aru	-
	Manna Foni and her child	Shot using AK 47 -Child strangled	Ingiga	
	2 LRA rebels	Shot by SPLA in a counter attack	Kuduo	- LRA had burnt a school
1997	Six people (name not known)	Killed in a road ambush		Lorry carry the deceased burnt to ashes
26 <sup>th</sup> Feb	Hiriana Henjino	Strangled to death as public viewed	Mukare	Goats and bee hives looted
22 <sup>nd</sup> Dec.	14 people (names not identified)	Gun shot	Kuduo	- over 1,000 people displace in the same week to Ide 203 km away
	An 18 yrs old girl	Shot by AK	Odemo	4 houses burnt

	(name not specified)	47	village	2 children aged 12 and 14 abducted.
1998	An oldman aged over 60 years	Struggled to death	Tarnaba	60 children abducted/lost
	2 people (names not specified)	Early morning shooting	Kuduo	1 person wounded 2 people abducted
1999	23 people died in one day	Landmine outburst	Tingili	2 people seriously wounded
	15 people	6 am shooting	Tingili	Crops destroyed

#### SOME TESTIMONIES BY THE INTERVIEWEES

- “These people are terrible, they chopped off the lips of a man whom they said has to continue laughing forever... they hammered two nails on both ears of another.” (*John Okello, 39 Years*)
- “This catastrophe has continued to deter development. The LRA can be anywhere anytime.... They move in big numbers mostly at night... our people are not safe because they harm or kill anybody they come across.” (*John Okello* )
- “We need guns and bullets. The SPLM must protect us... unfortunately the SPLM administration seem to have turned a deaf ear to our predicament.” (*Joyce Johnson, 40 Years*)

#### SOME ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS AND EXTRA INFORMATION

- Most of the LRA attacks are done either early in the morning or at night.
- The LRA are very keen to loot food stores during which processes they shot anyone who spots them.
- The number of people (LRA) who often engage in launching an attack range between four hundred and one thousand.
- In most cases, women and girls are the obvious victims of LRA atrocities, perhaps because they can not ran fast enough for their lives.
- No interviewee gave information about incidences of rape and/or sexual abuse by the LRA, although this factor often features in news reports.

- Mass killings by the LRA often occur when they come across a vehicle. It is actually possible that the LRA often ambush vehicles so as to use the same, in the process of which innocent travelers are the obvious victims.
- In the period between 1995 and 1999 the LRA killed using AK 47 automatic guns, landmines and PKM machine gun among others. They also used crude weapons like pangas. The fact that they use sophisticated weapons indicates that the rebel movement either has a major source of finance and/or reliable partners who supply them with the weapons. The same source is most likely the supplier of food and medicine to the LRA Perhaps this is an important starting point of ascertaining the commonly held speculation that the Khartoum government supports the LRA.
- Since 1995, the people of Oluboland have been victims of double-edged sword – the LRA insurgence on one side and the SPLA war on the other. The LRA has caused them more harm, they have over the years been unable to engage in any meaningful endeavors, neither farming, schooling, trading nor building modern houses. Consequently Oluboland actually remains the most stagnant part of Southern Sudan. At least other parts did some little development during the 21-year-old SPLA. war in Southern Sudan, but nothing at all has been done in Oluboland and nothing is going on.

#### THE LRA INSURGENCE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2000 – 2004)

In the Sudan the new millennium was ushered in with much optimism and even enthusiasm. Optimism and enthusiasm for peace and socio-economic transformation in this African country which in fact has been at war with itself for the last 21 years. Part of this optimism, and particularly in the target of this study (Oluboland) actually emanated from:

- The continued insistence by the Uganda government that the LRA was and no longer is an issue. (Something which to date can hardly be taken as imperial).
- The advances in the IGAD facilitated peace negotiations.
- The 'rare' lobby against the LRA by the international community especially with a focus on Northern Uganda.

Yet this optimism never had bore any fruits for the people of Oluboland, four years since the new millennium began. The LRA continues to attack innocent civilians in Oluboland without anybody, any government, and any international lobby group giving this serious issue the attention and concern that is necessary.

Below is a matrix indicating the atrocities committed by the LRA from the year 2000 to 2004.

YEAR	PERSONS KILLED	MANNER OF KILLING	LOCATION	OTHER ATROCITIES
2000	4 adults and 2 children	A daylight car ambush	Ugi	One person abducted
2001	Johnson Pitia	Shot	Kuduo	Beehive and food store looted
2002 (30 <sup>th</sup> of Nov)	4 people killed	6.00 shot open shooting	Muluki	Over 7 houses burnt
	- Laki Lodia - Ajos Solimani - Wani Kulemo	Open shoot out in broad daylight. One hit by stone to death	Muluki	- Households looted - Food stores looted
2003 (May)	Foni and Alberia Ile	(Not specified)	Monyoro	-
	Four sons of Obero by name Tongu Kongo Ladu and Jada	Sot by automatic machine gun early in the morning	Kuduo	Looted households
	Five people killed	Shot at Ugi	Logwi	3 people captured
2004	James Johnson & Ama Achu  6 killed.	Cut into peaces by panga Vehicle ambush	Lokiliri  Kuduo	Looted food stores and beehives abducted is people one injured

#### SOME QUOTATIONS FROM THE INTERVIEWEES

- “The SPLA must assist the people of Lomega we need guns and ammunitions to protect ourselves from the LRA because the authorities have failed to protect us.” (*Lomega Payam administrator Mr. Thomas Lowi*)
- “Our entire village was torched to ashes, our children were abducted and we have never seen them again... we are but victims of unknown circumstances.” (*A chief in Mugale*)
- “In this camp we will die of hunger. Let them who care bring for us food. Our children die everyday because of Malaria.”(*Moga Martin 59 years*)

## SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The LRA does not spare anybody they come across. They kill, abduct or recruit. In most instances the LRA mass killings begin with the burning of houses, after which the LRA shoots at anybody who comes out to witness the burning houses. People are very alert and a majority has moved to IDP camps. Those in the villages have gone to live in strategic mountaintops. The LRA gets part of their food through looting. That the LRA are so many in number clearly indicate that looted food alone is not enough for them. They must be having a definite food source. Also, the LRA has in the recent years not longer mingled with the community members.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ANALYTICAL COMMENTS, SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### **3.1 THE LORDS RESISTANCE ARMY; WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT**

The Olubo commonly refer to the LRA. as “Tong Tong”. “Tong” is the Acholi word for “cut”. The term must have been coined based on the merciless manner in which the LRA. tortures and/or kill their victims, especially by cutting one into pieces using crude weapons like pangas.

In Oluboland, the LRA has been and continues to be considered a worse enemy than the Arabs. Of course the Arabs had over the years been considered an enemy by South Sudanese because of the twenty one-year-old racial, sometimes thought to be religious, war between the Arab/Moslems and the Black Africans/Christians.

Sometimes the SPLA launched an attack on the LRA (1997), but this did not bear much fruit as there was no proper military strategy, especially after the LRA sought refuge (and they have even established a base) in the government controlled side of Juba at a place called Nesitu some fifteen kilometers South of Juba town.

It has been indicated earlier in this report that the LRA is more of a terror squad than it is a liberation movement. With regard to the same, this study established that:

- The use of the word “Lord” for the so-called movement is baseless because there is nothing Godly or say “Lordly” in the LRA agenda. That is, if the LRA has any agenda at all.
- The use of the term Lord for the movement is most likely because it is some kind of a cult and it is possible that human blood and sacrifice is part and parcel of the philosophical agenda of the cult. This philosophical agenda is yet to be known.
- The LRA is supported by a powerful partner which has resources, especially food, sophisticated weapons and medicine. These enable the group to roam in the hardship area of Oluboland where people nowadays only survive by eating wild

fruits and honey and where elementary disease like malaria and typhoid easily claim lives.

- The religious factor or say the cultic factor must be a major inspiration of the terror movement. This counts for their merciless but baseless atrocities.

Certainly something very tangible has to be done to save Oluboland from the invasion of this strange terrorist movement. This is the responsibility of all those who value human life and worth. It is the responsibility of the governments of Sudan, Uganda, Other Eastern Africa countries, the SPLA, IGAD, AU, UN, etc.

It is as well the responsibility of humanitarian NGOs involved in relief donation, policy influence, policy formulation and rapid response. It is also the responsibility of all of us. All said and done, Oluboland is actually one of the most marginalized parts of Southern Sudan and the reason is obviously the LRA threat. Something must be done, and done now.

### **3.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS**

- A total of one hundred and forty five people who are known in the community have been killed by the LRA since 1995. Several others who are not known were also killed.
- Ten were killed in the first six months from the time the LRA was first noticed in Oluboland.
- Forty-two were killed between February 1996 and the end of 1999.
- Twenty-seven were killed between the year 2000 and 2004.
- The entire Oluboland is threatened by the LRA, which can attack any place any time. The LRA is scattered all over Oluboland, but they often report back to their base in Nesitu some 15 kilometers south of Juba town.
- The residents of Oluboland live in constant fear of being attacked by the LRA. Consequently over twenty thousand people which is about half the total population of the Olubo, have moved since 1995 to seek refuge elsewhere. Those displaced have moved to Nimule, Lomega, Aru and Tingili IDP camps.
- It is not certain whether or not the LRA commits sexual assault.
- The LRA is more of a “satanic” cult than it is a liberation movement. Most people think that it is the latter. It can more adequately be described as a terrorist squad whose objective is simply to be reported to have caused havoc, but the objective of the LRA is indeed not clear.



- A big number of members of the LRA roam about in Oluboland and eventually report to their base in Nesitu.
- The entire Oluboland is actually threatened by the LRA and a culture of fear is evident. On this note people retire to their houses early and are always on high alert.
- Due to the threat of the LRA many people from Oluboland have moved to Nimule, Northern Uganda and Juba
- Many others have moved to congested IDP camps, which include Lomega, Tingili and Aru. These camps do not receive relief items from humanitarian NGOs because they are located in areas considered “No Go Zones” by Operation Lifeline Sudan to which many humanitarian NGOs belong.

Apart from killing innocent villagers, the LRA also:

- Burns houses
- Loots food and takes away animals
- Loots and/or destroys beehives
- Abducts children, women and youth.
- Commits sadistic torture like chopping off someone’s lips.
- Ambushes vehicles.

The assessment further established that:

- The weapons used by the LRA range from simple pangas to sophisticated and/or automatic weapons.
- The LRA were first noticed in Kubi (New Gulu), then they moved to Odemo and then the nearby villages. They settled in Kuduo for a few days before they eventually established their base in Nesitu, most probably with the assistance of the Khartoum government.
- The LRA attacks are both planned (as in the case of car ambushers) and haphazard (for example when they burn houses).
- The LRA must have initially intended to establish a base somewhere near the Uganda Sudan border. In this pursuit they caused havoc, probably with the objective of scaring the villagers off so as to occupy their then settlement.
- At least every village, every family and everybody in Oluboland has in one way or another been affected by the LRA insurgence. Some have lost relatives, some have been separated from their families, some lost property and many do not have a home.

### 3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

- A more elaborate study wherein people living on the mountain tops, those in the government controlled side of Juba County, SPLM leaders and Khartoum government officials will be interviewed should be conducted soon, so as to establish some speculative factors of this study, especially now that the IGAD facilitated peace process has been signed. Besides, going to the government controlled zones is not very difficult.
- Massive lobbying for the governments of Sudan and Uganda to stamp out the LRA from Southern Sudan should be done through electronic and print media as well as other possible ways.
- A dissemination workshop comprising the SPLM officials, the Khartoum government, the Uganda government as well as Olubo chiefs and Acholi (From Uganda) community leaders should be convened to deliberate on the findings of this assessment.
- The international community should be lobbied to impart pressure on the Sudan and Uganda government to quickly stamp out the LRA from Southern Sudan.
- The villagers in Lomega should be armed so that they can protect themselves from the frequent attacks by the LRA (suggestion by affected residents).
- A good number of soldiers should be deployed in Lomega and the entire Oluboland to protect the community from the LRA
- The SPLM administration should discuss the security problem in Oluboland as a matter of priority.
- A re-orientation and confidence building project for victims of LRA insurgence should be conducted
- A tracing programme for those abducted by the LRA should be put in place
- Humanitarian NGOs should be impressed upon to provided relief, food and necessary items to those in the IDP camps of Lomega, Tingili and Aru.