



# THE CATCH-22 OF SECURITY AND CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT IN JONGLEI STATE



# Acknowledgements

This report was written with data management support from Fernando Salcedo, Independent Researcher, and Francesca De Marco, former intern at the South Sudan Action Network on South Sudan (SSANSA) from the University of York.

Our thanks go to the vibrant team of disarmament monitors, who collected the field data during the two rounds of surveys. They include Amany Joseph, Achol Gai Aguer, Bul Kun Jok Majuch, David Mach, Jacob Achiek, James Jok Chol, Kok Chagor, Orem Chan Othon, Phillip Bakhit, Peter Kayier, Peter Garang and Simon Reat Manyot. We also wish to extend our deepest appreciation to members of communities who shared their views and ideas in the surveys, which formed the basis for this report.

The authors of this report would also like to thank Dr. Rens C. Willems for helpful comments on earlier draft of this report.

SSANSA is grateful for financial support from IKV Pax Christi and Cordaid for this report and the content-based and organizational support from IKV Pax Christi. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the entire SSANSA network. This report can be downloaded from [www.ssansa.org](http://www.ssansa.org) and [www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/publications](http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/publications).

SSANSA is a nation-wide network of civil society organizations from across the 10 states of South Sudan working to reduce and prevent gun violence in South Sudan. The network was formed to facilitate civil society actions to make communities safer from gun violence by preventing and reducing the illicit proliferation and misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South Sudan. ([www.ssansa.org](http://www.ssansa.org) - Atlabara C, 11th Street, West - Tambura Rd | Juba, South Sudan)

IKV Pax Christi is a Dutch civil society organization that works with its partners for peace, reconciliation and justice worldwide. “We support local peace efforts in conflict areas. We build bridges, nurture mutual understanding and improve disrupted relations between groups. Our aim is to prevent conflict and to build a peaceful, democratic and just society” ([www.ikvpaxchristi.nl](http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl) - Godebaldkwartier 74, 3511 DZ, Utrecht, The Netherlands)

Cover Photo: Lou Nuer youths returning home after a mission they liked to refer to as ‘revenge attack’ on Murle tribesmen of Pibor County in July 2013.

Photo credits © Camille Lepage / Hans Lucas

# Index

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>List of figures and tables</b>	<b>5</b>
Figures	5
Tables	5
<b>Executive summary</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>10</b>
The security context prior to the launch of the March 2012 Disarmament	11
Previous civilian disarmament exercises in Jonglei State	12
Disarmament Exercise During 2012	14
<b>Findings</b>	<b>16</b>
Numbers and Types of Weapons Recovered	16
Disarmament Evaluation	17
Overview of Findings – Pre Disarmament Evaluation	17
Level of Awareness of the Civilian Disarmament	18
Preparation of the communities for the disarmament exercise	20
Voluntary surrender	21
Community perceptions about conducting the Disarmament Campaign at the time	22
Community Expectations Regarding the Disarmament Campaign	22
Misconducts and Violations	24
Evaluation of the disarmament exercise	27
Awareness of disarmament in neighbouring county	30
Awareness of dispute resolution mechanisms available	30
Security Perceptions	31
Measures to address insecurity after disarmament	35
Role of the United Nation Mission in South Sudan	38
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Annex 1 – Buffer zones suggested by the local community representatives of Akobo County</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Annex 2 - Methodology</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Annex 3 - County Profiles</b>	<b>48</b>

# LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

## Figures

Figure 1.	Jonglei State; Victims of gun violence from 2009 - May 2012	14
Figure 2.	Level of Awareness among communities in Seven Counties of Jonglei State	18
Figure 3.	Percentage of People informed About Disarmament by Government Officials or Chiefs	19
Figure 4.	Level of Preparedness for the Disarmament Process	20
Figure 5.	Community Feelings towards Disarmament 2012- 2013	22
Figure 6.	What do you think the disarmament will bring to your community?	23
Figure 7.	How would you evaluate the disarmament process?	27
Figure 8.	Use of Force during the Disarmament Process	28
Figure 9.	Authorities to which Harassment against Civilians with no Guns were reported	29
Figure 10.	Security perceptions post major disarmament phase	31
Figure 11.	Persisting insecurity threats in the Post major Disarmament phase by county	32
Figure 12.	Security Priorities per County	33
Figure 13.	Community recommendations to maintain peace in Jonglei State after disarmament	35
Figure 14.	How can security be improved in your Payam?	36
Figure 15.	Distribution of respondents who demanded the return of their weapons for selfprotection by social groups	37
Figure 16.	Community understanding of whether the disarmament is concluded or not.	38
Figure 17.	Awareness of Presence of Authorities Twic East	50
Figure 18.	Authorities known to Communities – Akobo County	53
Figure 19.	Use of Force Disarmament Process – Ayod	55
Figure 20.	Presence of Authorities in Ayod County	55
Figure 21.	Use of force during the disarmament process – Duk County	59
Figure 22.	Security needs for the community – Duk County	59
Figure 23.	Security Concerns in Bor South	62
Figure 24.	Types of Force used during disarmament in Bor South	63
Figure 25.	How can security be improved in your county – Bor South	64

## Tables

Table 1.	Examples of incidents that occurred during the disarmament campaign	26
Table 2.	Respondents First Disarmament Survey (March - April 2012)	46
Table 3.	Respondents Second Evaluation Exercise	47

# Executive summary

This report presents the findings of a disarmament monitoring scheme that was conducted by the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) in Jonglei State, from the beginning of the campaign in March 2012 to July 2013. The purpose of the monitoring was to document the processes leading to the surrender of weapons by civilians; the nature of arms collection; ascertain the perceptions of communities on security implications of the disarmament exercise – and use these insights to provide recommendations for a policy move towards conducting ‘pro-people’ civilian disarmament campaign in the state and perhaps elsewhere in South Sudan. This report therefore, provides a descriptive review of the processes that surrounded the state-wide campaign and presents the perceptions of the target communities on the implications of the disarmament with emphasis on its security implications. It provides some basis for connecting the current campaign with past disarmament exercises in the state and the prevailing community security needs.

This report is divided into sections presenting the findings and analysis of the surveys conducted between March and April 2012 and between January and February 2013.

The first survey was conducted during the beginning of the disarmament campaign to establish the perceptions of the communities on the implementation of the disarmament as well as expectations of security implications. The second survey was intended to assess the process of disarmament through the lens of the communities as the campaign had entered its twelfth month. Besides the surveys, interviews were conducted with some stakeholders involved in the campaign. In addition to the general overview of findings, dedicated county profiles from the second survey are annexed to give a more precise overview of each county's characteristics.

The civilian disarmament campaign was launched in March 2012. It ran rapidly for 5 months until August. When major arms removal processes were suddenly halted in August 2012, the campaign had netted a reported 12,321 firearms. By July 2013, through small scale recoveries and ad hoc search and seizure operations, 12,407 arms were reported to have been recovered. While this number signifies a level of success in terms of the number of arms recovered, the security impact on communities varies across the counties surveyed.

When asked to evaluate the level of security since the beginning of the disarmament campaign, minority (3.33%) of all respondents stated that security has significantly improved – and all these respondents are from Bor County. This is not surprising because the state capital has been relatively secure even during the worst inter-communal clashes in the recent past. While majority of the respondents in all the counties surveyed stated that security improved but only a little or remained the same, in Twic East County, majority of respondents evaluated their security to have become worse since the campaign began.

Furthermore, given the relatively high levels of violence before the disarmament campaign, “stayed the same or only improved a little” could also mean there are still considerably high levels of insecurity. While it might be unrealistic to expect a significant improvement in security within a short time after the arms removal, perhaps it is important to recognize that improving security of citizens is the most fundamental argument by proponents of the campaign. It is also the major incentive promised by the government during the beginning of the campaign. Furthermore, establishment of monopoly over the use of violence is to principally guarantee the security of citizens. Therefore, whether the disarmament campaign has improved or will improve security of citizens rather than increase insecurity of communities are the two dimensions that set the lens for this report in assessing the Jonglei campaign.

Surveys conducted showed that the disarmament campaign was by large coercive. Additionally, Similar to past disarmament exercises in Jonglei State; arms removal has not been backed by effective mecha-



nisms to protect disarmed communities. The danger here is that, the campaign had limited impact in ending the cycle-of inter-communal violence that prompted carrying out of the civilian disarmament. Forceful civilian disarmaments in Jonglei have been chiefly criticized due to its inability to remove the motivations for arms while seizing arms from gun owners.

With very limited government capacity to soak arms supply sources including the recent supplies that came with re-emergence of the insurgency of David Yau Yau, the risks and actual rearmaments among civilian populations are not a surprise in Jonglei State.

This report therefore, suggests that Civilian disarmament in South Sudan's Jonglei State requires a careful balance between arms collection and initiatives that seek to reduce demand for arms among communities. This balance is critical because although the GRSS has embarked on several disarmament exercises in the state since the signing of the CPA in 2005, and recovered thousands of weapons, arms proliferation and misuse remains constant.

The causes of the various forms of gun violence include varied issues such as, the chains of conflicts over resources, poor infrastructures, limited livelihoods and opportunities for youth. However, the major issues sustaining demands for arms relate to the security deficit in most parts of the state and the absence of legitimate, trusted and effective structures for redress of grievances and the peaceful and fair settlement of local disputes.

Besides, there might be several other reasons for civilians to acquire arms, but vulnerability to attacks after disarmament is a key argument communities have made as reason for rearmament. Thus, in the aftermath of arms collection, providing security to the disarmed communities is essential to consolidate benefits of the arms collection exercises. Provision of a reasonable level of protection is also necessary to irrationalize the presumably genuine pretext individuals and communities make that, – they acquire and keep firearms for self protection, where the state has failed to do so.

At the writing of this report, inter-communal attacks between the Lou Nuer and the Murle tribesmen continued with armed youth launching series of cattle raids on each other. Attacks on communities by fighters loyal to rebel leader David Yau Yau further continues to punctuate the security scene.

While provision of security is one of the promises that the government made besides development – as incentives for communities to disarm – this promise is yet to translate into actions. The concern here is that, if the government has taken this responsibility to protect without the required and matching ability to do so, communities are likely to willingly take back the role to protect themselves and their communities by either acquiring new weapons or unveiling the weapons they withheld during the disarmament campaign.

Given the currently limited capacity of the government to provide adequate security – not only in Jonglei but all over South Sudan – honest balance between security needs of communities (jointly articulated with communities) and the existing capacity of the government to meet these needs is necessary. This should assist in establishing protection priorities and searching for complementary efforts, such as informal security and justice mechanisms that communities can offer to complement the work of the security agencies. While these require candid dialogue with communities based on mutual trust, the current relationship between security forces and communities is still characterized by lack of trust and limited dialogues.

Moreover, it is also important to recognize that disarmament exercises in Jonglei State often involves the use of excessive force, torture, killings, and rape. This jeopardizes the very security of citizens that the disarmament initiatives seek to enhance. In most cases, the perpetrators of unlawful violence against civilians during disarmament campaigns have walked free with impunity. This has contributed to cultivating the culture of lawlessness by influencing civilians to also take the law into their hands, thereby, constituting a big challenge to the rule of law. It further leads to communities distrusting the state security forces and by extension the government, undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

A complicating factor for the disarmament campaign in Jonglei and the protection of civilians are the atrocities being committed by fighters loyal to rebel leader David Yau Yau. Repeated failure to protect civilians from the rebel forces has the potential to induce shocking rearmament among communities. (This report does not contain substantial analysis of the effects concerning David Yau Yau even though it relates recent events to the disarmament campaign).

The July 2013 attacks on Murle settlements by an estimated 6000 armed Lou Nuer youth highlights either recent, rapid and massive rearmaments or that despite being 'comprehensive', the exercise variably left huge volumes of arms caches in some parts of the state. This risks enhancing vulnerability of some communities while on the other hand strengthening the capability of others to launch attacks on their neighbors. Currently, the peace process in Jonglei stands suspended mainly due to the fighting between the government and forces loyal to David Yau Yau. This leaves a host of unresolved disputes hanging which will not patiently wait for the next process. In the absence of a transitional peace and justice mechanism, such rearmament ushers in new prospects for revenge and counter attacks, further risking worsening the security and conflict situation in the state. This presents a major question for the government and other stakeholders involved in the disarmament, – the question of how to reduce the volume of arms among communities of the state without hastily exposing them to more danger, including risks of attacks from neighboring communities, individuals or other armed groups.

While there is no magic bullet for realizing this, communities are well placed and can best articulate their security concerns including tailoring of and leading the implementation of an arms collection strategy. Examples provided by communities during surveys included, the establishment of buffer zones at locations identified by communities to avert cattle raids between neighboring communities; increasing the general presence of security forces among communities; ensuring that civilian disarmament in itself uniformly covers the whole state; tightening the security for arms held by the regular forces to end the constant spillage to communities; and trace and return the recently raided cattle to rightful communities and individuals.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that attempts to disarm communities in Jonglei are a learning experience, and lessons learned in each attempt need to be taken into consideration for subsequent approaches or phases.

An assessment of civilian disarmament campaigns in Jonglei indicates that a pro-people approach, planned and implemented with and by the communities can achieve more success at a lower cost. Success that is not only defined in terms of the number of weapons recovered but in its ability for achieving and sustaining community security. This suggests that before the disarmament process proceeds the government should get back to consultations with the communities to jointly articulate and develop approaches to address their critical and disarmament specific security concerns. Additionally, protection of civilians needs to go hand in hand with strengthening justice and law enforcement as part of peaceful dispute resolution alternatives for resolving community and inter-communal disputes.



### The main recommendations based on the monitoring are:

- The Government of the republic of South Sudan (GRSS) should consider disarmament as a process that falls within the broader process of peace building and state building;
- The GRSS should come to terms with the fact that forceful disarmament is no longer a viable option as it achieves weapons recovery without addressing the reasons that motivates civilians to acquire and misuse arms;
- Increasing effective and decentralized presence of security forces is necessary to improve physical protection of vulnerable communities;
- A reform of the disarmament campaign is necessary to ensure that disarmament enhances rather than jeopardize the security of citizens;
- The new approach should be multi-layered with simultaneous emphasis on uniform voluntary surrender of arms and providing protection;
- It is important to put adequate efforts in trust and confidence building between and among communities and security forces;
- Strict accountability measures are necessary to address misconducts by the security forces in their interactions with the communities;
- Arms removal needs to be backed by tough initiatives to control the flow of arms into the communities;
- The GRSS should ensure that recovered weapons are well secured as part of curbing supply back to communities;
- It is important to recognize the connection of the persisting cattle raids and rebel activity to possible renewal of motivation among communities to rearm;
- The public needs to be made more aware about all ongoing justice processes, including the five disarmament operation court marshals established in Jonglei state;
- Disarmament cannot be seen as separated from the insurgency of David Yau Yau since their activities makes it easy for the youth to acquire arms.

# INTRODUCTION

In March 2012, the president of Government of the republic of South Sudan (GRSS) launched a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei,<sup>1</sup> which is the largest state out of the 10 states in South Sudan. Jonglei State currently accounts for the highest total rate of arms misuse among civilian populations from 2005 – July 2013. This campaign aimed to remove civilian held firearms from the communities. It was the first ever state-wide civilian disarmament campaign since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.<sup>2</sup> The campaign was name-coded “Operation Restore Peace”. It was launched against the backdrop of devastating inter-ethnic and tribal conflicts – manifesting mainly in massive cattle raids with a mix of dreadful violence – that overwhelmed the state to unprecedented scales in late 2011 and early 2012.<sup>3</sup>

Although the idea of arms removal from the hands of civilians was mainly given positive reception by majority of the populations, there was a widespread reservation among communities and the civil society organizations after this disarmament program was announced. These reservations are shaped by four main concerns.

The first concern revolved around the uncertainty of whether the process would be peaceful, because previous disarmament exercises in the state were coercive and saw pervasive violence and loss of lives;

Secondly, communities were concerned about whether the disarmament exercise would be implemented simultaneously and comprehensively, covering the entire state. This fear was premised on past experiences where disarmament was sporadic and not uniform, often exposing disarmed communities to attacks by their neighbors – including from neighboring states, some of which are traditional enemies. This further relates to possible challenges foreseen with the mobility capacity of the security forces, the terrain and large size of the state, and actual numbers of the forces involved.

The third concern revolved around whether arms owners across the entire state would be willing to disarm. This concern was mainly based on the belief that some individuals and armed youth groups, would not accept to disarm by any voluntary means. This could pose serious security threats to the remainder factions of the community who accept to disarm and effectively would by then have disarmed.

Finally, civil society had reservations regarding whether the conditions at the time were favourable for conducting a civilian disarmament campaign, given that there was a very recent cycle of violence that led to the loss of 2,000 to 4,000 lives, and to the displacement of thousands in the run up to the launch of the exercise. This reservation primarily revolved around the notion that, given that the situation was still precarious at the time, communities would consider arms a very current and relevant tool for protection. On the other hand, proponents of disarmament at the time justified the campaign as the principal means of ending the dreadful cycle of violence. Their main argument was that the disarmament campaign reduces the capacity of civilians to continue the cycle of violence, which was the main security concern at the time. However, still a very current and strong demand for arms would significantly diminish the chances of a voluntary disarmament – as the approach for arms collection that was announced by the government – explaining the fear of yet another forceful disarmament in Jonglei State.

This report presents the findings of a disarmament monitoring campaign that was conducted by the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) in Jonglei State, from the beginning of the campaign in March 2012 to March 2013.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the monitoring was to document the processes leading to the surrender of weapons by civilians; the nature of arms collection; ascertain the percep-

1 See Sudan tribune; Kiir opens disarmament in Jonglei State; available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/President-Kiir-opens-disarmament,41886>; [Accessed Feb 7, 2013]

2 The CPA moved decades of hostilities between the North and the South of Sudan from a military to a political sphere.

3 Sudan tribune, Dinka Bor attack on Murle Community leaves dozens dead, Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41548>, [Accessed on Feb 7, 2013]

4 This project was funded by IKV Pax Christi from the Netherlands.

tions of communities on security implications of the disarmament exercise – and to use these insights to provide recommendations for a policy move towards conducting a ‘pro-people’ civilian disarmament campaign in the state and elsewhere in South Sudan.

This report therefore, provides a descriptive review of the processes that surrounded the state-wide campaign and presents the perceptions of the target communities on the implications of the disarmament with emphasis on its security implications. It provides some basis for connecting the current process with past disarmament exercises in the state and the prevailing community security needs.

Quotes that were noted down during the monitoring exercise are used throughout the report to convey directly people’s perspectives on security and disarmament. This monitoring report also includes recommendations and highlights of contextual best practices emerging from the lessons that can be learned from comparing the current disarmament campaign with previous campaigns.

This report is divided into sections presenting the findings and analysis of the surveys conducted between March and April 2012 and between January and February 2013. The first survey was conducted during the beginning of the disarmament campaign to establish the perceptions of the communities on the implementation of the disarmament as well as expectations of security implications. The second survey was intended to assess the process of disarmament through the lens of the communities as the campaign had entered its twelfth month. It is important to note here that the data presented contains the views and perceptions of the communities interviewed in Jonglei and at points will diverge or will not appear coherent. The views presented were taken at face value and provide insights for policy makers into the diversity of views amongst the population of Jonglei. (this report does not contain substantial analysis of the effects concerning David Yau Yau though it relates recent events to the disarmament campaign).

## **The security context prior to the launch of the March 2012 Disarmament**

The security context in Jonglei State prior to the launch of the disarmament campaign was predominantly characterized by a cycle of inter-communal violence, often resulting into dreadful death tolls, massive displacements, and the loss of several hundreds and, sometimes thousands heads of cattle.

In December 2011, about 6,000 armed youth from the Lou Nuer tribe launched a series of systematic attacks, and exerted coercive control over the Murle<sup>5</sup> settlements of Pibor and Likwangole; killing, burning down homes and looting for nearly 12 days. This offensive resulted in the death of an estimated 1,000 members of the Murle tribe, including many women and children, and the loss of an estimated 50,000 heads of cattle. The attack was considered a response to earlier cattle raids by members of the Murle tribesmen in Akobo, Uror, Duk, Nyirol and Twic East counties that claimed the lives of up to 1,000 Lou Nuer and the loss of over 100,000 heads of cattle.<sup>6</sup> In response to the Lou Nuer attack, smaller groups of armed Murle youth launched a series of retaliatory attacks on Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka – beginning December 2011 until February 2012 – leaving several hundred people dead and hundreds more heads of cattle raided.<sup>7</sup>

Youth that are heavily armed often easily mobilized themselves for revenge attacks while the government and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), both having the responsibility to protect civilians, did little to stop or even mitigate these cycles of violence.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, fighting between the GRSS and

5 The Murle is an ethnic group that lives in the Pibor County of Jonglei state. They are predominately pastoralists. Throughout the years the Murle have been involved in many raids and counter raids with the Lou Nuer and other groups. These raids have mostly focused on cattle-rustling and child abduction.

6 Rands, Richard and LeRiche Matthew, (2012), Security Response in Jonglei State in the aftermath of inter-ethnic violence, Saferworld.

7 UNMISS 2012; Incidents of Inter-communal violence in Jonglei State Report [pdf]; Available at, <<http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=DBQoOQvnMAA%3D&tabid=4969&language=en-US>> [Accessed January 15,2013]

8 Gettleman, Jeffrey (2012), Born in Unity, South Sudan Is Torn Again, The New York Times, January 12.

militia groups continued during 2012 in Jonglei State – and persisted throughout the time of writing this report. The majority of the military operations focused against fighters loyal to David Yau Yau.<sup>9</sup> While there is no excuse for civilians to engage in indiscriminate and massive killing of members of their neighboring communities and for looting of their property – certain conditions at the time made the environment conducive to the cycles of violence. These conditions include the weak law enforcement and justice systems – that have not been able to pursue and effectively hold perpetrators of violence accountable; the inadequate state protection of citizens; limited alternatives for conflict resolution, and the very high proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Jonglei state. The state of affairs at the time even earned Jonglei state the status of a disaster state.<sup>10</sup>

## **Previous civilian disarmament exercises in Jonglei State**

In Jonglei State, previous disarmament exercises were sporadic, and did not cover all the counties simultaneously. Past disarmament exercises mainly took two forms. One is community driven voluntary disarmament (with UN support).<sup>11</sup> The second one is forceful. Forced disarmament in the past was conducted in the areas Walgak, Ayod, Pieri, Yuai, Tiam, Tangyang, Waat, Payai, Pathai, Pulchuol, Mutot, Karam, Lanken and Nyirol; while community led, peaceful and voluntary disarmament took place only in Akobo County.<sup>12</sup> There were also widespread ad hoc search and seizure operations in the past, especially around key events like the elections and referendum votes.

The sporadic nature of past disarmament exercises significantly undermined the ability to improve sustainable security among communities. In most cases, these exercises left disarmed communities vulnerable to attacks from neighboring communities who were not equally disarmed. This had a negative impact on security of the disarmed communities and created unwillingness to completely disarm in following disarmament campaigns. For instance, the disarmament exercise of 2006 was mainly considered a failure, particularly because it ended before the Murle settlements were disarmed. This left the Lou Nuer communities vulnerable to attacks from the Murle communities. Not long after the disarmament ended, the Lou Nuer communities suffered severely through several attacks at the hands of the Murle tribesmen.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, the Lou Nuer communities rearmed heavily in the face of what appeared to them as an explicit betrayal by the SPLA – who collected their arms, but did not protect them in the aftermath of the disarmament exercise.

A trend that has developed in civilian disarmament since the signing of the CPA is that, in the aftermaths of arms collection exercises, communities have been able to readily engage in violent conflicts with guns.<sup>14</sup> This trend still persists and holds across the entire state, indicating the thriving - but often invisible - armament business after conclusion of arms collection cycles. However, it should also be taken into account that past arms collection exercises could have recovered only some of the weapons, meaning communities might be engaging in violence using the guns that did not make it to the recovered pool of arms during disarmament cycles. While it might be unrealistic to expect all illegal civilian held arms in the state to be recovered in a single disarmament campaign, such a trend indicates that past civilian disarmament campaigns did not give adequate attention to the possibilities of substantial amounts of weapons remaining behind and/or rearmament after arms collection exercises. This further raises the necessity to put reduction of group and individual motivations and supply for arms at the heart of planning of civilian disarmament initiatives. Moreover, there were very minimum and in some cases no

9 Sudan Tribune, 2012; David Yau Yau's Background; Available at < <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot1247> > , [Accessed Jan 15, 2013]

10 Sudan Tribune 2012, South Sudan declares Jonglei, a disaster area; Available at < <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-declares-Jonglei-state,41186> > [Accessed Jan 15, 2013]

11 This community-driven disarmament initiative that was a collaborative effort of the Civil Administration of Akobo County, the Government of South Sudan, the SPLA, South Sudan Police, Traditional Authorities, Civilian Arms Registrars, Communities, South Sudan DDR Commission, UNDP, UNDDR, UNMIS Military Observers, UN Police, UNMIS Force Protection and Local Civil Society organizations.

12 Small Arms Survey Sudan Issue Brief, 2007. Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State. Small Arms Survey.

13 Young, John. Jonglei 2010: Another round of disarmament, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Situation Report, 2010.

14 Garfield, Richard. Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei, Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 11, 2007.

consultations with communities during past disarmament campaigns. This is a big challenge that undoubtedly undermined the opportunities for the government to sufficiently understand the motivations of communities to possess and misuse arms. This should be an important lesson for the GRSS to take forward as it will seek to continue with civilian disarmament in the state, under “Operation Restore Peace” or any other subsequent campaigns.

Moreover, the experiences of past civilian disarmament initiatives in Jonglei state have generated relevant examples and lessons learned. For instance, the Akobo civilian disarmament campaign of 2006 was both voluntary and peaceful, besides netting substantial amount of firearms. Key to the success was that it was “disarmament – of –civilians – led by civilians and that it involved a wide range of stakeholders including civilian arms registrars.”<sup>15</sup> However, besides being mainly successful, the Akobo campaign had some serious limitations in terms of the post arms collection interventions. This was mainly because, even though security was promised by the government, this did not materialize in practice. Furthermore, leaving their neighboring communities – particularly the Murle tribesmen – armed, consequently exposed the communities of Akobo County to myriad attacks from their neighbors not very long after the process was concluded.

By and large, Jonglei State has considerable experience to learn from itself when it comes to civilian disarmament. One major fact to take into account is that, most of the approaches to civilian disarmament have been forceful with appalling bloodshed and human rights violations. It is clear that although the GRSS has embarked on several disarmament exercises in the state since the signing of the CPA in 2005, arms proliferation and misuse remains constant.

Important lessons are that, forceful disarmament campaigns are not only costly in terms of the lives lost and human suffering involved, but cannot achieve sustainable reduction in the volume of arms and security among populations. This is also mainly because, the approach essentially does not take into account the motivations of communities to acquire and misuse arms. Given the currently weak control on flow of arms from various sources including from government stockpiles, rebel groups, traffickers, communities can always rearm. This demonstrates the necessity for the GRSS to depart from forceful disarmament as a first resort in removal of illegally held arms from civilian domain.

Additionally, In Jonglei state, most of the disarmament exercises in the state have been launched against the backdrops of recent violence involving the use of arms or tensions which were likely to creep to violence. Although there has been some pacific dispute resolution and reconciliation initiatives in the State in attempts to resolve conflicts where arms misuse have also often manifested, civilian disarmament has not been incorporated into the programming of such peace processes. Arms collection regularly fell out of the scope of broader peace dialogues and sequence of action plans that surrounded peace processes in the state.

With ‘peaceful and voluntary’ as the emphasis, in comparison to other approaches in Jonglei State, The Akobo campaign sets a better standard of civilian disarmament that also provides plenty of opportunities for laying the foundations for peace and sustainable security. “Operation Restore Peace” could have adopted a similar approach, although definitely with improvements to address the post arms collection security needs.


15 United National Mission in Sudan, 2006. The UN hails the successful Completion of Community-Driven.[Press Release], 22 August 2006. Available at <<http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2006Docs/PR36.pdf>> [Accessed 19 July, 2013]

# Disarmament Exercise During 2012

In March 2012, President Salva Kiir launched the first ever state-wide civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei State since the signing of the CPA. This campaign was scheduled as a response to the disastrous cycle of inter-communal violence that plunged the state during December 2011, and throughout early 2012.<sup>16</sup> Despite the various worries among Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), UNMISS and communities, that disarmament would turn violent, the government strongly defended the campaign when the Minister of Defence Gen. John Kong Nyuon in the launch event said; According to figures released by the state government, the number of people who were killed during gun

*“Those who are saying disarmament will be bloody are the same people who blame us [government] for not providing security. They contradict themselves by saying that the disarmament will be bloody. That is nonsense. We are not going to kill civilians. We want peace and there is no way [to] restore peace unless we take guns”<sup>17</sup>*

violence in Jonglei between January 2012 and May 2012 alone was 3,651 (Fig 1).<sup>18</sup> This is more than the number of people who were killed in the whole year of 2011 which was 3,112, and 16 times higher than the figure for the whole year of 2010 (220 , Fig 1).



Dubbed ‘Operation Restore Peace in Jonglei’, the head of the South Sudan army information department stated that “the process will be voluntary but, those who will try to resist or challenge the authority will be met with strong arm of the law”. This was rather surprising for a supposedly voluntary campaign where at the beginning of the campaign more communication would be expected on the justification and incentives for the campaign.

<sup>16</sup> This led to the death of estimated over 2000 people and the displacement of thousands as presented by Rands, Richard and LeRiche (2012). Security Response in Jonglei State in the aftermath of inter-ethnic violence. Saferworld.  
<sup>17</sup> Sudan Tribune, 2012. Kiir opens disarmament in Jonglei State; available at <<http://www.sudantribune.com/President-Kiir-opens-disarmament,41886>> [Accessed Feb 7, 2013]  
<sup>18</sup> This is notably more than Rands and LeRiche mention.



The operation was composed of 15000 forces, of which 12000 were from the South Sudan Army (also known as the SPLA) and the remaining (20%) 3,000 from the South Sudan police service. This operation was headed by Lt. Gen. Kuol Deng Kuol deputised by Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet.<sup>19</sup>

Most activities of the disarmament campaign ran from March 2012 until early August 2012 when it was suddenly halted. On August 21, SPLA forces that were moving to Nanam area of Pibor County were ambushed by forces of Yau Yau. The ambush left over 100 SPLA soldiers dead.<sup>20</sup> This incident also marked the emergence of the latest in a series of major insurgencies led by David Yau Yau against the GRSS. After the attack, command of the SPLA halted major disarmament operations and shifted focus of the disarmament forces to countering the insurgency that emerged.<sup>21</sup>

19 Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet Rejoined the SPLA after having formed a rebel group that fought the government in Juba. For an overview of the group see Sudan Tribune (2011) August 4, Peter Gadet declares ceasefire as South Sudan rebels say he has defected, Available at; <<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article39733>> [Accessed March 2013]

20 For background to the rebellion See: Small Arms Survey's HSBA Brief: David Yau Yau's Rebellion, June 2013, Available at; <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Yau-Yau.pdf>> [Accessed June 2013]

21 Interview with SPLA spokesperson, June 29 2013

# FINDINGS

The findings of the monitoring account for the two different survey evaluations conducted between 2012 and 2013. The instruments used in both evaluations differ from one another. Pre disarmament instruments targeted perspectives of local communities disregarding if they were members of community organization, or had well known status as community leaders.<sup>22</sup> The second evaluation aimed to gather the impressions of community leaders, as they were highly involved in the process of disarmament, and they are seen as key actors in protection of their communities.<sup>23</sup>

## Numbers and Types of Weapons Recovered<sup>24</sup>

After president Kiir launched the disarmament campaign at the Jonglei state capital Bor on March 12, 2012, the next day, 15,000 forces that assembled at the state capital were deployed across the 11 counties of the state to begin the campaign. Despite several references to simultaneous disarmament, it was practically impossible to begin the operation on the same day across the entire state. This was mainly attributed to the poor roads, and limited mobility assets. However, during the first week, the exercise recovered 9000 weapons from all over the state.

With a mix of old and new but mostly old firearms, the types of weapons recovered ranged from small arms like Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifles, pistols, Simonov SKS semi-automatic rifles, hand grenades to light weapons including PKM light machine guns, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) launchers and mortars. However, the most common type was the notorious Ak 47.

The figure given above included firearms collected from the arsenal of the South Sudan Police Services (SSPS) headquarters in Jonglei state.<sup>25</sup> However, the weapons belonging to the police were later returned to police storage facilities.

By August 2012, the number of weapons recovered from civilians was 12,321 – with 9 boxes of ammunition. Of these firearms, 702 were collected from Twic East County, 1,800 from Pibor County, 4,290 from Bor County, with 3,418 from Bor town only.<sup>26</sup> The 9 boxes of ammunition were recovered from Bor in a search and seize operation. As far as our team could establish, ammunition was recovered from none of the other counties. Out of the total 12,321 weapons recovered, 2000 firearms were issued to the Jonglei State department of the South Sudan Police Services. The 10,321 were reported to have been transported to the Army headquarters in Juba for storage.<sup>27</sup>

Due to lack of reliable data on state-specific arms flows both in the pre and post CPA era, it is difficult to estimate the number of weapons circulating throughout Jonglei state prior to the launch of the campaign. Therefore, measuring progress or success in terms of the number of arms collected is not easy. An important indicator for the GRSS to measure impact of the disarmament campaign is the manifestation of arms misuse in the state. This includes incidences of gun violence and the related casualties involving civilian perpetrators. If improving the security of civilians is the goal, perceptions of communities on security can provide an additional basis for measuring progress. In a following part, the report presents

<sup>22</sup> The first survey was carried out in Duk, Akobo, Bor, Twic East, Uror, Nyirol and Pibor.

<sup>23</sup> The second survey was conducted in Twic East, Bor, Ayod, Akobo and Duk. Second survey did not cover Pibor County due to the high level of insecurity in the county. Fighting between fighters loyal to David Yau Yau and the government and the resultant displacements made it impossible to access residents of the county.

<sup>24</sup> Please note that these numbers could not be completely verified.

<sup>25</sup> The disarmament forces collected the weapons of the police based on intelligence that after the disarmament was announced, some civilians had their weapons stored in the police station. This was to evade seizure by the disarmament forces – anticipating that the police armoury would not be a concern to the disarmament team. This was confirmed in interviews with our monitoring team.

<sup>26</sup> A comprehensive breakdown of all the recovered weapons per county could not be obtained.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with SPLA spokesperson, June 29 2013.

survey results of the question whether security has improved, remained the same or became worse.

## **Disarmament Evaluation**

This section provides data on the actual arms collection process including the abuses and violations during the disarmament process from March 2012 throughout January 2013. It also presents the findings of interviews and observations conducted by our monitoring team between March and April 2012. Interviews were conducted with youth representatives, women representatives, chiefs, and officers from the disarmament forces. The primary focuses of the interviews were three key issues. First, to establish the perceptions of the different groups regarding the disarmament exercise, particularly regarding security implications of the disarmament exercise. Secondly, to gauge the level of awareness and preparation – relating to consent of citizens and whether the process was voluntary or not. Thirdly, to collect perspectives of the communities on how security could be maintained or improved in the aftermath of arms collection.

### **Overview of Findings – Pre Disarmament Evaluation**

In the 2012-2013 disarmament campaign, there was a widespread sentiment that disarmament is a good thing, but only if it would be comprehensive and citizens would be protected in the aftermath of the arms collection exercise; thus it was essential to know that neighboring communities were also being disarmed, in order for one community to voluntarily disarm.

The findings established that communities were generally aware that civilian disarmament was forthcoming. Majority of the respondents (76.0%) indicated they were well informed about the campaign. However, the sources of information varied across counties, Payams and individuals. Sources of information on the arms collection included, chiefs, representatives of the national, state and local governments, and civil society organizations. Most respondents indicated that they got information about the disarmament campaign from their local government (county government representatives). Despite the significant level of awareness, the public information herein should not be confused with community consultations from a normative perspective in the context of a preparation for a voluntary disarmament. This public awareness strategy was mostly one way with an exceptional case like Akobo where the campaign almost took the form of dialogue. In Akobo after civilians were informed by the local government and the disarmament forces, communities presented their demands of the prerequisites for arms surrender. Essentially, the local community leaders demanded security guarantees before the civilians could surrender arms. This included deployment of armed forces in suggested buffer zones to deter attacks from the neighboring communities.

In preparation for a voluntary arms collection exercise, community awareness should have gone beyond information about the plan of government to begin civilian disarmament. Awareness creation needs to take the form of a comprehensive dialogue with local leaders of communities and the population. Consultations with communities should include generating understanding of the perceptions of communities on disarmament, discussing the rationale for civilian disarmament, and providing incentives for laying down arms and protection plans beyond arms collection. This is necessary to begin building the trust needed for voluntary surrender of arms. Essentially, the outcomes of consultations would indicate whether communities are willing to voluntarily disarm, and if not establish the reasons behind their unwillingness. The GRSS has the right to consolidate the monopoly of violence (if legitimate), but the communities need to understand what that means for their security. Thus, understanding the perspectives of communities on disarmament is necessary for tailoring the appropriate arms collection interventions for successful disarmament with sustainable results.

After being informed, communities are expected to prepare for the arms collection exercise. When asked if they were prepared for the disarmament campaign or not, 76.0% of the respondents indicated to be


prepared for the exercise, and 8.1% stated their non-preparedness. However it is important to note that being prepared in this case can mean different things to different people as it can include both being prepared to hand in or hide a weapon during the disarmament.

When asked about their feeling of the disarmament, the responses were Bad 7.2%, Good 55.0% Very Good 16.2% and mixed feeling accounting for 16.2%. On one hand, when respondents were asked about their expectations of the disarmament, responses indicated assorted hopes with most respondents envisaging peace as an outcome of the exercise. Provision of services and economic development were second and third respectively. On the other hand, while some were optimistic that the disarmament exercise would bring positive change, others expected the disarmament to result into insecurity in their community. This is mainly premised on the vulnerability to attacks that have often been created in the aftermaths of arms collection exercises in past disarmament initiatives. This concern highlights two important questions, – one, is whether disarmament will indeed be comprehensive, (meaning there should be no fear of some communities or community members remaining with firearms). The second question is, - in the event that, uniform disarmament becomes impossible, what guarantees could shield community members – who shall have surrendered their weapons – from attacks of the populace who evaded the disarmament. Persisting pockets of small attacks and larger scale inter-communal attacks continue to shed lights to this concern. This remains a major issue for the GRSS to address before taking any step to embark on any major civilian disarmament exercise. A joint planning (with communities) to develop strategies for risk reduction and plan for protection is crucial for success.

## Level of Awareness of the Civilian Disarmament

In a disarmament campaign, it is important to inform the public about the timeframe and nature of the disarmament program. This would further facilitate understanding of the types of weapons that the disarmament targets, the procedures of arms collection as well as the incentives and the objective of the government to conduct the disarmament campaign. From a military perspective, however, making people aware also increases the chance that people will hide their weapons before the military reaches them.

Interviews held between March and April 2012 indicated that a majority of the community members had been informed about the disarmament exercise either before or when it had commenced in some parts of the state (Figure 2).



However, informing the public took place within a short timeframe (slightly more than 2 weeks) and mainly happened in county capitals. It is important to note that most of the communities in Jonglei State are nomadic pastoralists. The surveys conducted only covered communities at county and Payam headquarters not in remote and scattered settlement patterns of the nomads. It could be possible that surveys failed to represent most of the un-informed civilians.


*"The exercise is peaceful. Not much problem. We just got some of the guns being collected by the chiefs of the areas. This has made the job easy for us".*

*An officer in the Disarmament forces on the process in Twic East*

In all counties visited, a majority of respondents indicated they had been informed. The sources of information varied, including local chiefs, local Government administration,<sup>28</sup> Police, Army, radio broadcasts and civil society organizations (CSOs). The level of involvement of CSOs in awareness creation was minimal. The monitoring survey found that, 44,3% of all respondents got information about disarmament from Local Government authorities and 31,1% were informed by chiefs.

This was a common feature across all the seven counties with Twic East and Duk counties presenting the highest percentage of respondents who received disarmament information from their chiefs (Figure 3).

**Figure 3. Percentage of People informed About Disarmament by Government Officials or Chiefs**



Findings of our monitoring team also established that the level of involvement of chiefs in actual arms collection was also higher in Twic East and Duk. Interestingly, these are also the counties that experienced the lowest levels of violence in the communities by the disarmament forces.

On the other end of the spectrum, Pibor was the county with the lowest level of participation of chiefs in informing the public. Noticeably, Pibor is also the county which experienced the highest level of violence, and force from the disarmament forces. This illustrates, in part,<sup>29</sup> the relationship between the level of violence and working together with local leaders of communities during arms collection initiatives.

Furthermore, these figures may not decisively infer that working with chiefs will result into voluntary or peaceful disarmament, but they illustrate that involving local community leaders in civilian disarmament can prevent or reduce the coerciveness. This assumes legitimate local leaders are chosen to engage with on behalf of communities. Isolating or ignoring the stand point of other local leaders with significant influence on their community (especially the youth) can be risky. For instance, during the campaign, the self proclaimed prophet, Dak Kueth was not engaged in a dialogue.<sup>30</sup> Instead the SPLA just asked him do disarm. However, Kueth has a significant level of influence on mobilization of local youth to carry out large scale inter-communal attacks on neighbors. Therefore, understanding the standpoints of a leader

28. For the purpose of this survey, Local government herein includes the administration units from the level of county commissioner to the payam level. We have chosen the category of chiefs to refer to the administration at the Boma level, which is also the lowest administrative unit representing local government.

29. As is clear in the rest of the report, it also relates to the widely held belief in Jonglei that the Murle are the original source for the current violence.

30. Dak Kueth is a self-proclaimed prophet/magician from the Nuer tribe. Thought to have vast influence among his local community of Urur county especially in predicting attacks by 'enemies' and endorsing revenge attacks after their community is raided. He maintained a group of armed youth as his body guards. His loyalists are mainly referred to as the White Army. He is being suspected for mobilizing the Lou Nuer youth to launch attacks on their rival Murle communities of Pibor county. For reported accusations of Kueth for mobilizing youth to attack the Murle communities. See Sudantribune, 2012. < <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46779>> and Gurtong, 2013. < <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11976/Lou-Nuer-Murle-Youths-Reportedly-Clash-In-Pibor-County.aspx>>


like Kueth and striking a deal to enable him to advocate for disarmament could be more beneficial than the forceful approach which did not convince him and his followers to disarm.

Findings of the surveys indicate that voluntary surrender of arms is greatly dependent on trust in security forces taking over protection roles or the lack thereof. Communication on disarmament should therefore take into account the real concerns of populations on disarmament. Populations should be involved in the search for sustainable solutions to their concerns. This does not dismiss elements within communities who are overtly opposed to disarmament due to highly militarized minds or are not willing to disarm for criminal intentions. The following section provides information on the readiness of citizens and their reservations regarding the civilian disarmament.

### Preparation of the communities for the disarmament exercise

Considerable numbers of unknown armed youth left their homes and dispersed in the bushes to avoid the arms collection campaign – intermittently carrying out cattle raids in neighboring communities as well as attacks on convoys along main county-state roads. Armed youth from the Lou Nuer and Murle tribes also clashed with the disarmament forces in numerous occasions.<sup>31</sup>

Additionally, hundreds of youth from Pibor, Uror and Akobo counties crossed to Ethiopia to evade disarmament.<sup>32</sup> Our monitors also witnessed the movement of some of the armed youth from Akobo towards the Ethiopian border between March and April 2012. In another incidence at Nanam area of Pibor County, after the army subjected a group of youth to beating, the youths pulled out firearms that were hidden in a river.<sup>33</sup> In Pibor County, there were some youths roaming in the bushes to evade the disarmament campaign but did not flee to Ethiopia. Rebel leader David Yau Yau made a swift move to mobilize these youth to join his rebellion which was reborn during the disarmament period. While some reports attempt to argue that the youth joined Yau Yau due to the human rights violations and abuses, it was not only the Murle youth who fled into the bushes to evade the disarmament. Nonetheless, some youth who lost their arms to the disarmament campaign found joining the insurgency of David Yau Yau an easy opportunity to rearm.



31. See; Sudan Tribune 2012, South Sudan army clashes with armed Lou Nuer youth, Available at <<http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-army-clashes-with-Lou,41999>> , [Accessed April 28,2013]

32. See; Sudan Tribune 2012, Ethiopia fears attacks by influx of Jonglei armed youth, Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/Ethiopia-fears-attacks-by-influx,42382> , [Accessed April 28,2013]

33. Report by a SSANSA disarmament monitor deployed in Pibor County, April 2012.



In Uror County, Prophet Dak Kueth, the Lou Nuer Prophet declared that he was overtly opposed to the disarmament campaign, and called on the youth in his community (Lou Nuer) to reject arms surrender. In an attempt to flee his residence for the bush, his followers – popularly known as the White Army – fought with the disarmament forces in Uror leaving 6 people dead.<sup>34</sup> Dak Kueth later fled to Ethiopia with other Lou Nuer youth who also embraced his idea of rejecting arms surrender at the time.

On their way back from Ethiopia into South Sudan, the group clashed with the SPLA forces in Wechlual. The clash left 29 of the youth and 5 SPLA forces dead and nine others injured with about 22 firearms recovered by the SPLA.<sup>35</sup>

## Voluntary surrender

Out of all the counties visited by the monitors, Twic East, Uror and Duk presented the highest levels of community cooperation with their chiefs in voluntary collection of weapons. In these counties, members of the communities were encouraged by their chiefs to hand in their firearms at designated locations. These weapons were later collected by the disarmament forces. However, this cooperation is not sufficient to conclude that these communities were finally confident that it was the right time to voluntarily disarm, and decided to rely on the government for protection. It could be just a means to avoid the consequences for total non-cooperation. This uncertainty is premised on the fact that after community members surrendered weapons to their chiefs, ad hoc search and seizure operations in Twic East were still able to recover considerable quantities of arms. This indicates that some members either concealed their weapons or surrendered only ‘some’ of firearms.

This complexity can further be illustrated by a comparative look at the cases of Akobo and Twic East Counties. In Twic East, chiefs asked their community members to surrender weapons at particular locations before the disarmament forces arrived – which they did. For the case of Akobo, the county commissioner communicated the position of the community, demanding the establishment of buffer zones at suggested locations to guarantee their security,<sup>36</sup> and the return of cattle that had recently been raided by the Murle tribesmen. These concerns were addressed to the head of disarmament operations. Consequently, arms collection did not start in Akobo until a promise was made that the government would protect the citizens after arms collection. However, the major question was, whether the government could live up to the trust bestowed upon them by the Akobo community.

Experiences in Akobo with past disarmaments accounts for this uncertainty about protection after disarmament. The attack of February 2013 in Akobo which left an estimated 89 civilians and 14 SPLA soldiers dead was the beginning of a significant jeopardy to the security of civilians in the aftermath of arms collection exercise.<sup>37</sup> It is practically difficult to ascertain that this event could lead to rearmament in Akobo, but the attacks carried out by Lou Nuer youth (including from Akobo) on Murle tribesmen during July 2013<sup>38</sup> illustrates that both communities have rapidly rearmed or held back substantial amount of weapons during the disarmament campaign. This massive attack has the potential to induce further rearmament and armaments especially among these two tribes. Among the Murle youth, scaling up armament would be considered relevant in the context of preparation for retaliation, while the Lou Nuer would want to keep sufficient level of armament in anticipation of a revenge attack from the Murle.

Given there are plenty of historic examples where similar situations led to rearmament, it is critical for the government to prevent attacks on civilians from their neighbors. While exploring means of protect-

34. Report by SSANSA monitor, April 2012.

35. Sudan Tribune, 2013. SPLA attack tribal leader on Ethiopian border, five soldiers killed. Available at <<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44914>> [Retrieved March 2013]

36. See Annex 1 for a letter that shows the list of locations where buffer zones were to be established.

37. Office of the commissioner, 2013. Murle militia attacks unarmed civilians in Akobo West. [Press release] February 8, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45467>> [Accessed, June 15 2013]


38. Green, Andrew. 2013. Over 300 killed, thousands uprooted in bout of South Sudan fighting. Reuters, August 8, 2013. Available at <<http://www.trust.org/item/20130808154325-v15vj/?source=search>> [Accessed, August 10]

ing civilians, it is important to consider that arms collection in the context of unresolved disputes can be counterproductive by causing unintentional vulnerability among the various communities. Thus, it is necessary to link arms removal with conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives. Therefore, planning for next arms collection phases should involve dialogue on when and how communities would consider arms removal appropriate.

**Community perceptions about conducting the Disarmament Campaign at the time**

This section presents the perspectives of the communities regarding the disarmament campaign when the campaign was at its commencing in March 2012 in some locations, and had yet to start in other counties. This further provides perceptions of communities regarding their expectations of what the campaign would change in their community.

The survey found that, the attitude of citizens towards carrying out the disarmament exercise was generally positive, with 53.2% of all respondents stating that they thought disarmament is a good agenda, 13.9% of all respondents consider it is a very good agenda, while 20.0% perceived it with mixed feelings. 10.0% stated that it was a bad idea.




It is important to understand that these perspectives do not relate to the administration of the arms collection itself but rather are based on expectations of what the disarmament could bring. The survey findings also indicate that communities still expect a form of disarmament that can eventually bring them sustainable security and development. In the words of most of the respondents “Disarmament that is different from past disarmament initiatives”.

In the following section of the report, we present the expectations of the communities; particularly highlighting the strategies of how disarmament should be managed according to communities, paying particular attention to strategies that do not endanger the security of all citizens.

**Community Expectations Regarding the Disarmament Campaign**

The majority (21%) expect disarmament to bring peace to the state. Although expressed in various terms most (over 44%) expected disarmament to translate into peace and/or security. The remaining 56% of responses spread around disarmament bringing basic services (11%), socio-economic development (10%), and Business and trade (8%) (fig 6).

**Figure 6. What do you think the disarmament will bring to your community?**



It is imperative to notice that some of these expectations are aligned with promises that the government have made in their appeal for civilians to lay down their arms, thus influencing the responses that were recorded for this research. Similarly in 2006, the government indicated that insecurity related to the misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is the biggest factor undermining government attempts to provide services, attract investments and development. However, after the round of disarmament in 2006, communities did not really experience the development, investment or services that were used to justify the disarmament.<sup>39</sup>

Although security contributes to providing an enabling environment for development, one can hardly conclude that states having lower levels of arms misuse have higher levels of development. While such promises might be intended to induce voluntary arms surrender, it can also create unrealistic expectations, misunderstandings, frustrations and further conflicts impacting negatively on future engagement with state authorities. This produced a lack of trust that this disarmament can be any different from the past campaigns. Beginning to reach out to communities with developmental activities under a “*development for disarmament program*” could help overcome to meet these expectations.

Furthermore, while most respondents appear optimistic that the disarmament would improve their conditions in terms of development and security, 3% asserted that they expect insecurity. This assertion carries the concern of possible vulnerability to attacks in the hands of youths who were predicted to evade disarmament. With the recent Lou Nuer attacks on the Murle tribesmen, persisting pockets of criminal and rebel activities constituting a host of current ‘post-disarmament’ security threats, the expectations of this 3% should not be ignored.

Perhaps one of the most fundamental appeals to the government is that citizens expect a different form of disarmament. The survey instrument establishes the need for uniformity and comprehensiveness in the state coverage as key issues that will give the exercise better outcomes. Next steps for disarmament in Jonglei should begin with community consultations to collate the concerns of citizens on disarmament and help initiate trust building.

Consultations would give a chance for community members to articulate disarmament specific security concerns including setting priorities to maximize impacts of post-disarmament protection initiatives. It can also widen the opportunities for both vertical and horizontal accountability as consultations would discuss division of roles and responsibilities between communities, government and other relevant stakeholders on how to carry out disarmament that yields sustainable community security.

In the counties part of the surveys, on average 21 % of respondents answered they expect peace. However, there were significant variations on expectations on county levels. In Pibor 43% mentioned service delivery as an expected result of disarmament, even though the average percent was 11% on state level.<sup>40</sup> This variation in expectations should therefore be taken into consideration during the planning of peace, security and development initiatives beyond arms collection.<sup>41</sup>

## **Misconducts and Violations**

Besides the SPLA white paper, law enforcement forces or any state agencies carrying out law enforcement duties are universally expected to be bound two instruments. One is the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the second is, the UN Code of conduct for law enforcement officials. These are also the instruments we shall use for assessing these violations. The choice of these instruments is based on their universality and relevance to South Sudan as a UN member state. This round of disarmament campaign have seen considerably high levels of human right violations, excessive use of force including use of lethal force resulting to unnecessary fatalities.

39. Young, John. Jonglei 2010: Another round of disarmament, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Situation Report, 2010.

40 It should be noted these issues mentioned are the result of an open-ended question that did not seek to prioritize the answers.

41 Further decentralized and more in-depth research is required to link these expectations to plans constructively.

The misconducts and abuses were difficult to reconcile with the two instruments listed above and the Universal declaration of Human Rights. Crux of the dilemma here is the endeavour to usher in law and order through a process that in it self marred by legal flaws.

The operation was punctuated by major flaws of distinguishing between arms owners and members of communities without arms. While we present some of the misconducts collected by our monitors, the major question we also seek to answer is *“Was there a way for the disarmament exercise to be peaceful and avoid or minimise misconducts?”*

There were notable operational failures by the security forces during the disarmament process in the form of violations and misconducts in their arms collection duty. In several instances, firearms were used without proper proportionality, necessity or legality. For example, based on an interview in Pibor, our monitor recorded that a pastor was shot in Pibor without any reasonable basis. The pastor was unarmed and there was no evidence of exerting any imminent threat to other members of the community, or the life of the army officers - that could prompt self-defense.

Table 1 below presents a summary of the incidents that SSANSA monitors were able to record. It is not an exhaustive list of all incidences that happened during the whole period that this report covers (March 2012 – March 2013). There are violations and misconducts documented by other actors. For instance, a report by Amnesty International on abuses in Pibor County documents various violations including unwar- ranted shootings, simulated drowning, lootings and arbitrary detentions.<sup>42</sup>

<b>Table 1: Examples of incidents that occurred during the disarmament campaign</b>		
<b>DATE</b>	<b>INCIDENT</b>	<b>ACTION TAKEN</b>
March 12, 2012	Rape of one woman by 2 members of the disarmament forces. <i>Location: Pariak – Bor County</i>	The 2 men accused of rape were reported to have been arrested and had undergone due military justice processes.
March 21, 2012	Beating of a group of youth, because they were suspected to have hidden their weapons. <i>Location: Nanam area – Pibor County.</i>	The youth afterwards pulled out some arms from the river and no further action reported.
March 21, 2012	Police beat up a group of youth gathering at a home. “The police just got us staying in one place. Then the police said we stared at them seriously, they approached and started beating us.” Said a victim of the incident in an interview with a SSANSA monitor. <i>Location: Duk Payuel – Duk County</i>	No action was reported.
March 20, 2013	A young man beaten up by members of disarmament forces. Interviews with community members established that he was beaten because someone else reported that he had a gun. The disarmament staff however said, the reason for beating him was that he had a gun but refused to hand it over. The community members interviewed said, he was known to be having a gun but claimed that the gun belonged to a friend. It could be that he returned it before the disarmament staff arrived. In an associated search the police took some money from his house. <i>Location: Poktap – Duk County</i>	No action reported.
March 20, 2013	Unknown armed men attacked Jale Payam at 6pm, raided 200 goats and killed one resident. <i>Location: Jale Payam – Bor County</i>	Army personnel present pursued the raiders and recovered the goats.

<sup>42</sup> See: Amnesty International (2012). South Sudan: Lethal Disarmament. Abuses related to civilian disarmament in Pibor County, Jonglei State.



In addition, it was established from the interviews that some of these cases were addressed, indicating that this was not a systematic approach that the disarmament forces could have engaged in. However, accountability measures should be strengthened in future arms collection exercises in the state.


In spite of the high level of abuse and rights violations, compared to previous disarmaments exercises in Jonglei, there is little improvement. In 2006, when forceful disarmament was implemented in Northern Jonglei among the Lou Nuer tribes, about 3000 firearms were recovered but 1500 people lost their lives in the ensuing battle. However, the lesson to learn from these experiences is that, forceful disarmament costs the lives of not only the civilians but also members of the organized forces.

Some armed youth sporadically launched attacks on the disarmament forces resulting in the loss of lives on both sides. Of course, security staffs need to respond appropriately including through the application of force whenever confronted with any form of violence from members of the public that poses direct or imminent threat to their lives, the lives of their fellow officers or members of the public. But the use of any force in such a situation should be used as a last resort when less extreme means are clearly insufficient to bring or maintain order. And the application of force should only be to the minimum extent necessitated by the situation. The confrontations with armed youth were duly documented, but the extent of appropriateness in the use of lethal force could not easily be measured. This dilemma is further compounded by the current activities of the armed groups loyal to rebel leader David Yau Yau. There were no means available to ascertain whether the groups in confrontation with the army were just armed civilian youths or groups loyal to David Yau Yau. Drawing this distinction is necessary in order to adopt the appropriate response.

## Evaluation of the disarmament exercise

This section presents findings of and moves on to analyze the second set of surveys conducted between January and March 2013. It assesses the nature and extent of the use of violence, the extent to which the process has been peaceful according to communities.

When asked to evaluate whether the disarmament had been voluntary – indicating peaceful or forceful, 21% of all respondents said the disarmament exercise was peaceful and voluntary while majority (78%) indicated that the disarmament was forceful in nature (see figure 7).




While some may argue that force may have been applied appropriately to those who posed threats to the forces, this notion leaves two questions begging answers. First, was the use of force necessary at the reported instance? This relates to use of force before exhausting all other non-violent options. Secondly, was the force used proportionate? For instance, in the case of the unarmed pastor who was shot dead in Pibor, March 2012, interviews conducted by our monitors did not establish any threats posed by the

pastor. Such arbitrary killing is criminal by both national and international legal standards.

Interviews conducted by our monitors provide evidence that often force was used against suspects based on general presumptions that they possess weapons. The result of this assumption was that people without weapons also became victims of harassments (Table 1).

The five counties surveyed reported that army members used force against civilians while conducting the disarmament exercise. Excessive force in arms search-and-seizures and beatings of civilians to recover weapons were a common feature in the disarmament exercise, particularly in the early phases of the disarmament. The major use of force was related to searches and physical assault against civilians suspected to have weapons.

In Akobo, all residents from our sample reported witnessing members of the army attacking and beating up civilians in order to gather their guns. 71.66% of respondents in Ayod, and all respondents in Akobo reported witnessing of physical aggression against civilians by the army during the disarmament (see fig. 8). These aggressions were one of the fears among the communities, rights groups and UNMISS when the disarmament was announced in March 2012.



Bor and Duk counties reported high numbers of house searches (98.3% and 95.0% respectively). The problem with search-and-seizure operations is that they generally fail to recover all of the weapons that have been hidden away by civilians. Members of communities have therefore been subjected to tortures in order to surrender weapons in their possession.

Human rights violations were echoed early during the process of disarmament by the (UNMISS) Secretary General Hilden F. Johnson who stated “I welcome the Government of South Sudan’s leadership and effort in this regard, and call for continued restraint, [however], we are very concerned about these reports of human rights violations during disarmament.”<sup>43</sup>


There are reports of human rights violations against people without weapons in all counties surveyed but Twic East. 90.0% of the members of the civil society groups and all the Payam administrators in Ayod reported cases of harassment against people without weapons. According to both sources, the cases were reported to the police and the traditional court (Figure 9), without a satisfactory response in any of the cases. However, the survey instrument used could not establish whether the authorities to whom the cases were reported were not willing or not able to charge the army or police.

In Duk, 90.0% of the community respondents and 80.0% of the Payam administrators reported cases of harassment against civilians without weapons. Similar to the situation in Ayod, those violations

43 Gurtong. UN Reports Human Rights Violation In Jonglei Disarmament, 11 April, 2012. <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6777/UN-Reports-Human-Rights-Violation-In-Jonglei-Disarmament.aspx> [Accessed February 18th, 2012]

were reported to police and traditional court authorities without any satisfactory response. Only in Bor County, both Payam administrators and civil society groups reported positive responses when reporting harassment against civilians without weapons. This indicates the imbalance in effectiveness of the justice mechanism put in place to regulate the conduct of the disarmament campaign. Proceeding with the campaign requires strengthening the justice component of the campaign with a main focus on making it stronger and more accessible to communities.

District court marshals were established to handle abuses committed by the disarmament forces in all the divisions Bor, Pibor, Ayod, Waat and Malualsaat but the reports of their work were not made public during the campaign. Comprehensive reports on the work of these courts were expected to be submitted to the head of the department of military justice after conclusion of the disarmament exercise.<sup>44</sup> By the end of June 2013, 31 soldiers were reported to have been dismissed from service and they were imprisoned. Between 7-12 cases were referred to the president because they were considered to fall outside the powers of the district marshal courts. The cases included rape and murder, according to the law they warrant death sentences and life imprisonments but these sentences can only be approved by the president.<sup>45</sup> At the time of writing, information regarding the status of the cases referred to the president could not be acquired.



However, only 28% of the abuses were reported to the Army (fig 9). This could mean that communities are not sufficiently aware about the presence of these courts. It may also mean that citizens reported their grievances to the mechanism they trusted most or that, the violations and abuses were reported to justice mechanisms that were readily accessible to the community members at the time. In future disarmament campaigns, a mutually agreed and accessible mechanism for addressing abuses and violations would be appropriate to address all abuses coherently and transparently. Given the general problem of accessibility related to poor roads, it was a certainly too much to expect communities from across the 11 counties to report cases to only these 5 locations. A crucial aspect for accountability is for the courts to make information on cases reported and their status of motion public as far as possible. This would help to promote legitimacy of these courts and increase transparency of its proceedings.

44 Interview with SPLA director for Military Justice, February 2, 2013

45 Interview with SPLA spokesperson, June 29 2013

## **Awareness of disarmament in neighbouring county**

This part assesses the perceptions of community members regarding their awareness of the comprehensiveness of the disarmament campaign.

Respondents from all social groups and Payam administrators were aware of the process of disarmament. A great majority of the population was informed about the disarmament process by either the Payam administrator or other government officials. All respondents were also aware that a disarmament exercise took place in their neighboring Payams, but expressed reservations on whether their neighbors would disarm completely.

Vulnerability caused by past disarmament exercises – which were not uniform, and simultaneous – had a significant impact in the 2012 disarmament campaign. For instance, data gathered through follow up interviews infer that the majority of respondents were suspicious about the success of the disarmament process in Pibor County. A women leader in Akobo County stated that the problem of arms and insecurity has its epicentre in Pibor by claiming that security would be achieved when “the government disarms the Murle of Pibor.”<sup>46</sup> Similar responses were found throughout. A member of the community of elders in Kongor Payam affirmed that the only way to succeed in the disarmament process is by “disarm[ing] Pibor County and allowing the government tells who owns and who doesn’t own guns.”<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, respondents from Murle communities of Pibor County expressed similar sentiments. After being asked what should be done to maintain peace and security after disarmament, a young respondent from Pibor said “Government should collect guns from Lou Nuer and Dinka so that they do not attack Pibor.”

These suspicions hints at one of the major reservations of communities to disarm, which could also imply that substantial amounts of weapons are held back by the various groups to counter expected future hostilities from neighbors. It is difficult to estimate the volume of arms remaining among the various communities but their manifestations can validate this problem. While it would be impetuous to assume that all communities of Jonglei held back weapons due to the suspicions they share with neighbors, it can equally be disastrous to ignore these sentiments and assume that communities who claim to have surrendered all weapons have actually done so. This emphasizes the need for an adequate flow of information across the counties regarding disarmament related processes. Awareness on the disarmament progress in a county can help build confidence among neighboring community members that disarmament is equally implemented in a neighboring community, - thus, stimulating voluntary arms surrender. This is specifically helpful to build confidence among tribal groups that have been traditional adversaries or engaged in recent violence against each other.

## **Awareness of dispute resolution mechanisms available**

One of the lenses this survey used was looking at the phenomena of gun violence in Jonglei state from the perspective of “the gun as an internal dispute resolution instrument.” This is because next to being used in communal violence – often involving communities from different ethnic groups – guns have also been used in homicides within communities. The survey attempted to ascertain whether community members were aware of basic dispute resolution and protection services available in their areas. This was established by triangulating the responses of the community members with the responses from the public administration. With the exception of some in Twic East, respondents from all the Payams showed awareness of the existence of traditional courts as mechanisms to resolve internal disputes.

A judicial court is found only at the state capital Bor. This constitutes a challenge to access of justice and partly explains the tendency among communities to resort to guns as an instrument of settling dispute. The police and army are reported to have direct presence in Ayod, Akobo and Bor County, but the army base is reported to be too distanced from the majority of the Payams surveyed. This creates

<sup>46</sup> Interview with women leader, Nyardit Payam, January 5, 2013.


<sup>47</sup> Interview with community elder, Kongor Payam, January 6, 2013.

inconvenience for rapid response operations due to the dreadful state of the roads, particularly during the rainy season. The survey instrument could not establish to what extent communities actually use existing dispute resolution and protection services and whether they are convinced that the mechanisms are adequate to address their internal security and justice challenges.

### Security Perceptions

Although the disarmament campaign is a process and not an event, it is essential to evaluate with the local communities the extent to which the campaign has achieved its purpose. While the survey instrument did not assess the extent to which Jonglei is peaceful in relation to the disarmament campaign, it was able to establish how the five communities surveyed perceive their security since the start of the disarmament campaign in March 2012. (See Figure 10.)

Looking at whether security improved over the past one year, only 3.33% of respondents – all from Bor county- stated that security had significantly improved. This is not surprising because the state capital has been relatively secure even during the worst inter-communal clashes in the recent past. Majorities of 60% of the respondents in Ayod, 72.58% in Akobo, 66.66% in Bor and 55% in Duk stated that security improved but only a little. In other counties minorities responded the same: in Ayod 40%, Akobo 27.42%, Bor 30%, Duk 40% and in Twic East 6.78% feel that security remained the same (See Figure 10).



Security remaining the same does not necessarily mean that the government is doing well with regard to providing protection. Given the high levels of violence before the disarmament campaign, “stayed the same or only improved a little” could mean there are still considerably high levels of insecurity.

On the other hand, 93.22% of respondents in Twic East and 5% in Duk County indicated that they feel less secure since the disarmament campaign began. Striking fact here is that, Twic East is also the country that accounted for the highest level of voluntary surrender and the lowest level of community resistance. This is problematic because the community members accepted to lay down arms expecting state protection. Being unable to deliver the promise of protecting the communities requires two urgent state interventions. First is to embark on an immediate outreach strategy to make community members aware about how the GRSS aims to protect civilians. Second is to engage the citizens in a dialogue to


explore functional mechanisms of protection and search for improved and more comprehensive protection mechanisms.

The danger in failing to engage communities in dialogues is the community perception that it is due to negligence that the government is not in a position to protect them. One of the major implications of this would be the resort to self-protection mechanisms, which would certainly mean rearmament.

Interviews held with community members in Twic East indicate that the local youth who used to defend the county have been incapacitated by removing their arms during the disarmament. Cattle rustlers from neighboring communities quickly took advantage of this vulnerability and have launched series of attacks in the county. The relationship between the perception of worsening insecurity and the disarmament is further illustrated by Figure 11, where all respondents in Twic East (100%) identified cattle rustling as the biggest challenge to security. Figure 12 presents suggestions of respondents on areas requiring priority interventions, and indicates communities in Twic East prioritize interventions to stop cattle rustling in their county. It is particularly worrisome that for these respondents, the disarmament not only failed to improve overall security but actually made it worse. This constitutes one of the biggest limitations of the disarmament exercise, and its ability to improve security uniformly across the entire state.

Crucially, interventions require to be tailored to the needs of the different counties. In the following section, the nature of security threats that communities highlighted are presented.

As presented in Figure 11, cattle raiding remains the main security concern among all respondents in the five counties surveyed. All respondents in Bor and Twic East counties stated that cattle rustling are a major persisting insecurity problem. This sentiment is similarly shared by respondents in Akobo and Duk.






Abduction was also deemed a persisting concern but this came up prominently only in Bor and Duk Counties. Abduction cases are dramatically lower compared to the first 5 months of 2012<sup>48</sup> in all counties surveyed but Duk County (Figure 11). The reduction rate in abduction cases in Jonglei state should be deemed as a success since abductions were considered the third major security problem among most communities in Jonglei State in 2007.<sup>49</sup>

Widespread notion among respondents is that security threats persisting after the exercise are often seen as in response to a perceived imminent attack by a neighboring Payam or county rather than the actual risk of local conflicts. Majority of all respondents in the five Payam surveyed stated that the source of conflict is armed youth from a neighboring community. A recent statement by Bor county commissioner Agot Alier Leek echoed the voices of various other Jonglei commissioners calling for forced disarmament in Pibor County. Mr. Leek argued that civilian disarmament in Pibor is necessary, stating that “These are armed civilians that are still heavily armed. I would call on the government of South Sudan and the SPLA to carry out a forceful disarmament to this population if peace is to reign here in this region.”<sup>50</sup> Conversely, the above notion is problematic since previous disarmament campaigns indicate forceful disarmament does not achieve sustainable security. First, since forceful disarmament gives less if any consideration to motivations of communities to possess firearms – and without surety of effective control on supplies, civilians can easily acquire new weapons.

Secondly, because the forceful removal of arms would target removal of – and by force – firearms held by civilians, without feasible consideration of the extent to which the disarmament forces have the capacity to identify firearms owners and effectively remove all weapons held by civilians. The main complexity with this dimension is in establishing criteria to determine the right suspects. Without precise criteria, all the local youth – including individuals having no weapons – stand the risk of being victims of state violence.

Respondents were also asked what they consider security priorities that need to be addressed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, cattle raiding emerged as the issue that deserved most attention from providers of protection (See Figure 12). All respondents in Bor and Twic East, 76.7% of respondents in Akobo and 80% in Duk stated that addressing cattle raiding should top the protection agenda in their counties.

**Figure 12. Security Priorities per County**



48 See, Figure 1

49 Garfield, Richard. (2007), Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei. Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 11 (page 26).

50 Sudan Tribune, “Jonglei: Leaders call for “forceful civilian disarmament” after raids”. Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45055>

Dedicating more resources and efforts to combating cattle rustling will undoubtedly have a positive shift in citizens' perception of security. However, the approaches to address cattle rustling require innovation to more effective and contextually appropriate methods. Whenever cattle raids occurred in the past, fingers were often pointed at the whole community to which a cattle rustler is suspected or confirmed to belong, rather than at specific perpetrators. This has made apportioning of individual criminal liability for cattle theft difficult, thereby undermining the prospects for justice, further promoting tribal stigmatization, and exacerbating inter-communal violence. It is critical therefore to consolidate existing interventions that to remarkably proved "effective" – like rapid responses in the immediate aftermath of cattle raids but also to search for innovative approaches together with communities.

Survey results indicate that abduction is the second major security threat that should be addressed. 61.6% of respondents in Duk, 25% in Ayod and 21% in Bor emphasized that it is a security concern to be accorded more attention, meaning a scale up of efforts is required to address the concern. As a crime that is often committed during cattle rustling, an integrated approach aimed at combating both cattle rustling and cattle raiding would be best suited to address the problem of abductions.


When asked how their security can be improved, 92.4% of all respondents said disarming their neighbours would enhance security in their Payams. While 64.1% and 72.1% of all respondents feel increasing police and army presence respectively would improve security, 16.9% of all respondents held that returning the collected weapons to the civilians would help advance security in their Payams. Perhaps the 16.9% are the people who would also be quick to rearm if means are available and motivations persist. This 'minority' view has the potential to consequentially propagate rearmament among the wider majority in the state. The fear of rearmament among communities was expressed by Kuachdong's Payam Administrator who said that "If cattle raiding continues, it may lead the youth to arm again."<sup>51</sup> This emphasizes one of the key findings of this report that, behind the motivation for rearmament is the inadequate protection after weapons have been collected.

The hostilities by armed groups loyal to rebel leader David Yau Yau came as the third concern requiring critical attention. The survey shows that Akobo is most affected by hostilities of militias. With 40% of all respondents in Akobo saying this is a critical security concern that requires greater efforts as a matter of urgency.

51. Interview with Payam Administrator, Kuachdong Payam, Ayod County. January 6, 2013.

## Measures to address insecurity after disarmament

During the first survey, responses were split on the question “what should be done to maintain security and peace after disarmament”, (See Fig. 13). 22.0% indicated a need for more government security provision, 19.0% suggested for more police forces and 20.0% believed more army would help maintain security and peace after disarmament. It means that 61.0% of all respondents suggested that the government should take full responsibility to protect communities. Answers of the remaining 39% dealt with the call for peace and reconciliation initiatives, infrastructural development, judicial reform, and support for youth in education and employment.




The variety of suggestions in this enquiry highlights the need for a multidimensional approach in addressing the problem of arms proliferation and misuse among civilian populations. Given the limited resources and available capacity, it is necessary to prioritize the most effective interventions.

With security provision emerging as a priority in the first survey, the second survey gave a specific emphasis to how communities think security can be improved at the local level. The January-February 2012 assessment established communities expect more of the state security promised to them.

The job clearly does not end with arms removal. Collection of civilian held arms may mean more work for the security services, because the youth who might have been providing protection to community members have been disabled by removing their arms. This means that, the full responsibility including failure to provide protection to civilians shifts to the state. However, some respondents feel that if their will to protect their own community could be backed by redistribution of arms, security could drastically improve.


When asked how security can be improved in their Payams, the majority of all respondents (92.4%) think disarming their neighbours would enhance their security (See Figure 14). While 72.1 % indicated that increasing army and police presence (64.1%) would make their community



more secure, others (16.9%) suggest return of weapons to civilians for self-protection. With existing sources of arms and challenges to supply controls, it can be very challenging to stop such people from rearming. This motivation can be addressed by providing a reasonable level of protection to communities.

A stratified closer look at the data of those respondents demanding rearmament of civilians for self-protection shows variations among different age and gender groups. For instance, of all the respondents who mentioned return of weapons to civilians, 51% were youth, 41% were community elders and the chiefs. Only 8% of women feel that return of weapons to civilians would improve security – and none of the Payam administrators think that returning arms to civilians would enhance security. (See Figure 15) The administrators see most use in getting more police and army.

**Figure 15. Distribution of respondents who demanded the return of their weapons for self-protection by social groups**



Payam administrators in all Counties surveyed stated that disarmament exercises and improvement in the infrastructure of the county must go together, to ensure that the disarmed communities will remain secure after the conclusion of the exercise. A major criticism regarding the previous disarmament exercises focuses on the lack of response that army and police forces provide after a community is under attack. The poor state of roads constitutes a major impediment for armed forces to respond in a timely manner to incidents. This is an issue that is even more problematic during the rainy season.


Finally, Payam administrators, and the majority of respondents in all counties, agreed that a stronger state intervention regarding the promotion of vocational programs and jobs is required in order to attract youth to productive activities. Respondents acknowledged that a lack of employment opportunities, and vocational programs are one of the major factors that induce youth to delinquency, and subsequent violence.

These outcomes highlight the form of actions that would positively impact on civilian perceptions of security. While just increasing the number of police or army does not automatically produce a positive shift towards community security, the presence of a reasonable number of security personnel in each Payam is essential to demonstrate government efforts to take full responsibility to protect civilians. However, deployments need to be backed by necessary logistical support to ensure police are effective.

According to surveys conducted between January and February 2013, 88% respondents thought that the disarmament process had ended. 5% believe it is still ongoing and 7% do not know which phase the disarmament campaign is in (See Figure 16). While the government indicated that disarmament would continue until Jonglei state is free from illicit arms, it is not clear what timetable exists to conclude the campaign.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, without reliable data on the number of arms that are in circulation in Jonglei State, it is difficult to use the amount of weapons as the only indicator to conclude that Jonglei State is finally free from illicit arms.

<sup>52</sup> See Sudan tribune; Kiir opens disarmament in Jonglei State; available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/President-Kiir-opens-disarmament,41886>; [Accessed Feb 7, 2013]

**Figure 16. Community understanding of whether the disarmament is concluded or not**



Manifestations of arms misuse provides evidence that Jonglei State is still awash with SALW. A range of small scale violence continues<sup>53</sup> and is punctuated with larger scale inter-communal violence involving firearms. The present situation is made even more complex due to the possible ease of acquiring arms from the rebel group currently operating in the state. It is important for communities to understand the phase of the exercise because it can impact negatively on rearmament. In the surveys it emerged quite adequately that communities feel the priority now is disarming their neighbors (see Figure 14). For instance, knowing that the disarmament is concluded may be understood to imply that community members who still have arms have successfully evaded the disarmament exercise. The problem with such an assumption is that community members may feel forced to balance the armament level.

The halting of the disarmament campaign due to David Yau Yau, should urge the government to give a public statement on the official status of “Operation Restore Peace”.

## **Role of the United Nation Mission in South Sudan**

When the March 2012 civilian disarmament was announced, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) seemingly had no clear role in the process other than facilitate the movement of politicians and some influential community leaders allowing them to ask communities to voluntarily lay down their arms. Unlike in previous voluntary civilian disarmament campaigns in the state, the role of UNMISS in this campaign was minimal. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) played more roles in a voluntary and peaceful disarmament campaign in Jonglei state in 2006.<sup>54</sup> In Akobo country, when the community leaders came together with the civil society, the UNMIS and other UN agencies the role of the military reduced to just gathering the surrendered weapons. Not a single gunshot was fired and not one life was lost then and the Akobo disarmament stands as the only exercise in the state which has been voluntary and peaceful in the recent history of Jonglei State.

Although the ground presence of UNMISS was deemed necessary by civil society groups like SSANSA – which urged the deployment of peacekeeping forces from other sectors to Jonglei state to provide physical oversight to the disarmament process – the role of UNMISS was limited mainly to independent monitoring. This involved sporadic visits to counties.<sup>55</sup> While this type of monitoring is necessary, the conviction among civil society groups was that their persistent presence throughout the physical collection of arms would potentially suffice to deter misconducts and violations of human rights.

53 See Sudan Tribune, “Three Killed in Twic East Ambush”. Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45359> [Accessed, February 9th 2013]

54 United National Mission in Sudan, 2006. The UN hails the successful Completion of Community-Driven.[Press Release], 22 August 2006. Available at <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2006Docs/PR36.pdf> [Accessed 19 July, 2013]

55 Interview with SSANSA monitor in Jonglei State, May 2012

Surveys established that doubt was widespread in the perception of communities on whether their neighbouring communities were also disarming. Exchange monitoring trips between communities could help to build confidence that the disarmament is indeed a state-wide exercise. Exchange visits are particularly important to facilitate information exchanges between those communities with the highest levels of distrust towards each other. Given the appreciable level of trust between communities and their chiefs, it could be strategic to institute a joint monitoring team to move all over the counties to witness disarmament in neighbouring communities. The team could comprise of chiefs from the different counties including local leaders with key influence on the youth, for instance, spiritual leader Dak Kueth, Ismail Knoyi, and perhaps some cattle camp youth leaders.

Although limited by logistics capacity, UNMISS is in a better position to facilitate with such a confidence building initiative. Such a support can widen local oversight on the process especially the campaign has a military leadership. As the process moves to upcoming phases, it is crucial to consider maintaining support to civilian oversight on the process.



# CONCLUSIONS

Civilian disarmament in South Sudan's Jonglei State requires a careful balance between arms collection and initiatives that seek to reduce the demand for arms among communities. This balance is critical because although the GRSS has embarked on several disarmament exercises since the signing of the CPA in 2005 and recovered thousands of weapons, arms proliferation and misuse remains constant. The latest disarmament campaign that begun in March 2013 at the publication of this report recovered over 12,300 weapons. But the misuse of arms by civilians remained a worrying trend, with gun related casualties remains high and the trend risks shooting progressively. It is unrealistic to expect the pervasive insecurity in Jonglei to end within one year but the persisting gun violence illustrates that the job is way unfinished. Security forces have to fill the security gaps created as a result of disabling informal structures that communities perceive were helpful in protecting themselves.

Survey findings indicate that community perceptions of security were generally positive, with over 90% of all respondents stating that security has improved a little. This unfortunately seemed a short lived improvement as illustrated by the recent deterioration of security in the state. The biggest challenge for the GRSS and all relevant stakeholders is how security improvements in some parts of the state can be sustained. Answers to this question can be found in pursuing both the demand and the supply side issues. On the demand side lays the predominant motivation to rearm.

The established trend among several parts of Jonglei is that, even after previously surrendering their arms in preceding disarmament exercises, in the absence of state protection, civilians had again assumed the role of the state by acquiring weapons for self-protection. Therefore, to sustain the security gains, it is imperative that the government steps up efforts to provide security to its civilians. Protection of civilians needs to go hand in hand with strengthening justice and law enforcement as part of peaceful dispute resolution initiatives. A list of recommendations by communities in this report highlights the efforts necessary to consolidate security in Jonglei.

On the supply side is the critical and demanding task of cutting supply of arms. Critical here is securing state stockpiles of arms and stepping up surveillance to curb cross-border flow of arms into the state. With a limited capacity of the security forces to effectively control cross border flow of arms, the government could rely more on intelligence shared by communities. However, this can only happen if there is sufficient trust between the communities and the state. Therefore, adequate efforts need to go into encouraging dialogues among communities and with security forces at local levels.

It is important to recognize that disarmament exercises in Jonglei State, often involve the use of excessive force, torture, killings, and rape. This jeopardizes the very security of citizens that the disarmament exercise seeks to achieve. It further leads to communities distrusting the national security forces and by extension the government, undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

It is however important to note that relative to previous disarmament exercises, the SPLA has been better able to subject some perpetrators of abuses and violations against civilians to justice processes.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, the lethality of the use of force during arms collection has been lower in the 2012-2013 disarmament exercise compared to what communities experienced during previous disarmament exercises, particularly the disarmaments during 2006 in Northern Jonglei. This illustrates the progress being made on the side of the government to improve the administration of civilian disarmament.

The Jonglei disarmament produced some positive results, and could possibly reap further benefits if it incorporates strong components of community security as its priority focus. Providing security to the disarmed communities is key to consolidating the benefits of the exercise in the short run. It is also necessary to reduce the possibility of rearmament amidst ongoing challenges to effectively control the supply side.

56 There are court marshals in Bor, Pibor, Ayod, Waat and Malualsaat established to handle civilian abuses committed by the disarmament forces.

Lastly, it is important to recognize attempts to disarm communities in Jonglei are a learning experience, and that lessons learned in each attempt need to be taken into consideration for subsequent approaches or phases. What these campaigns indicate is that forceful disarmament often involves massive bloodshed and cannot achieve sustainable security. A pro-people approach, planned and implemented with and by the communities can achieve more success at a lower cost. A success is not only defined in terms of the number of weapons recovered but also by the ability to achieve and sustain community security. Thus, before the disarmament process proceeds, it is time for the government to resume consultations with the communities to jointly articulate and develop approaches to address critical and disarmament specific security concerns.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## **The disarmament process should focus on sustainable security.**

While disarmament is a necessary component in securing the future of Jonglei State, it should be more than just about collecting weapons or achieving a short term ‘success’. Arms collection should be backed by long term plans of providing adequate protection to all communities in Jonglei State. It is necessary to nurture trust and enhance cooperation between security forces and the communities towards joint action for community security, for instance by sharing information necessary for tracking criminals and arms trafficking trails.

## **The GRSS should consider disarmament as a process that falls within the broader process of peace building and state building.**

For Jonglei communities, disarmament connects with economic and infrastructural development, justice and security sector effectiveness. For instance, improvement of the transportation infrastructure is vital for both the effective response of the military and police force and for opening business opportunities. Particular attention should be devoted to the (potential) role of youths and women. Arms removal needs to be integrated and well sequenced in resolving major hanging inter-communal violence, especially the disputes between members of the Murle and the Lou Nuer youths.

## **The GRSS should accept that forceful disarmament is no longer a viable option.**

All stakeholders should appreciate the fact that weapons recovery without addressing the reasons that motivates civilians to acquire and misuse arms is a failing strategy. The forceful nature in itself jeopardizes the security of civilians that it seeks to achieve. Working with communities to address the motivations for arms acquisition is more feasible than forceful removal of arms being held by civilians.

## **Increasing effective and decentralized presence of security forces is necessary to improve the physical protection of vulnerable communities.**

For the army and police to be responsive to the security needs of communities, it is necessary that they are rapidly deployable to areas of need. This is currently unmanageable due to the poor road network, and inadequate facilities for air response. Therefore, it is important to direct adequate resources towards the construction of roads while in the short run strengthening the operational capability of existing forces by among others providing mobility assets that can be used on the bad roads.

## **A reform is necessary to ensure that disarmament enhances rather than jeopardize the security of citizens – which is not the case by large at the moment.**

Youths continue to raid community members who have been disarmed. There are some attempts by security forces to recover raided cattle which proved successful but efforts need to be stepped up to address cattle theft. The second problem is the atrocities being committed by fighters loyal to rebel leader David Yau Yau. While it is the mandate of the government to counter hostilities from militias, repeated and disastrous offensives on civilians – like the attack on Akobo in February that claimed the lives of 103 civilians – are often perceived as betrayal in the eyes of the communities. Therefore, repeated failure to protect civilians from the rebel forces has the potential to induce rearmament among communities.

## **The new approach should be multi-layered with simultaneous emphasis on uniform voluntary surrender of arms and providing protection to the disarmed to clearly demonstrate that the intention of the government to disarm is to enhance security of all communities in the state.**

Also, as security improves, community members who might have hidden their weapons due to the doubt that government would fail to protect them may finally want to surrender their arms. It is important to consider the possibility of such civilians safely surrendering their weapons. A reasonable period of amnesty would be relevant to address that.

### **Prioritize trust and confidence building between communities and with security forces.**

Given the high level of suspicion among communities surrounding the disarmament process – particularly with regards to whether other neighboring communities were also disarming. It is important to facilitate local community representatives to visit neighboring communities during and after the disarmament to confirm that their neighboring communities are also being disarmed. This can facilitate voluntary surrender of arms among the various communities.

### **Strict accountability measures are necessary to address misconducts by the security forces in their interactions with the communities.**

This helps in building trust between communities and the government, improves the quality of protection by security forces and promotes the rule of law. These components are all necessary for successful voluntary disarmament in the future.

### **Arms removal needs to be backed by tough initiatives to control the flow of arms into the communities.**

The GRSS needs to expedite the process of putting legislation in place to regulate and impose strict controls on arms held by the organized forces, and civilians. On the other hand, the success of initiatives for tracking black market arms traders is important to curb supply from non-state actors. The success of such operations greatly depends on the intelligence provided by the communities.

### **The GRSS should ensure that recovered weapons are well secured.**

Currently, too many recovered weapons are eventually supplied back to communities. Recovered weapons should be sorted and marked before re-distribution for easy to tracing in case they are being trafficked back to communities. It is imperative to establish a comprehensive inventory of arms in legitimate hands, to control the flow of arms from organized forces to civilians.

### **The GRSS should put in place coordinated joint justice and law enforcement mechanisms for addressing the issue of cattle raiding.**

Cattle raiding is recognized as the main motivation for communities to rearm. A holistic solution would not only focus on addressing tribal issues but also in breaking down the criminal structures that sustain cattle raiding.

### **The GRSS should prioritize raising awareness among the communities about on-going justice processes, including the five disarmament operation court marshals established in Jonglei state.**

Verdicts should be made public to increase transparency and to build trust with the communities on the credibility of such mechanism. This has the potential to deter misconducts in future civilian operations.

### **Disarmament cannot be seen as separated from the insurgency of David Yau Yau since their activities makes it easy for the youth to acquire arms.**

Arms easily flow from the rebel forces to community members as some youth who were forcefully disarmed – but still find life without guns impossible due to vulnerability – might find this a short-cut to rearmament. For as long as community members still find arms possession relevant to the context, they can take every measure to rearm including through joining armed groups with the principal purpose of acquiring firearms. Worse still, disarming the communities and being unable to protect them against the threats posed by rebel will largely be perceived as betrayal for most community members.

# REFERENCES

- Gettleman, Jeffrey 2012. *Born in Unity, South Sudan Is Torn Again*. The New York Times. January 12.
- O'Brien, Adam. 2009. *Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign*. HSBA Working Paper No. 16. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. January.
- Rands, Richard and LeRiche, Matthew. 2012. *Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence*. London: Saferworld. February.
- Small Arms Survey. 2007. *Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent Experiences and Implications*. HSBA Issue Brief No. 3. Geneva: October.
- Sudan Tribune. 2012. 'South Sudan declares Jonglei, a disaster area.' January 5.
- Sudan Tribune. 2012. Kiir opens disarmament in Jonglei State. March 12.
- Young, John. 2010. *Jonglei 2010: Another round of disarmament*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Situation Report.
- UNMIS. 2006. Sudan: *The UN Hails the Successful Completion of Community-driven Disarmament in Akobo, Jonglei State*. 22 August.
- UNMISS 2012. South Sudan. 'Incidents of Inter-communal violence in Jonglei State.' June.
- Young, John. *Jonglei 2010: Another round of disarmament*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Situation Report, 2010.
- Garfield, Richard. *Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei*, Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 11, 2007.

# Annex I

## Buffer zones suggested by the local community representatives of Akobo County



Republic OF SOUTHERN SUDAN

**AKOBO COUNTY**

JONGLEI STATE

Executive Director Office

Date 28<sup>th</sup> Mar 2012

To: Area Cdr Disarming forces

RE: Deployment of forces in Akobo County

Sir,

Here are the locations per payams

S/N	Location	Payam
1.	Dengjok	Boma-Dengjok payam
2.	Wei thoa	Boma
3.	Thok wath	Boma
4.	Burmah	Nyandit
5.	Kony	Boma
6.	Chiban	Boma
7.	Old Akobo	Boma
8.	Wei thagang	Boma
9.	Kiabuo	Boma
10.	Wuoth piny	Boma
11.	Alali	Boma

Your Good Welcoming to request is highly appreciated.

Thanks,

Makuac Ding Arok  
Ex. Director  
Akobo County

Cc: Commissioner –Akobo County  
Cc: Payam administrators  
Cc: A/Commissioner of Police  
Cc: Col. Moses Malei of Wild Life Forces  
Cc: NISS Office  
Cc: CID Office  
Cc: File

# Annex 2

## Methodology

This report presents the findings of a monitoring program that the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) carried out during the civilian disarmament campaign taking place in Jonglei state; according to government communications, this exercise is scheduled to continue until Jonglei state is free from illicit arms in the hands of civilians.

The first part of the report is based on 10 days of field monitoring and survey in 7 of the 11 counties of Jonglei during the kick off phase of the disarmament campaign in March and April 2012; media reviews and field reports collected from March 2012, throughout January 2013, and field surveys conducted in 5 of the 11 counties of the state during January 2013. Surveys were conducted along with field interviews using questionnaires during the field trips. The surveys measured the level of contentment through to the campaign, the level of awareness among citizens regarding the campaign, and the expectations and recommendations for the conditions “Beyond arms removal”.

Logistical barriers, and financial constrains hurdle limited access to all counties of Jonglei state, leaving only 7 of the 11 counties in the first phase of the survey, and only 5 counties in the second phase of the monitoring and surveys. Furthermore, given the high level of insecurity that can be attributed to the fighters loyal to David Yau Yau, monitors were only able to access areas which were relatively secure.

The second (post) disarmament evaluation exercise took place between January and February 2013. Monitors were instructed to visit Six Payams over five selected counties in Jonglei State (Akobo, Ayod, Bor, Duk and Twic East). Security reasons motivated the selection of both Payam’s and counties. The monitors were instructed to stratify their observations, selecting respondents from youth and women organizations and the council of elders. The stratified data will be used in the report to indicate the difference perceptions on security and disarmament between the youth, women and elders. Monitors were also instructed to provide a representative sample of the communities involved, but such a request was deemed difficult, as respondents were not always available to respond the questionnaire.

A second questionnaire tailored to government officials, and Payam administrators was constructed to triangulate the responses of the community in three different areas. 1) General Information: Including level of awareness in regard of the disarmament process and protection institutions. 2) Security Section: including the level of awareness of and prospective of security threats, and 3) Evaluation Section: including information regarding the involvement of the community in the disarmament project.

**Table 2: Respondents First Disarmament Survey (March - April 2012)**

	FEMALE	MALE	UNDETERMINED	TOTAL BY COUNTY
Akobo	17	20	3	40
Duk	8	27	-	35
Bor	16	16	8	40
Pibor	28	9	-	37
Twic East	11	33	-	44
Uror	3	34	-	37
Nyirrol	-	29	9	38
Total by Groups	83	168	20	271



**Table 3: Respondents Second Evaluation Exercise**

	<b>WOMEN GROUPS</b>	<b>YOUTH GROUPS</b>	<b>COMM. OF ELDERS</b>	<b>TOTAL BY COUNTY</b>
Ayod	20	21	20	61
Akobo	20	23	19	62
Bor	20	20	20	60
Duk	20	32	8	60
Twic East	16	21	22	59
<b>Total by Groups</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>302</b>


During the first survey (Conducted between March and April 2012), a total of 235 respondents were interviewed from the six counties visited. The survey did not classify respondents according to leadership roles in local organizations or government.

A total of 302 observations were collected during the second evaluation exercise. According to our monitors, the youth seemed most enthusiastic in the evaluation exercise. This could perhaps be because primarily they were the most affected group by the disarmament exercise; The numbers of responses by county were equitable in both community surveys and Payam administrator surveys, accounting for a total of 60 community surveys, and 5 administration questionnaires by county.

# Annex 3

## County Profiles

### County Profile Twic East, Jonglei State



#### Payam and Interview Groups.

- Pakeer**
- 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 4 Youth Groups
  - 4 Community of Elders

- Ajuong**
- 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 4 Youth Groups
  - 3 Community of Elders

- Kongor**
- 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 4 Youth Groups
  - 5 Community of Elders

- Lith**
- 1 Payam Administrator
  - 2 Women Groups
  - 4 Youth Groups
  - 5 Community of Elders

- Nyuak**
- 1 Payam Administrator
  - 2 Women Groups
  - 5 Youth Groups
  - 5 Community of Elders

#### County Population Information

Total population (Source: 2008 Census)	85349
Current (2012) population (Source: Est from NBS)	94695
Disarmament Process Last Year	Yes
Number of Primary Schools	32 – 62% Government
Male – Female Enrolment	57.9% male - 42.1% Female
Poverty Headcount (Less than 1.25US\$ day)	50%

#### Introduction

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, like in other counties in Jonglei state, there have been several civilian disarmament exercises conducted in Twic East. The largest disarmament project in the area in terms of the number of weapons recovered was in 2010, when over 300 arms were recovered from civilians. However, rampant insecurity and inadequate state protection impelled the population to seek for alternative modes of self-defense. That also meant acquiring firearms for self protection. Before the latest program of disarmament began, Peter Deng Aguer, Twic East MP, called to the national authorities to promote a program of community policing.

## Disarmament Process Evaluation

Of all respondents constituting chiefs and representatives of youth groups and women groups, 6.78% reported that the security situation remained the same as before the disarmament exercise was started. While none of the respondents felt that there was even a little improvement in security and 93.22% of all respondents stressed that security got worse.

Cattle raiding was the principal cause of deterioration of the security situation in the area, as also acknowledge by Dau Akoi Jurkuch, Commissioner of Twic East County. In an appeal to Radio Miraya, Mr Jurkuch stated that the police and army forces should collaborate to protect cattle herders, who are often attacked by unknown gunmen (Miraya Fm –October 2012).

All the respondents identify youth from other Payams as responsible for the dreadful security situation in Twic East. A representative of women groups in Ajuong Payam said that the problem lays in the lack of protection that herders and their cattle have when they seek for available grazing land. “Protect Cattle, people die for their cattle” (Interview Ajuong, January 2nd 2013).

On the manner of arms removal, 21.9% of all respondents report that the disarmament campaign was forceful, while 78.1 state that the process was peaceful and voluntary.

The majority of the respondents are aware of the process of disarmament, but they were not aware of the final destination of the weapons. “[The army] took the guns and store them, we don’t know what happened after” said a representative of the youth groups in Kongor Payam, after inquiring about the location of the guns after the disarmament process.

75.0% of the respondents state that the process of disarmament had concluded in their Payam, and the remaining 25.0% state that they are not fully aware if the process ended or is schedule to continue. However all participants consider that the process of disarmament needs to continue as the insecurity situation continue to affect all inhabitants of Twic East County.

*“Disarmament should continue. [Promote] Peace and reconciliation, [along with] Army presence”*


*Interview Payam Authority Nyardit Payam*

Figure 17 (next page) shows the level of awareness of respondents on the presence of authorities in the county. This highlights the level of dispute settlement that could be used as alternatives to gun violence. When asked whether the disarmament process was proceeding well, 65.0% of all respondents declare that the process of disarmament needs serious adjustments in order to continue. A representative of the youth groups in Lith Payam states that the government needs to “disarm other communities, and provide force if necessary” (interview January 3rd 2013). The use of force is often mentioned when addressing the strategies to follow in order to disarm other communities; a member of the council of elders in Ajuong Payam state “Other communities should be disarmed first - If communities refused, it should be made by force” (Interview Ajuong, January 2nd 2013).

## Security recommendations from the community

The communities surveyed declare that it is necessary to increase the police and army presence in all Payams in order to guarantee some basic level of security. 75.0% also conclude that disarming the neighbours is a necessary step in order to promote a sustainable peace in the region state.

**Figure 17. Awareness of Presence of Authorities Twic East**



The majority of the respondents acknowledge that security has a direct interrelation with development and the improvement of the transit infrastructure, as they are vital for the effective response of the military and police force. A youth representative in Kongor Payam state that the security situation can improve by “connecting all counties by road, establish means of communication, [providing] information of security situation” (Interview Kongor, January 3rd 2013).

It is also well recognized that youth should be encouraged to engage in different educational programs that generate employment and discourage them to use violent means in order to guarantee sustainable peace in the region. This subject was emphasized in interview with the Payam administrator of Nyuak Payam, stating that the state government should “engage the youth with work, maybe in agriculture; educate the youth so they turn away from cattle raiding” (Interview Nyuak, January 4th 2013).

# County Profile Akobo, Jonglei State



### Introduction

In 2006, Akobo was the epicentre of a monumental disarmament effort. According to Small Arms Survey, the Akobo experience brought some visibility to the voluntary disarmament process, with over 1,400 weapons turned in. Despite this, Akobo has suffered multiple security threats from neighbouring counties, exacerbating an already combusted inter tribal conflict. The pervasive insecurity after the voluntary disarmament motivated many citizens of the county to rearm [for self protection]. The biggest challenge thus was sustaining the outcomes. These gains were certainly rolled back primarily because, it was not backed by initiatives that would guarantee protection of civilians and further initiatives that would nurture cohesion within and between Akobo and her neighbouring communities like the Murle tribesmen.

### Payam and Interview Groups.

**Nyardit**  
 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 5 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

**Diror**  
 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 5 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

**Dengjek**  
 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

**Walgak**  
 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 3 Community of Elders

**Alali**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 5 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

### County Population Information

Total population (Source: 2008 Census)	136,210
Current (2012) population (Source: Est from NBS)	151,125
Disarmament Process Last Year	Yes
Number of Primary Schools	53 – 98.1% Government
Male – Female Enrolment	65.2% male - 34.8% Female
Poverty Headcount (Less than 1.25US\$ day)	52%

## Disarmament Process Evaluation

A great majority of respondents from both the Payam administrators and the community groups report some security improvement as a result of the disarmament process. 72.58% of the respondents state that security has “only improved a little”, while the remaining 27.42% declare that despite the disarmament exercise, [in]security levels remain the same.

*“Communication system should improve, connecting all counties by roads, disarmed all civil population”*

*Interview Lith Authority Nyardit Payam*

Early in September, Akobo County commissioner Goi Jooyul Yol and Gabriel Majok Bhar, a member of the Akobo Youth Association, rallied their communities in the promotion of a comprehensive disarmament campaign.

*“We fear Payam is going back to posses weapons if cattle thieves are not addressed.”*

*Interview Payam Authority Nyardit Payam*

Notwithstanding efforts through Jonglei Peace agreement of May 2012, Akobo has been victim of numerous attacks from neighbouring communities, resulting in the killing of several women and children and the once again rearming of the population.


According to UNMISS (2012b), the majority of youth surrendering their weapons state willingness to enlist as SPLA soldiers to protect their communities; According to UNMISS a decision to enlist youth members of Akobo was still unclear (UNMISS b, March 2012).

Cattle raiding remains the major concern of the population in Akobo County. However, since the major process of disarmament concluded, fewer episodes of cattle raiding have occurred in all the Payams. A youth leader in Nyardit Payam commented that “Since disarmament, we have no encounter more of [these] problems” (Interview Youth Leaders, Nyardit January 5th, 2013), in reference to episodes of cattle raiding.

The presence of the army has been made more extensive in the aftermath of the disarmament process of 2012, which provides security confidence to the population of Akobo.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> The interviews were conducted in January, before the attacks on February 15 by David's Yau Yau rebel group, which left 118 civilians and 14 SPLA members death.

**Figure 18. Authorities known to Communities – Akobo**



**Security recommendations from the community**

All respondents state not being aware of any incident of harassment occurred against people without guns, and assert that the process of disarmament is completed and there is no need for a second disarmament campaign. However, there is a major distress with the army’s inability to disarm other counties in Jonglei. A member of the community of elders in Dengjek stated that the government should “make a comprehensive disarmament process, deploy the military in collaboration with the police” (Interview Dengjek, January 5th 2013).

*“Construct roads to allow the movement of goods - distribute services to people, [the] administration to engage in disarmament, pay attention to the rearmament of the Murle by Yau-Yau, collaborate with the chiefs in the process of disarmament.”*

*Interview Payam Authority Diror Payam*

Women, youth groups and elders state that the most urgent insecurity threat comes from the Murle youth from Pibor, and the rebel group led by self-proclaimed prophet Dak Kueth. Since March 2012, Dak Kueth has mobilized a considerable amount of Lou-Nuer youth to fight Murle population in Akobo. The army however, opposed effective resistance to this mobilization on December 2012.

Payam administrators and local communities alike present serious concerns regarding the security threat that other communities pose for Akobo County. A youth representative in Nyardit Payam said: “they [Government] need to adjust it [disarmament program] to make it equal around all the counties” (Interview youth Representative January 6th, 2013).


Some of the concerns are linked with issues of development and security, proving the clear interrelation between socioeconomic stability and security. Youth and women groups alike state that developing vocational training programs would create a positive effect in the community, reducing the risk of internal violence.



## County Profile Ayod, Jonglei State

### Introduction

Ayod County is located in the north east of Jonglei State, sharing borders with Lakes State. It has been relatively secure compared to other counties in the state. Due to security threats in her neighbouring areas and natural disasters, Ayod has received up to 6,255 IDP's (UNMISS 2012) from neighbouring counties, increasing the probability of food insecurity during 2012, which FAO estimated in a deficit of 9,606 tons.



### Payam and Interview Groups.

#### Pajec

- 1 Payam Administrator
- 4 Women Groups
- 5 Youth Groups
- 4 Community of Elders

#### Kuachdong

- 1 Payam Administrator
- 4 Women Groups
- 4 Youth Groups
- 4 Community of Elders

#### Baidit

- 1 Payam Administrator
- 4 Women Groups
- 4 Youth Groups
- 3 Community of Elders

#### Wau

- 1 Payam Administrator
- 4 Women Groups
- 4 Youth Groups
- 4 Community of Elders

#### Mogok

- 1 Payam Administrator
- 4 Women Groups
- 4 Youth Groups
- 4 Community of Elders

### Disarmament Process Evaluation


Traditional authorities and community groups reported that, although security has improved since the disarmament process took place, the community remains under threat from persisting cattle raiding from neighboring youths.

Women groups and traditional authorities reported that security levels still have to improve to protect women against rape and abduction.

### County Population Information

Total population (Source: 2008 Census)	139282
Current (2012) population (Source: Est from NBS)	154534
Disarmament Process Last Year	Yes
Number of Primary Schools	13 – 69.2% Government
Male – Female Enrolment	62.0% male - 38.0% Female
Poverty Headcount (Less than 1.25US\$ day)	62%

However, it is not clear if the threat of rape comes from the local communities or the neighboring counties. Although UNMISS and GoSS report a peaceful disarmament process in September 2012, the majority of women and youth groups and Payam administrators interviewed state witnessing some level of harassment during the process. 70.0% of the respondents consider that the process was carried by force, and only 30.0% evaluate the process as “voluntary and peaceful”.




The majority of respondents including all the Payam administrators in Ayod accounted for cases of harassment against individuals without guns during the process of disarmament. According to respondents, all cases of harassment were reported to both the Payam administrator and the police officers, and 80.0% of the cases were reported before the Traditional Court. According to respondents, reporting the cases to the authorities did not produce any satisfactory outcome.

75.0% of the respondents acknowledge that the process of disarmament concluded in Ayod County. However, the same percentage of respondents admits it is necessary to continue the process of disarmament as not all the guns have been collected.

*“[the] Army used to beat up people during the process, (sic) and they should take care of Yau yau before disarming the communities”*

*Interview Youth Representative Ayod County*



### **Security recommendations from the community**

The majority of respondents in all the Payams agreed that security can be improved by increasing the army presence in the area, and disarming neighboring communities. Both Payam administrators and local communities expressed their concern in regard with the state of the Payam infrastructure. The lack of roads and public services is being considered as an element of detriment in the Payam's security, as army forces have difficulty to access the Payam in case of a confrontation. A Payam administrator in Kuachdong Payam expressed this feeling clearly when he stated, "We need roads, better services, we need health services to invite business people and develop. Children need to know what is the government, and enjoy their freedom" (Interview Kuachdong Payam, January 3rd, 2013).

Youth and women groups agreed that the best strategy to mitigate conflict in Ayod County is the implementation of vocational programs for the youth, which will encourage economic development and reduce the risk of violent responses from the local youth. In Dengjek Payam members of women groups stated provision of vocational skills and intensification of the disarmament of neighbors would help improve security in their Payam.

# County Profile Duk, Jonglei State

## Introduction

By March 2013, Duk County had already experienced three major disarmament exercises since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005. Communities are still armed, justified as a means for protection [from other communities]. However, it is unclear whether the previous disarmaments did not recover all weapons or whether community simply rearmed. During March 2013, legislators from Duk County together with representatives of UNMISS forming a joint Monitoring Mission visited Duk county prior to the commencement of the disarmament exercise in the county. During their visit, legislators urged communities to disarm voluntarily and even promised that government would protect them this time. “When the government comes to disarm the community, you have to know that it will provide [necessary] security to all of you”, said Jonglei Legislative Assembly member Rachael Athiak Ruei. But with the experiences of past disarmament campaigns, civilians certainly wanted a promise that will this time translate into actions. A resident of Duk Padiet stressed this when he said: “We want to make sure that we have enough security from the government before we hand over our guns”. Notwithstanding their reservations, in the March 2013 campaign, the Duk County community had to be disarmed but mainly through search and seizure operations by the disarmament forces.



### Payam and Interview Groups.

- Paywel**
  - 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 6 Youth Groups
  - 2 Community of Elders
- Pauyang**
  - 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 6 Youth Groups
  - 2 Community of Elders
- Padiet**
  - 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 6 Youth Groups
  - 1 Community of Elders
- Pagak**
  - 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 8 Youth Groups
  - 1 Community of Elders
- Dongcak**
  - 1 Payam Administrator
  - 4 Women Groups
  - 6 Youth Groups
  - 2Community of Elders

### County Population Information

Total population (Source: 2008 Census)	65588
Current (2012) population (Source: Est from NBS)	72770
Disarmament Process Last Year	Yes
Number of Primary Schools	31 – 67.7% Government
Male – Female Enrolment	61.2% male - 38.8% Female
Poverty Headcount (Less than 1.25US\$ day)	54%

### Disarmament Process Evaluation

Among women groups, youth groups and community of elders in Duk County, only 5.0% stated that the security situation has deteriorated since the process of disarmament started. 55.0% concluded that the situation of security has improved, but only a little and further measures should be implemented in order to achieve security in the Payams. 40.0% of the respondents stated that the security situation remained the same, since the process of disarmament concluded. 80.0% of the respondents stated that cattle raiding is one of the most salient problems in the security of their community, followed by abductions (60.0%), and rape (5.0%).

*“This security issues [Cattle Raiding, Abductions] have to be addressed by disarming all the counties in Jonglei State”*

*Interview Women Groups Representative, Padiet Payam*


Although the cases of rape is statistically low among the respondents, it is interesting to notice that none of the female surveyed state rape as a security issue in the Payam. A representative of a women group in Padiet Payam stated “robbery and rape are no longer problems of insecurity in our Payam” (Interview February 2nd, 2013). Regarding the issue of rape, a women leader in Dongeak Payam stated that “rape has not been an issue in our Payam, even before the disarmament [process] started” (Interview February 4th, 2013). However, survey instrument used could not establish if rape was indeed not an issue or not mentioned due to the stigma on rape.

A great majority of the respondents (95.0% among all groups) stated military force was used during the process of disarmament particularly in searches (Fig.21).

Payam administrators provided a slightly different view regarding the use of force in their Payam; 40.0% of the Payam administrators stated that the process in the Payam was peaceful and voluntary and that no use of force was reported. 60.0% reported that there were searches during the disarmament process. However, none of the Payam administrators in Duk County declared any cases of weapon owners being beaten up by the army forces.

The majority of respondents (96.6%) reported that the weapons were submitted to the army directly, and to a lesser degree to the local chiefs (5.0%). None of the respondents is aware about the final destination of the weapons; a member of the community of elders in Padiet Payam stated that “the guns were taken by the army, we don’t know where they took it” (Interview February 2nd, 2013).

**Figure 21. Use of force during the disarmament process – Duk**



**Security recommendations from the community**


When asked about the status of the disarmament campaign, the majority of respondents (80.0%) indicated that the process of disarmament concluded in their Payam. Only 6.6% said not to have any knowledge regarding the stage of the disarmament process at the moment of the survey.

*"[the government] should open more schools for everyone and the young (sic). Employment instead of focusing on raiding"*

*Interview Payam Administrator Dongcak Payam*

The great majority of respondents in the county stated that an increase in the police force (100.0%) and the army force (80.0%) is necessary to guarantee stability and security in the Payam. 91.6% stated that disarming the neighbouring Payams is necessary in order to promote peace and stability in all counties of Jonglei State. A smaller percent of respondents (13.3%) stated that the army should return weapons to the community to deter neighbouring youth from attacking the Payam.

**Figure 22. Security needs for the community – Duk**



Few respondents stated a need to increase educational programs that provide employment opportunities to the youth. The majority of respondents place a clear emphasis on the need to disarm neighboring communities, particularly Murle youth in Pibor, while also increasing police force and army force.



# County Profile Bor South County, Jonglei State

## Introduction

In March 12th, president Salva Kiir Mayardit decreed the beginning of the disarmament campaign in Bor, Jonglei State, in response of the dreadful levels of insecurity among the different counties in Jonglei. Over 4,000 rifles were collected in Bor during the following days in the first week, providing positive projections to the outcomes of the disarmament project. However, the continuation of gun violence has led to a rising perception of insecurity. This has been mainly because some members of the community were believed to have evaded the disarmament campaign – which was mainly in the form of search-and-seizures. There are persisting threats of attacks by members loyal to the rebel leader David Yau Yau. Over 1500 heads of cattle were lost - to cattle raids conducted by armed groups - by the communities of Bor South County between March 2012 and January 2013. Bor Members of Parliament in January 2013 also threatened to sue the government for disarming the communities but not providing protection to them.<sup>58</sup>



## Payam and Interview Groups.

- Kolnyanj**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

- Jallie**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

- Baidit**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

- Makwuach**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders

- Anyidu**  
 1 Payam Administrator  
 4 Women Groups  
 4 Youth Groups  
 4 Community of Elders


58 Gurtong 2013. Bor leaders ask government to protect disarmed civilians. Available at <<http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/9067/Bor-Leaders-Urge-Government-To-Protect-Disarmed-Communities.aspx>> [Accessed March 10, 2013]

**Disarmament Process Evaluation**

All the Payams in Bor County report having police stations, army bases and traditional courts. 58.3% of the respondents acknowledged having access to a judicial court, which is expected since Bor South County hosts the capital of Jonglei State. The majority of respondents (66.6%) state that the security level has slightly improved since the end of the disarmament campaign while only 3.3% consider that security has improved considerably since the end of the disarmament process.

County Population Information	
Total population (Source: 2008 Census)	221106
Current (2012) population (Source: Est from NBS)	245318
Disarmament Process Last Year	Yes
Number of Primary Schools	57 – 75.4% Government
Male – Female Enrolment	58.5% male - 41.5% Female
Poverty Headcount (Less than 1.25US\$ day)	50%

Community responses challenged the responses of Payam administrators who considered that the security situation had deteriorated since the end of the disarmament process (60.0%). The remaining Payam administrators (40.0%) stated that security remained the same since the conclusion of the disarmament process.



The great majority of respondents (95.0%) stated that cattle raiding remains as the number one concern among both community leaders and Payam administrators. Robbery follows as the second security concern among the communities in Bor South (30.0%). According to Both Payam administrators and traditional community leaders, the number of abductions has fallen significantly over the last years. The issue of abductions was presented as a security improvement for the Payam administrator of Anyidi, who stated: “Abductions are not a problem anymore; we have not report any more abduction cases in the Payam”. (Anyidi Payam administrator)


When inquired about security areas to which the government should devote more attention, the majority of respondents state that cattle raiding, abductions and homicides are critical areas of attention. A youth representative from Kolnyanj explained that, although dormant, abductions and homicides could possibly rise up again as, “when there is a problem with security, you have many problems with security. If cattle raiding continue, peace and security are going to be affected in other areas” (Interview February 6th).

*“[the government needs to] open the road for security forces, Increase armed forces, [and] disarmed all the counties”*

*Interview Payam Administrator Anyidi Payam*

The great majority of respondents (96.6%) acknowledged that the disarmament exercise was compulsory, and that force was often times used during the disarmament process. Searches were the primary use of force during the disarmament process (98.3%), followed by situations in which the army used direct force against civilians unwilling to give up their weapons. It is interesting that while for the disarmament forces, searches were voluntary, for the communities, it was a forcible means of recovery. It is important to note that there was no prior call for communities to surrender their arms at designated locations. This means that, even if civilians had the intention to peacefully and voluntarily surrender their weapons, it was impossible to do so. Without such a clear period of amnesty – usually considered an important phase from a normative perspective – it is difficult to give a peaceful touch of symbolism to the process. A search-and-seizure approach communicates a general preconceived notion of the unwillingness of communities to surrender their weapons in the disarmament campaign.


**Figure 24. Types of Force used during disarmament in Bor South**



All representatives of women and youth groups in the county affirmed that during the process of disarmament, the army harassed civilians without weapons. When inquired if the cases of harassment were reported, the great majority of respondents (83.3%) affirmed that such cases of harassment were brought to the Payam and traditional authorities. All the cases of reported harassment had satisfactory results, as the army did not beleaguered civilians without weapons after the report.

**Security recommendations from the community**

All respondents stated that the disarmament campaign needs to continue. However, community leaders emphasized that major adjustment have to be considered in order to promote a more peaceful process. A youth community leader in Baidit Payam stated that “disarmament should be uniform, and searches should be done in consultation with the owners of the houses and places” (Interview Baidit Payam, January 5th 2013). Uniformity was a major concern among all respondents who stated that disarmament should take place in all counties, in order to avoid leaving counties defenceless against their neighbours.



The majority of youth leaders do not feel comfortable with the security forecast in their communities. During an interview, a youth leader from Makwuach Payam stated “[the government should] return back the guns, for our protection and our property” (Interview Makwuach Payam, January 4th 2013). Increasing army and police forces, and disarming neighbors are among the most important recommendations from the communities in Bor.

*“We need more police to patrol and to capture the people who steal cows and goats”*

*Interview Payam Administrator Makwuach Payam*

The community also recognized that there are several structural issues hindering their security, particularly with regard to the state of the road system, and the lack of educational institutions for the youth. Finally, all Payam administrators acknowledged the need to create laws that particularly address punishment and sanctions for civilians carrying weapons post disarmament.









