

# HUMAN SECURITY IN THE BORDERLANDS OF SUDAN, UGANDA AND KENYA



**Key advocacy issues from the perspective of a grassroots  
peace building programme for youth warriors**

IKV Pax Christi works for peace, reconciliation and justice in the world. We join with people in conflict areas to work on a peaceful and democratic society. We enlist the aid of people in the Netherlands who, like IKV Pax Christi, want to work for political solutions to crises and armed conflicts. IKV Pax Christi combines knowledge, energy and people to attain one single objective: there must be peace!

Seeds of Peace Africa (SOPA) International is a peace building and conflict transformation organisation working for the empowerment of children, young people and women through non-violent means, conflict transformation and peace education for them to participate in building positive peace, sustainable development and respect for human dignity in realizing a just and friendly world.

July 2011



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This analysis has been prepared by the Cross-border Peace & Sports Programme for Youth Warriors coordinated by Seeds of Peace Africa (SOPA) International and IKV Pax Christi. Special thanks to the coordinators and staff of the civil society organisations implementing this program in Sudan/Uganda/Kenya, for their continuous efforts in contributing to peaceful co-existence for communities in the borderlands.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

Bishop Paride Taban, together with Seeds of Peace Africa International (SOPA) and IKV Pax Christi initiated a grassroots peace building programme for youth warriors<sup>1</sup> in the borderlands of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda<sup>2</sup>, called the Peace & Sports programme (P&S). Paride Taban is emeritus Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Torit and patron of Kuron Peace Village initiated in 1997 to reduce conflict between the cattle raiding communities sharing the grazing areas astride the borders of Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei States in South Sudan. SOPA is a Kenyan based organization working to transform young people exposed to violence into agents of peace. IKV Pax Christi is the largest faith-based advocacy group on peace, reconciliation and justice based in the Netherlands.

The P&S programme started in January, 2007. It brings together karacuna, young men of the warrior age-grade, from pastoral communities in the Karamoja cluster<sup>3</sup> that engage in cattle raiding – from the Jie and Dodoth in Uganda, the Turkana in Kenya and the Toposa, Buya, Didinga, Jiye and Murle<sup>4</sup> in Sudan. They are given the opportunity to participate in sports activities, conflict resolution meetings and peace manifestations.

The programme is entering a new phase. The P&S programme has a network of participating organisations that have an interesting advocacy potential. There is a broad range of connections: grassroots stakeholders in security including the potential authors of insecurity on one end of the spectrum; international forums dealing with human security, small arms control, development and pastoralism on the other end, and in the middle Community Based Organisations (CBOs) located in the administrative centres of the Karamoja Cluster.

Ongoing within this network are a number of advocacy/lobbying conversations:

- (1) Between the CBOs, kraalleaders and the warrior groups about responses to violence;
- (2) Between the CBOs in the three countries on security issues with a coordinating and supporting role for *Seeds of Peace Africa* (SOPA);
- (3) Between SOPA and other organisations participating in Kenyan and East African regional networks dealing with security issues and having access to regional intergovernmental organisations;
- (4) Partnership of local CBOs/NGOs and churches with international peace organisations like IKV Pax Christi provides these organisations with a bridgehead to European and global civil society networks dealing with security. IKV Pax Christi has access to European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) forums and can carry the lobby to the highest level. This network links young men motivated to change the conditions that predestine them to a short life full of violence to the corridors of the UN.

### **Human security in the Karamoja Cluster**

Security and livelihoods in the border areas of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan are permanently under threat as a result of the interplay of four interlinked sets of factors:

- *Absence and/or inadequate state protection and response* – for the three states the border areas are economically and politically marginal. While policing urban centres, mining or cash crop producing areas can be seen as an economic investment, protecting the unproductive pastoralists against one another is easily dismissed as wasteful philanthropy. The general sentiment is that pastoralists should take care of their protection.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See 'background document 2007-2011' under 'documentation' at <http://www.peaceandsports.org>

<sup>2</sup> P&S programme has been implemented by Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) and Dodoth Agro-pastoralist Development Organisation (DADO) in Uganda, by Lokkichoggio Oropoi Kakuma Development Organisation (LOKADO) in collaboration with Diocese of Lodwar and Lopeo in Kenya, by Catholic Diocese of Torit (CDOT), Losolia Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (LRDA) and Kuron Peace Village located in Eastern Equatoria South Sudan. In the first years Pibor Development Association in Boma, Sudan, also implemented until the organization stopped existing.

<sup>3</sup> The Karamojong live in the southern part of Karamoja region in the north-east of Uganda, occupying an area equivalent to one tenth of the country. According to anthropologists, the Karamojong are part of a group that migrated from present-day Ethiopia around 1600 A.D. and split into two branches, with one branch moving to present day Kenya to form the Kalenjin group and Maasai cluster. The other branch, called Ateker, migrated westwards. Ateker further split into several groups, including Turkana in present day Kenya, Iteso, Dodoth or Dodos, Jie, Karamojong, and Kumam in present day Uganda, also Jiye and Toposa in southern Sudan all of them together now known as the "Teso Cluster" or "Karamojong Cluster". According to their own memory, the Toposa, Jiye and Nyangatom migrated from the South.

<sup>4</sup> The Buya, Didinga, and Murle being speakers of languages of the Surma group, are linguistically speaking not part of the Karamojong Cluster. They, however, share the same culture of cattle raiding with the speakers of Akarimojong and related dialects.

<sup>5</sup> A classic example where the government used the community as frontline defense in special situations is a diplomatic riot in 2010 between Sudan and Kenya over the Nadapal-Lokkichoggio border. When Kenya moved its immigration offices 24 kms towards Nadapal triggering war of words with Toposa leaders who felt their ancestral land was being grabbed by Kenya. At one point, the community mobilized young men and engaged the Kenyan army in sporadic shooting. The government responded to this demand by the community by tacitly arming the community to confront the Kenyans.

- *Vicious and recurrent cycles of inter-communal conflict*- to address this challenge the determination of the communities to stop or to condone the violence is of decisive importance and remains a challenge in an environment where revenge is part of the cultural makeup and not hitting back is ridiculed as a sign of ‘feminine’ weakness. Breaking the cycle is difficult. In the case of the P & S programme the focus was on changing this warrior mentality and in persuading feuding communities to negotiate amicable solutions to their conflicts. It has also been instrumental in consolidating peace agreements by taking preventative action, after raids, by tracing stolen livestock and arranging for the return of stolen animals to rightful owners. These interventions have been proven to reduce incidences of raiding.

- *Heavy presence of small arms and weapons and availability of ammunition*- There is little communities can do on their own as long as the state leaves them to their own devices and neighbouring communities - some of whom are in other countries-continue to use guns. Only a coordinated international effort combined with a locally well-informed police force can help.

- *Absence of concrete economic programmes and opportunities* - big investors are unlikely to come to the borderland regions unless security is guaranteed and a responsible state is in full control. Yet, economic conditions can improve even before the area is secure if initiatives are locally based. The emergence of cross-border markets is a hopeful development in this respect.

Each of these factors draws a specific dynamic and will need to be addressed in its own way. Apart from inter-communal conflicts, these other conditions are largely beyond the control of the communities that are suffering from these consequences<sup>6</sup>. Governments and other stakeholders must therefore attend to these problems. Drawing the attention of these actors to the plight of these communities nationally and along the affected borders through advocacy by citizen groups can make an important difference. The P&S network is a grassroots channel through which important contributions in building national and international support for government measures that will curb feuding and raiding can be generated. For example there is a need to introduce



*Toposa warrior wants to cross an area with his animals, but has to hand in his gun first at a police post in South Sudan*

mistake-proof methods of registration of ownership of livestock. Cross-border coordinated branding would be a tremendous instrument in the hands of the police in order to curb raiding across borders. Research is needed on how all these could be made cheaper and these measures would be best handled by governments.

### **Composition of the report**

The report successively deals with the four threats to human security as outlined above and as they present themselves to the communities in the borderlands of each of the three countries. For each threat the response of state, civil society and community actors will be described and analysed. On the basis of this analysis key advocacy issues can be circulated at different levels of action: by CBOs at the district/county and state levels in the borderlands, in the case of P&S network by SOPA at the national and regional level in the Horn of Africa, and by IKV Pax Christi at the international level.

The information on this study has been collected through interviews with governmental and non-governmental actors in the three countries, in Nairobi, Kampala, Torit, Kotido and Kaabong during the months of August and September 2010. A list of interviews is attached. The report has benefited from the studies listed in the bibliography. The author gained additional perspectives and understanding of the issues dealt with in this report in the course of ten years of involvement in peace work in Southern Sudan and Karamoja.

<sup>6</sup> See also the 2011 documentary produced by JISK Film Peace Beyond Borders on warriors' perspectives on the security dilemma's they face in the borderlands, a joint initiative of the partners implementing the Cross-border Peace & Sports programme for youth warriors in collaboration with Seeds of Peace Africa, IKV Pax Christi and the Netherlands Sports Alliance.

## II. THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS BY THEIR STATES

### A. STATE REMEDIES TO TEMPER ITS FAILURE TO PROTECT

After examining the efforts of the governments of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda to minimise the effects of their failure to create a secure environment for their citizens, the response of the communities and the civil society in the three countries to the lack of security will be described and analysed.

#### Kenya

In areas affected by high rates of criminality the police are supported by the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) commonly referred to as 'Home Guards' in northern Kenya and 'Reservists' in urban areas. They are voluntary and operate under the Officer-in-Charge of the District Police. Their primary role is to act as an intelligence outpost and in vast areas they are usually the only police presence. They receive one month's training upon recruitment and are provided a gun, usually of an obsolete type. They operate without uniform or a distinctive badge. They do not receive remuneration and they do not retire.

The origins of this voluntary force dates back to World War II when there was shortage of police officers. They are deployed to fill the gap in policing often at the request of citizens. They are usually members of the communities they are to police. For example, after a wave of banditry cases in December 2007, the President in an election rally in Kabarnet, ordered for the expansion of the number of Police Reservists at the request of the local Member of Parliament in that locality. When they die, the District Police is not notified so that their guns pass to people unknown to the Police Service. After 60 years this could have resulted in a significant numbers of 'ghost KPRs' contributing to the proliferation of arms in the country.<sup>7</sup>

In many areas the force has become controversial. As informers of crime suspects in their communities, they are more susceptible to corruption, also because they usually deal with larger numbers of better armed men. They have been reported to be involved in crimes. For this reason the urban KPR were disbanded in 2004. In the towns provision of security has now become the domain of private security companies. Security experts believe that by now, the number of personnel employed

in private security companies equals that of the security forces of the state.<sup>8</sup>

From the point of view of the marginalised pastoralist communities, the least one can say is that the deployment of the KPR is a risky solution. Though they may function as a link to the state security apparatus, they can only survive by making their own –usually illegal– deals with the armed actors who control the place. They contribute to the general lack of transparency in security arrangements. Findings published in a 2003 Practical Action/ITDG report on the situation in Samburu, remain true today and summarise best some of the challenges of dealing with the KPR: The presence of Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) has not eased conflicts in the district and as such should be disarmed, retrained or new recruits enlisted.<sup>9</sup>

One of the recommendations of the report is: "There is inadequate policing of pastoralists areas as both the national and district police and security forces are either unable or unwilling to confront cattle rustlers who have more often than not struck with impunity. State's obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is conspicuously under siege in northern Kenya. This has greatly contributed to the spiralling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The state arming of local vigilante groups, popularly known as 'Home Guards' in response to security problems, has exacerbated the cattle rustling conflict rather than ease the situation. Legal state arms issued to these groups have been used in criminal activities including cattle raiding."<sup>10</sup> (Practical Action/ITDG, 2003: 64)

It is likely that the KPR institution is used by government and politicians as a convenient and cheap pretext for them to be seen to serve the security needs of these communities. In 2003 the Government launched the National Task Force on Police Reforms in which Community Based Policing plays an important role. A new set of Standard Operating Procedures on Community Policing has been included in the Police Reform Framework. Though these have not yet been ratified, pilot projects are already on course in different parts of the country.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> [www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/dec07/2007191201.htm](http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/dec07/2007191201.htm)

<sup>8</sup> Gumedze, Sabelo, *The Private Security Sector in Africa, The 21st century's major cause for concern?* ISS Paper 133, Febr. 2007

<sup>9</sup> Practical Action (ITDG, 2003) p.32

<sup>10</sup> Practical Action (ITDG, 2003),p. 64

<sup>11</sup> Practical Action: *Peace and Security in the Karamoja Cluster*, 2009:p.19.

## Uganda

Addressing insecurity among the pastoralists of Karamoja has for a long time been a low priority for the Yoweri Museveni led government. The Karamojong were not a threat to the state. They were government allies during the Teso Rebellion and in the war against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The government had no interest in taking measures that had the potential of antagonising the people of Karamoja. On the other hand, the government was under strong pressure from the people in the neighbouring districts who were victims of the cattle raids carried out by the Karamojong<sup>12</sup>, especially in Acholi and Teso, to react or offer protection.

### *Government Initiatives: Vigilantes and LDUs*

The first government initiative to regain some control of the persistent fighting and feuding came in 1993 with the establishment of the Karamoja Pacification Committee. It formed the 'vigilantes', a community based paramilitary force. The 'prestigious' warriors from the raiding communities were brought together in a coordinated anti-stock theft force. The expectation was that through their networks among the members of the warrior's age-grade, the vigilantes would be able to track raiders, recover stolen cattle, keep the roads safe, and act as role models for the *karacuna* and as a consequence attract other warriors to the force. The immediate bonus for joining the vigilantes was that those who joined would have their gun legalised and earn a modest monthly salary from the army.<sup>13</sup>

For the first two years the programme was successful, even beyond expectation. People used roads without fear of being ambushed. However, two things brought down this success. One was when the communities bordering on Karamoja who on seeing the success of the vigilantes demanded that a similar force be established in their areas to protect them. These demands although justified implied that the force could not remain exclusively Karamojong. The Teso and Acholi communities also demanded that the force would work under the police, and not under the army. As communities that had –or still were- hosts to rebel movements their memories of the UPDF were not altogether positive.

The second factor contributing to the demise of the vigilantes was the fact that the vigilantes continued to stay in their communities of origin, in close contact with the raiders. During the period that the vigilantes-force was being restructured under the police so that it could also take care of the security needs of the neighbours of the Karamojong, the payment of salaries by the army was repeatedly delayed. Without salaries, opposed to be mixed with other non-Karamojong groups under the police of which the vigilantes did not have a high opinion, the vigilantes lost interest in the whole project. Their loyalty to their communities regained the upper hand and they rejoined raiding parties. Some of vigilantes' commanders became commanders of raiders.

Because of the confusion the government disbanded the vigilantes and introduced a new force: the Local Defence Units (LDU's), a paramilitary model also used in other parts of the country. The LDUs were –again- recruited from among the warrior's age grade and included former vigilantes. To discourage closeness to their communities they were made to stay in the army barracks. They were not happy in the barracks. They were not provided uniforms and they received only limited training. Salary payments remained irregular making them feel like second class soldiers. During a conference on disarmament that IKV Pax Christi organised in Moroto, Uganda in 2003, the LDU participants were unanimous in their preference to be removed from the barracks and to report to the civilian authorities at the sub-county level.<sup>14</sup>

The LDU deployment plan fizzled out when the rumour grew that they would be co-opted to fight the LRA insurgents. In the end, some joined the army and fought in Acholiland, others were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) while most returned to their communities.

### *RELOKAs and nayokotuk*

An important lesson of the first disarmament campaign (2001-03) was that disarmed communities were vulnerable to attack from not yet disarmed communities, and were likely to re-arm as soon as they could. So during the second disarmament which started off in 2006 the UPDF offered to protect the cattle of

<sup>12</sup> Karamojong is used as the collective name of the dozen or so ethnic groups inhabiting the Karamoja Region which include the Karimojong living in Moroto and Nakapiripirit District.

<sup>13</sup> It is not without interest to know that according to many Karamojong the vigilantes idea is associated with the name of the Italian Comboni father Don Vittorio Pastori who died in 1994. He is remembered for his hunger relief work in Karamoja and is the founder of the Italian NGO 'Cooperazione e Sviluppo'. A youth centre in Moroto has been named after him.

<sup>14</sup> Pax Christi/OPM/UHRC, p.

disarmed communities in a limited number of UPDF controlled kraals. The principal objective of this strategy was to support the ongoing disarmament operation. It will be discussed in the section devoted to disarmament.

In the meantime, at the national level in Kampala, the debate on the relationship between security and development resulted in the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). It outlined a strategy based on progressive synergy between development, restoration of law and order and security and small arms disarmament. In 2008 KIDDP was revised to accommodate the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) that was one of the outcomes of the peace negotiations between Uganda government and the LRA. The PRDP included Karamoja and provided a framework for reconstruction and development for the whole northern Uganda region. In the framework of the wider KIDDP, a programme for police reform in Karamoja was launched, under the banner '*Restoration of Law and Order in the Karamoja Area*' (RELOKA). It was promptly implemented. By September 2008, 1200 persons had been recruited, partly from Karamoja, partly from the rest of the country. In an interview with the Police Commander in Kaabong in August 2010, about half of the planned numbers had been deployed in the sub-counties, at a rate of 10 RELOKAs per sub-county. In Kaabong District only 2 (out of 11) sub-counties were still without police station. These numbers should be compared to the only 100 (according to other informants 150) policemen in the whole of Karamoja in 2008, mainly deployed in district and county headquarters.<sup>15</sup>

The newly recruited policemen receive extensive training in new district police quarters (Kotido, Abim, Kaabong, Moroto). The buildings and transport equipment are funded under the Justice, Law and Order Programme of the Netherlands Embassy in Kampala (≈ 4 million). The landing of RELOKAs in the community was not as soft as had been planned - according to IKV Pax Christi partners in Northern Karamoja. The RELOKAs who do not come from Karamoja have it rough. They are usually ill-prepared to police the battle hardened warriors. In February 2009 it was reported that 66 out 1200 RELOKAs, almost all non-Karamojong deserted.<sup>16</sup>

The RELOKAs are currently reinforced by a new generation of locally recruited, trained, contracted, salaried, and uniformed community police who will act as a specialised tracking and anti-stock theft force known locally as *nayokotuk*. Popularly they are still known as Local Defence Units (LDUs). They are deployed at sub-county level, at about 100 per sub-county working with the police (mainly RELOKA types) and the Sub-County Security Committees.<sup>17</sup> Some have already run away due to long delay of their salary payments. Locally, people suspect the money has been used by the government during the recent election campaigns.

It is as if the demands put forward by the LDUs in the 2003 meeting in Moroto have point-by-point been granted (Pax Christi: 2004:38-39). The big difference between now and then is the presence of a police that has the will and capacity to be effective. Other developments are also encouraging. Before 2008, Karamoja had only one operational court. Now all five districts have magistrates and courts. Ambushes have become rarer. The roads continue to be patrolled by the UPDF. During a two hour - 70 kms- journey by car from Kotido to Kaabong, those undertaking this study were able to count seven UPDF units some marching on the road, others in the bushes at a distance from the road. SOPA and IKV Pax Christi partners grudgingly admit improvements in security: 'We can now safely call for meetings without fear of someone pulling a gun to underscore his point'. In addition, the relationship between the UPDF and Turkana herdsmen improved over time. According to local partners in Karamoja this is due to the perseverance of the Turkana in abstaining from cattle raiding. This has earned them a relatively good name.

However, there are allegations that UPDF soldiers are still involved in corrupt practices. The monitoring of UPDF by *nayokotuk* helped to reduce the corruption. The chapter on disarmament will look at the persistent insecurity caused by the disarmament operations and the standoff between the last warriors and UPDF.

### **Sudan**

Safeguarding the gains made after the brokering and signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and ensuring its successful implementation are the chief priorities of the Government of southern Sudan (GOSS) and of most states like Eastern Equatoria State (EES).

<sup>15</sup> For a comprehensive view of the Government disarmament plans see: <http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/downloads/0204Karamoja/KIDDP.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/regional-special/Police\\_officers\\_desert\\_Karamoja\\_80037.shtml](http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/regional-special/Police_officers_desert_Karamoja_80037.shtml)

<sup>17</sup> In the administrative structure, a district is subdivided into Counties and Municipalities or Towns depending on their size and other criteria set by the Ministry of Local Government. Every County is further subdivided into sub-counties.





*Herd of goats and cattle drinking water in Turkana West*

Preventing an all out war and avoid provocations that might trigger unrest until the referendum on self-determination was held and its outcome implemented has been the government's first preoccupation. The emphasis on security has been geared towards developing an efficient and effective armed force whose primary responsibility is to defend the burgeoning state, not human security, including the protection of citizens and their property which are subordinate to this larger goal.<sup>18</sup>

The few police posts<sup>19</sup> that have been established since the CPA signing are largely ineffective and are no match

to the usually armed civilians. Arrested suspects usually find ways to escape<sup>20</sup> especially where the responsible policemen are former soldiers originating from the same communities. In conflicts with other communities the police close ranks with their community becoming parties to the conflicts thereby rendered useless and prejudiced in settling conflicts with other communities. Few police are found at the payam level (the local administrative unit). In 2009, in Ikwoto County, eastern Equatoria, for example, out of a total of 100 policemen 50 were stationed in the County Headquarters.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.gossoonline.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/Finance/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content\\_files/file5/GoSS%20Expenditure%20Priorities%20and%20Funding%20Needs%202008.pdf](http://www.gossoonline.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/Finance/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file5/GoSS%20Expenditure%20Priorities%20and%20Funding%20Needs%202008.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> In 2008 when Schomerus carried out a survey of insecurity in EES, there were only 15 police officers in the State, Schomerus, 2009: p 47.

<sup>20</sup> Clement Ochan, Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order, Feinstein International Center, 2007:p.21

<sup>21</sup> Small Arms Survey, Symptoms and Causes, Insecurity and Underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria, 2009: p9.

### *Eastern Equatoria*

The security on most roads in Eastern Equatoria still oscillates between UN levels 2 and 3 with occasional peaks into 4. Level 3 requires driving in convoy or with an armed escort. Large scale cattle raiding continues unabated. There are frequent cases of ‘cold blood killing’ (also known as ‘unnecessary killing’) reported. In the period immediately following the takeover by Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of the State’s HQs in 2005 there was political willingness to deal firmly with communities that caused insecurity. Since the violent confrontations between the SPLA and the people of the village of Loguruny in May 2008, there have been no new reports of such firm action. Especially in Ikwoto and Budi Counties raiders have become a law unto themselves. They are ensconced in their cattle camps in the Kidepo Valley. The safest way for villagers not to be robbed of their cattle is to give them up to the raiders to guard. The raiders are reputedly heavily armed and militarily effective. A possible explanation for the SPLA government not confronting these groups head-on is to avoid that they become a recruitment ground for of pro-Khartoum agents with a mission of undermining the CPA.

On a positive note, in 2010 the government of EES started to implement a programme to redistribute the existing police in equal numbers over the communities in 8 counties making sure local contingents are ethnically mixed. In addition a badge of 400 policemen were trained by EES with UNMIS assistance to join the existing police. UNMIS itself stated that the emphasis of the training was on ‘VIP protection’ and ‘crowd control’

and in fact only a small number of police was equipped with perspex shields, helmets and rubber truncheons. These fresh police forces will no doubt face mobility problems especially in the vast pastoral areas. Apart from this training at State level, GOSS in Rejaf, Juba has built a police training college together with UNDP. Meanwhile, several thousand policemen received training here. The training was not perfect. In a late stage it was discovered that trainees suffered the kind of abuse and harassment reminiscent of the SPLA its harsher days. However, the rule of law will no doubt expand thanks to these investments. Police posts will soon be opened at payam level<sup>22</sup>. This due to a partnership between UNDP and the government.

### *Conclusion*

Between the 3 countries, Uganda appears to be making the most serious efforts in taking measures that will offer the people of Karamoja the same protection as other citizens. The establishment of full control by the state, however, is accompanied by an explosion of violence, in many respects worse than the low intensity inter-communal fighting. It is leading to the pauperisation of significant numbers of citizens. In contrast, Kenya seems to shy away from drastic measures – possibly drawing lessons from Karamoja or because of a persistent lack of concern for its northern parts. In South Sudan policies aimed at protecting the citizens have been overruled by considerations to consolidate the achievements of the war and to ensure that the CPA is implemented and conditions were set for the inauguration and building of the new state, the Republic of South Sudan from the 9<sup>th</sup> of July 2011 onwards.

## **B. COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO THE STATE’S FAILURE TO PROTECT**

### **Kenya**

In the absence of state protection, inevitably, pastoralist communities opt for self-protection. This has been a natural choice for these communities for decades now. The time that there was no state in charge of protection is still within living memory. The difference with the older days is the larger quantity and increased effectiveness of the firearms and ammunition at the disposal of the community. While the desire to have arms to protect oneself may seem to be legitimate to the outsider, using them in cattle raiding certainly does not. A situation emerges where the distinction between the ‘legitimate’ use of guns in self-defence and their

illegitimate use in raids blurs. The ‘legal’ guns of the few Home Guards, in the village, only make the situation more confusing.

The conclusion of the Practical Action/ITDG report previously mentioned states the following:

‘The State’s obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is conspicuously under siege in northern Kenya. This has greatly contributed to the spiralling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The state arming of local vigilante groups popularly known as Home Guards, in response to security

<sup>22</sup> Eastern Equatoria State is divided into 8 counties each divided into payams (between 2-8 per county) which consist on average of 5 bomas. An IKV Pax Christi and SOPA partner is aware of 7 police posts under construction: 3 in Kapoeta South County (Namorunyang, Katiko and Talabara), 2 in Kapoeta North County and 2 posts on the Kapoeta-Torit road on Lobira Junction and Towhbak Hills -areas notorious for road ambushes-

problems, has exacerbated the cattle rustling conflict rather than ease the situation. Legal state arms issued to these groups have been used in criminal activities including cattle raiding.<sup>23</sup>

Among the pastoral communities of Northern Kenya military and policing roles are accommodated by the traditional warrior age-grades (*karacuna*, *moran*, etc). Among the predominantly agricultural and urban communities self defence groups have emerged to

safeguard community rights in land (Sabaot Land Defense Force, the Kalenjin Land Defenders), offer protection against crime (Mungiki, Taliban) or can be called upon to confront rivalling political blocks.<sup>24</sup> Some of these groups have evolved into religious sects (Mungiki); others have assumed quasi-statal powers, developing their own laws and penal code. This is the case with the Sungusungu of the pastoralist Kuria who live astride the border of Kenya and Tanzania. The Sungusungu are a community response to widespread



*Children watching a Kenya Police Reservist*

<sup>23</sup> Practical Action/ITDG report, p 64

<sup>24</sup> Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), Kalenjin Land Defenders (KLD), Mungiki, Taliban, Sungusungu, etc.);see also Fourth Review Report, The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project, Status of Implementation of Agenda Items 1-4, p.8, item 26.

insecurity caused by arms proliferation<sup>25</sup>, cattle raiding and banditry to which the state authorities had no answer. They developed their own system to track stolen cattle; they hold regular trials, impose fines and mete out punishment. Since they alleviated the work of the state security forces, the government welcomed them. However, the Sungusungu penal code was in many ways more severely punitive than that of the state and its implementation often violated human rights principles. The desirability of communities taking over essential functions of the state is now more and more being questioned.<sup>26</sup> The Kuria experience is relevant for the peoples in the Karamojong cluster. For many years there has been a call to re-empower the institution of '*ameto*' the tradition punishment mechanism among the *Ateker* peoples. The Sungusungu experience would make one weary of such empowerment.

In this context the provision of security as a private income generating activity should finally be mentioned. In Marakwet, on road stretches that are considered risky, groups of armed young men offer protection to motorists against a fee.<sup>27</sup>

### Uganda

The fact that for a long period the government was not willing or able to protect the communities of Karamoja against their neighbours has been an important justification for these communities to arm themselves. As in Kenya, the firearms intensified and multiplied the existing conflicts. As in Kenya they set in motion inexorable cycles of revenge with which traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were no longer able to cope. As a result of the exacerbation of conflict, the Karimojong, Karamoja's largest ethnic community that had for hundreds of years been able to maintain its unity fell apart into three hostile sections, Bokora, Matheniko and Pian.

The weakness of the Ugandan state not only created a vacuum in which domestic conflict could escalate unchecked but it also created new opportunities for the Karamojong. For instance, they gave military support to the government in the suppression of the rebellions in neighbouring Teso and Acholi which was for them chance to thoroughly destock their neighbours, unhindered by the

government. The raiding of the Teso continued till long after the Teso Rebellion was over leading in 2001 to the displacement of over 100.000 Teso and the depletion of most of their livestock. It was this untenable situation that finally triggered the disarmament campaign of 2001.<sup>28</sup>

Endemic conflict resulted in limiting the areas where cattle can safely graze, thus causing overgrazing in some areas and underutilisation in others. No leader emerged that both had the confidence and ability to unify the tribes and end or redirect the bloodshed - as might have been the case during similar crises before the establishment of the colonial state. Instead, most leaders and representatives descended upon the communities competing for votes in parliament and in the District Councils, promising support against their current enemies without any real action. The communities entangled themselves in spirals of conflict. Despite some short term winners, in the long term most were losers. Presently, increasing numbers of Karamojong are realising this and many have started to migrate to the towns.<sup>29</sup>

### Sudan

During the past century there have only been two short periods during which the communities of Eastern Equatoria enjoyed a measure of state protection. The first period consists of the two or three decades after the colonial pacification by the Condominium government, the second, after the Addis Ababa agreement, only lasted one decade. The term 'protection' is here used in the limited sense of protection from attacks by neighbouring communities, not from the patrols of the government. For the now surviving generations, war has never an exceptional condition. Communities played a decisive military role during both civil wars.

Eastern Equatoria was the main battlefield of the first civil war. While not all communities were involved all the time, the Anyanya got all its support from the communities. During the war that just ended, most communities were affected by it most of the time. The splits in the SPLA, leading to changing alliances between factions and communities made the last war more destructive. It exacerbated ethnic tensions and caused the

<sup>25</sup> Kuria soldiers brought arms home from the liberation war in Uganda. The Kuria were overrepresented in the Tanzanian army that went to Uganda.

<sup>26</sup> Suzette Heald, 'State, Law and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania' *African Affairs*, 2005, 105/419:265-83

<sup>27</sup> ITDG: *Conflict in Northern Kenya*, 2003: p.51.

<sup>28</sup> KAUFU (Katawi Urafiki Foundation) with DENIVA (Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Association), Secondary Data Review of Iteso and Karamojong Conflict, [www.deniva.or.ug/.../programme-governance\\_teso\\_karamoja\\_review.doc](http://www.deniva.or.ug/.../programme-governance_teso_karamoja_review.doc)

<sup>29</sup> E.Stites, D. Mazurana, D. Akabwai, Out-migration, Return, and Resettlement in Karamoja, Uganda: The Case of Kobulin, Bokora County, Feinstein International Center, Briefing Papers, June 2007.

communities of Eastern Equatoria to fight one another as proxies of the factions. As in Karamoja and Northern Kenya, most armed conflicts are focused on livestock raiding. But in contrast to Karamoja and Northern Kenya, the experience of armed conflict in Eastern Equatoria has a political edge. The military support communities offer –or withhold– to the state is a political factor of some consequence. Many communities can rightly claim that

the CPA was an outcome of their fighting. With some exaggeration one could defend the thesis that in South Sudan it is rather the communities that protect the state than the reverse. One should therefore expect the governments of South Sudan and Eastern Equatoria to be careful in disarming the communities especially as long as the results of the referendum have not been fully accepted and implemented by both parties.

## C. CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES TO FAILING STATE PROTECTION

Under this heading, there will be a review of the different civil society initiatives that aim to address the protection gap left open by the state. It will be followed by a review of strategic roles that a local network of CSOs and churches such as the P&S network could play, taking into account the strategic priority given by IKV Pax Christi to promote human security in the context of the fragile states.

It has been observed that there is a rapidly growing number of civil society organisations active in the Karamoja Cluster, many of which have the protection of citizens as their main concern.<sup>30</sup> Apart from the church and its related agencies, CSOs are a recent phenomenon in the Karamoja cluster. In Kenya we witness a slow but steady growth of CBOs and NGOs since the early 90s. In Sudan the SPLA and other rebel factions allowed international non-governmental relief agencies to work in the areas under their control from the early 1990s. From the mid-90s indigenous NGOs emerged, partly as a result of an active policy of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the coordinating agency for relief under UNICEF. Since the CPA the scope of action and number of INGOs has expanded their focus shifting from relief to development. The national NGOs and CBOs that flourished during the war are now suffering from a severe brain drain to the international organisations and the government. While Karamoja in Uganda was a latecomer with respect to NGO action, it now seems to be ahead in the number of agencies, co-ordination structures and visibility in the media. As part of an

international pilot project, INGOs, NGOs, UN agencies operating in Northern Uganda collaborate in raising funds and in monitoring the implementation of the funded programmes. They have bi-annual coordination meetings with the government. The organisations are grouped into clusters according to the type of intervention they specialise in. The ‘protection cluster’, deals with security, law and order, human rights, and gender based violence. Some monitor compliance of the state security agencies with human rights standards, others provide support to specific target groups as displaced, returnees, children, victims of gender violence, etc. Taking into account the particularities of the groups and organisations that make up the P&S network there are three aspects of human security that deserve serious advocacy consideration. They are:

- Policing
- Gender-based violence
- Human rights compliance by security agencies.

### **The state and community policing**

The introduction of community policing is a favourite recommendation made in many CSO documents. In contrast, recommendation for broad police reforms or police expansion are largely absent. They seem to be an unpopular advocacy issue for CSOs.<sup>31</sup> Is it because government police apparatus are considered irredeemably rigid and corrupt? Or is there something to the concept of community policing that is secretly appealing to civil society organisations? Is it the

<sup>31</sup> Governments do not suffer from this bias, at least if we go by the support given by the Dutch government to the infrastructure and training of police.

democratic appeal that goes with self-organisation, or the aversion shared by both civil society and community, to the security machinery of the state? Whatever the case, the convergence between civil society advocacy priorities and the unwillingness or inability of governments to provide fully-fledged protection to geographically remote and economically marginal areas, is most unfortunate. By promoting community policing the CSOs unwittingly condone the governments' unwillingness to deploy police in remote and marginal areas.

In areas where conflicts between communities are the primary cause of insecurity an effective independent police force is a first requirement. It is obvious that inter-communal conflicts cannot be resolved by groups whose primary loyalty goes to their particular community. A government arming such community police groups fuels and exacerbates the conflicts between the communities. This dynamic has been borne out by the deployment of KPR in Northern Kenya and the successive generations of community based police (vigilantes, ASTUs, LDUs) in Karamoja. It should be a source of comfort that the governments in Karamoja and Eastern Equatoria are now expanding and reorganising their police force in terms of this understanding.

Community based police can only work in a context of trust between the community as a whole on one side, and the government police on the other. In the absence of trust, community policing makes conflicts more difficult to manage because the position of the community police between the community and the government will always be ambivalent and may divide the community into informers and suspects. The firepower entrusted to the community police will further complicate a negotiated resolution of conflicts. It is doubtful whether such considerations have been taken into account by the leadership of the RELOKA programme in Karamoja when they decided to supplement the police force with a community-based force of livestock trackers especially since trust between communities and government is at an all-time low.

During the war in Eastern Equatoria, protection of civilians was either in the hands of the one of the armies –SAF, SPLA, armies of other rebel factions- or the responsibility of armed community members who had organised themselves as vigilante groups. Communities

that were on good terms with one of the armies received help in setting up a system of home guards. Many communities had a poor relationship with the army which, in many places behaved as an occupying force, not respecting local rules with regards to access to women, marriage and rights over children. In Nimule, the Episcopal Church of Sudan took the initiative to set up a community policing unit that intervened when citizens' rights were violated. It enabled citizens, within certain limits, to lodge complaints against soldiers to top officers in the army. It succeeded in playing a preventative role and allowed citizens to resolve problems without having recourse to the army or the civil authorities put in place by the SPLA. The so-called Community Safety Committees in displaced camps in Sudan played a comparable buffer role.

In areas where there was no effective presence of the SPLA or SAF, churches and NGOs created community based bodies for the enforcement of peace and the law. The Peace Village established by Bishop Paride Taban in Kuron on the border of Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei is a case in point. The 'peace corps' operates under the responsibility of the retired bishop. It mainly deals with inter-communal conflict. The Bishop is seen as an impartial authority by the mutually hostile local communities. Under his auspices conflicts between the corps and surrounding communities, if they occur, stand a good chance of being resolved.

In the Western part of Eastern Equatoria, among the communities traditionally practising rule by the corporate age-grade of middle-aged men (*'monyomiji'*), IKV Pax Christi is involved in a programme to help create a working relationship based on trust between the newly created police and the *'monyomiji'*.

What to think of community based defence forces? They are in a different category from community police because they only serve in situations where communities are vulnerable to attack by an armed group of superior military force that may be intent on kidnapping community members, and/or robbing their food. When it comes to advocacy for the community's right to self-defence, CSOs should begin by reminding the state on whose territory the attacks take place, as well as the international community, of their responsibility to protect. The 'arrow-boys'<sup>32</sup> of the communities of Western Equatoria that are harassed by the LRA are a case in point. Here IKV Pax Christi

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<sup>32</sup> The name 'arrow-boys', referring to their not being fully and adequately armed, was first used for self-defense groups against LRA attacks in Northern Uganda.

advocated arming the arrow-boys in the interest of human security.

Community-based defence forces played an important role in the civil war in Sudan. The 'Popular Defence Forces' (PDF) of the communities just north of the North-South boundary in Kordofan and Darfur, actively participated in the war sometimes coordinating their attacks with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), sometimes acting on their own. The PDF were responsible for the slave raids into Bahr-el-Ghazal. Compared to state armies, community-based defence forces are less disciplined and thus more inclined to commit human rights violations and war crimes.

In the light of these observations, the creation of a community police force only means an improvement of protection in specific circumstances when there is a basis of trust between *all* the communities and the police. In the context of the cattle-raiding communities of the Karamoja Cluster there is no point to scatter 'the responsibility to protect' over a multitude of mutually hostile communities. What is needed is the creation of an impartial and effective police. In this respect there is an important difference in emphasis between the recommendations of this report and that of Practical Action.<sup>33</sup>

### **Protecting women from Gender-Based Violence (GBV)**

In the contexts of the war in Eastern Equatoria and the violence that accompanies the disarmament operations in Karamoja<sup>34</sup>, there has been a dramatic increase in gender-based violence. In August 2010 the MP for Pokot in Uganda caused a media stir when he accused the UPDF of condoning rape during its disarmament operations – allegations vigorously denied by the army<sup>35</sup>. In response to similar earlier claims, the organisations participating in the 'Protection Cluster for Karamoja' in Uganda have started to take action on GBV.<sup>36</sup> Within the Cluster, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) takes the lead in addressing GBV issues. This involves making a baseline assessment, creating awareness, reviewing current laws and their enforcement, providing post-sexual-violence health

services and a lot more. From the minutes of the Karamoja Regional Protection Meeting of 31<sup>st</sup> March 2010, progress in the implementation is slow. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is implementing a sensitisation campaign on GBV, training women groups, health workers and CBO staff with as primary aim to help increase GBV reporting rates. UNFPA has formally requested government health officials to instruct health units to be pro-active in the treatment of GBV survivors. But at the 31<sup>st</sup> March meeting the number of GBV cases reported to health officials had not changed. On another note, since it has been observed that women are most vulnerable to rape during firewood collection, UNFPA has developed a more efficient type of cooking stove. The times women go out for firewood has been significantly reduced and consequently the incidence of rapes has decreased.<sup>37</sup>

In Eastern Equatoria rape has been elevated to an important problem by intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies. This is because roads and paths between villages are generally unsafe for women and exposes them to rape and other forms of violence. A report of Small Arms Survey reports alone among women coming from surrounding villages to the market of Ikwoto, there are several cases of rape each month. Products carried to the market and purchases are often robbed. Of these cases only an estimated 3% are reported to the police.<sup>38</sup> In addition, during SPLA punitive operations in response to livestock raiding, rape is used as a weapon.<sup>39</sup>

In Budi and Ikwoto Counties of Eastern Equatoria, UNDP supports associations of women who practise group farming to be better protected against rape. UNDP provides them with a tractor to prepare the land so as to minimise the time they are at risk. In collaboration with the Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC), UNDP looks for ways to improve the collaboration between village leaders (*monyomiji*) and the police to improve the security of women and other citizens. Collaboration between police and village leaders is one of the objectives of the *Monyomiji Support Group*, a collaborative effort of five NGOs (CDoT, AIC, CRS, NCA,

<sup>33</sup> 'Peace and Security in the Karamoja Cluster: A Policy Review', 2009: p.41-2.

<sup>34</sup> Eria Olowo Onyango, Pastoralists In Violent Defiance Of The State: The Case of The Karimojong In Northeastern Uganda

<sup>35</sup> Human Right Watch Report, 2007: p.28,37,72,74. Uganda's Army under scrutiny for rights abuses in Karamoja, Political, Religious and civic leaders challenge UPDF's presumed clean record, The East African, 11-17 October 2010: 24-25.

<sup>36</sup> 'Making protection understood in Karamoja – a draft strategy for 2008' ([www.ugandaclusters.ug/.../ProtectionCluster-KaramojaStrategyFeb2008.doc](http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/.../ProtectionCluster-KaramojaStrategyFeb2008.doc))

<sup>37</sup> Karamoja Regional Protection Meeting , held in Moroto on 31-03-2010.

<sup>38</sup> Small Arms Survey, Symptom and causes..., April 2010: 5-6.

<sup>39</sup> Clement Ochan, Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order, Feinstein International Center, 2007:p.16,



Elder Toposa woman in Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan

IKV Pax Christi) that aims to connect the traditional governance and security structures focused on the *monyomiji* institution<sup>40</sup> to the formal government apparatus. Mentality change of young men is high on the agenda of the EES Government and UNDP and the EES Minister of Culture and Community/Social Development are open to projects that involve the young men in sports.

### Human rights

Advocating for compliance with human rights and exposing violators, has become a key role civil society actors play in contexts of repression and violence. The CBO partners of the P&S Programme collaborate with the respective national human rights commissions who have offices in Karamoja and in Eastern Equatoria as well as with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Through their networks the partners can make a useful contribution to the work of human rights organisations. Though the network is not geared to adopting human rights monitoring as its core business, they are able to cross-check information. Their support in advocacy campaigns on specific issues, for instance GBV, can be particularly valuable because of their grassroots connections.

Another way for partner organisations in the P&S network to promote human rights is by helping to establish and operate consultation mechanisms between the security forces and the communities. Only

Uganda seems to have put such mechanisms in place. IKV Pax Christi was one of the organisations advocating for the establishment of these centres during the first disarmament in Karamoja. The Centres served to report, investigate and address human rights violations. The current Civil Military Coordination Centres (CMCCs) have the reputation of being heavily biased in favour of UPDF. They are not trusted by the communities. Peace & Sports partners in Karamoja are completely disillusioned about the CMCCs. Since the Centres are considered hostile to the communities, they preferred not to be associated with them.

In the context of the current wave of accusations of UPDF, a concerted civil society campaign for the reform of the CMCCs may have a chance of finding a willing ear in government and army circles. The actors best placed to initiate such a campaign are the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and the Uganda Human Rights Commission.

In EES human rights action by civil society is inconspicuous. Yet the authorities complain that their hands are tied by the human rights watch dogs operating in the State. During the conference on the inclusion of *monyomiji* in governance, the EES Governor blamed the 'human rights agencies' of preventing him from taking effective action against cattle raiding and banditry in his state<sup>41</sup>. According to IKV Pax Christi sources, the governor really meant one specific CBO when he was referring to human rights agencies. One day the latter accused the governor of appropriating raided cattle for himself instead of returning them to the community that had been raided. In return, the governor arranged prison and house arrest over several months for the founder of this CBO.

The bi-annual report of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, documented 43,922 cases of civil and political rights violations between 2005 and 2010, 70% of which were carried out by state security organs, mainly the Kenya police<sup>42</sup>. Though it may not be their core business it is important that the partner organisations of the P&S programme co-operate where they can in reporting and addressing human rights violations.

<sup>40</sup> Monyomiji are the ruling age grade that takes over power from its predecessors once in 10 – 25 year depending on the community. Monyomiji ruel is practiced in the communities of EES that live west of the Kidepo Valley with the exception of the Madi and some of the Acholi communities.

<sup>41</sup> Intervention Aloisio Ojetuk Emor during conference "Engaging monyomiji: bridging the governance gap in East Bank Equatoria", report in preparation.

<sup>42</sup> Kenya: Police Lead in Human Rights Violation-Report, Daily Nation, 22 September 2010.





*Police post in Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan*

## D. CONCLUSIONS

1. The experience in the conflict ridden areas of the Karamoja cluster demonstrates that the creation of a community-based policing mechanism is not an effective remedy for improved human security, for two reasons:

Where the principal cause of insecurity is inter-communal conflict, a community-based police is powerless. To resolve conflicts and make peace agreements sustainable, a supra-communal authority is necessary and/or independent courts and law-enforcement agents with state backing.

In an environment marked by inter-communal conflict, the community policeman finds himself torn between the loyalty to his own community and loyalty to the state. When faced with a choice between the two, particularly when his longer term personal security is at stake, the likely choice is allegiance to his community. A community policeman by definition works in his community. There is no duty station to which he can be transferred in case his position is untenable. Another concern in this context is that community police may also prevent the state security forces from taking effective measures in addressing a conflict, for example by feeding the state's security forces with information with a negative bias

towards the community's enemies, information which the state is unlikely to be able to corroborate.

2. Inside the community, the human security of its members is optimal when the community is cohesive. Traditional mechanisms are more likely to be effective- and so are CSO efforts- in bringing about mentality change. Recruitment of a police that has double allegiance to community and state may negatively affect this cohesiveness.

3. CSOs have an important role to play in changing attitudes concerning gender-based violence and finding alternatives that allow women to go about their domestic responsibilities without exposing themselves to violence.

4. In their efforts to pacify the communities in the Karamoja Cluster, the security forces of the three countries, especially in Uganda and Sudan, instead of building trust, promote a climate of fear. In this context civil society organisations can help promote trust by closely monitoring the compliance of the state with human rights and, where possible, creating and sustaining mechanisms that reduce the use of violence by the state (civilian-military consultations).

## E. RECOMMENDATIONS

*Recommendations on protection for organisations participating at different levels and locations of the Peace and Sports network:*

### a. Grassroots level: CBOs and karacuna

#### *1. Mentality change of warriors as a first step towards human security*

CBOs participating in the network should continue and expand their work with members of the warrior age-grade on changing mentalities. Sports is a viable and credible entry point for work on mentality change. Government officials and church leaders in EES were generally very positive about the 'P&S' formula and would welcome an expansion of the programme to other parts of the state. In order to keep nourishing the interest of the warrior-sportsmen, organising sports tournaments and meetings at regular intervals in the Karamoja Cluster can be recommended. The risk of fights breaking out, could be minimised in creating different 'divisions', a lower division of clubs that are not yet ready for competitive matches and a higher, more advanced, division whose clubs interact according to international rules of engagement. In the same context promoting women sports groups and peace choirs can be considered.

#### *2. Diversification of the role of karacuna groups*

CBOs in Uganda indicated a need for incentives to keep the karacuna interested. Transforming the karacuna groups into groups responsible for one or more income generating activities carries the risk of the 'institutional survival' focus becoming secondary to the peace focus. Economic activities are prone to creating division and conflict. The spirit of an initiative such as the P&S network is better served by the inclusion of cultural activities in the programme rather than promoting a focus on economic interests. If the participating groups really need economic support let the CBOs approach development organisations to reach out to these young men.

#### *3. Promote awareness of gender based violence*

The rise of the incidence of gender based violence reported in the Karamoja Cluster justifies this as a focal issue for local advocacy particularly if messages are disseminated by karacuna as it will have special credibility. Theatre is also an interesting avenue to transmitting sensitive matters in a way that is not

immediately confrontational. Theatre will inevitably include women. Some members of the network, the Dodoth Agro-pastoral Development Organisation, (DADO), have experience in working on domestic violence.

#### *4. Strengthen the reporting capacity of CBO's using the karacuna members in the field*

Reporting is a necessary element in early warning and human rights monitoring. It produces the information that is used in advocacy and lobby activities in the capitals and abroad. Last but not least: it helps build the cohesion of a cross-border network like P&S. The acceleration of the exchange of information as a result of the rapid extension of internet access creates new opportunities for strengthening the links between the grassroots and the international lobby forums.

### b. Inter-communal and cross-border networks in the Karamoja Cluster

#### *1. Consolidating and, where possible, expanding the early-warning and rapid response role of the network.*

P&S's support to inter-communal sports and peace exchanges has focussed on a limited number of communities: Dodoth-Jie, Dodoth & Jie-Turkana, Toposa-Turkana, Didinga-Toposa. Neighbouring communities, especially those grazing their herds in the Kidepo Valley, would welcome their inclusion in the network. It is recommended that P&S should assess the possibility of extending its network of CBOs and the scope of participating sports clubs to include other communities in which male warriors play a key role - both in protecting their communities and in exposing them to retaliatory attacks.

#### *2. Widening of P&S's regional network should be carried out in close consultation and collaboration with other peace actors, especially INGOs, NGOs and CBOs.*

Competition of CSOs for funds, partners, and credit for work done, has sometimes been very destructive. The Karamoja Cluster Network for Peace and Development may offer a framework in which this coordination could take place.

### c. Regional civil society network

#### *1. Continued advocacy by the regional civil society networks in which P&S participate on the right to protection by the state for all citizens*

In this context the establishment of a civil society



*Pastoralists herding goats and cows in the borderlands in search for water and pasture*

working group on ‘protection’ accumulating expertise and monitoring developments is appropriate. The working group could be an interlocutor between regional civil society organisations with an interest in the Karamoja Cluster and issues of pastoralism, and regional intergovernmental organisations with a stake in protection by the state.

*2. The regional civil society networks in which P&S participates with SOPA as its regional lynch-pin*

They should play an initiating and facilitating role in a new round of public debate on appropriate policing in marginal, pastoralist areas. The debate should build on the P&S experiences in the field in the three countries<sup>43</sup>, bring relevant stakeholders together including police authorities at district, state and national levels, and the regional intergovernmental organisations with a mandate to improve security (UN, AU, IC-GLR, IGAD, EAC, RECSA).

d. Advocacy targeting international donors

*1. Feeding the positions arrived at during these debates*

*into relevant lobby networks like the Coalition of European Lobbies on Eastern African Pastoralists (CELEP).*

SOPA should feed information from the field into CELEP. Backed by the resolutions of the regional meetings, CELEP develops lobby instruments that will be used in interaction with European and Dutch donors that take an interest in pastoralist issues.

*2. Police reform and attention for human rights in the police force*

Central to this conversation will be police reform and the relationship between police and community.

*3. Stimulate debate within national and international civil society networks dealing with human security on the relationships in the triangle state, community and civil society*

The leading question is: in promoting human security under what conditions does civil society promote the strengthening of state security structures, and under what conditions do we advocate for the strengthening of community security mechanisms?

<sup>43</sup> Or 4, if Ethiopia (member Karamoja Cluster Peace and Development network and Mifugo) is included, or 5 if Tanzania as a member of Mifugo takes part.

### III CYCLES OF REVENGE: Addressing the motivational dimension

This chapter will reflect on advocacy positions on inter-communal conflict and cattle-raiding for actors at different levels of the P&S Network. We are dealing here with a conflict dynamic at the community level of which the communities -or groups within communities- have always been the principal actors as well as the principal victims.

However, in the last ten years the role of external actors is growing. Politicians play on the inter-communal conflict dynamic to win votes from their constituencies. According to a recent research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), it is not exceptional now that politicians take a share in the raided livestock.<sup>44</sup> Other conflict exploiters are the security personnel, and business people who dispose of the raided cattle.

These are alarming developments and may be signs of worse to come. However, the engine for raiding is still at the community level. The principal drivers for conflict are grassroots people, in particular the *karacuna*. This is not the place to offer a fresh analysis of the causes and motives for livestock raiding. This has been done by many scholars and civil society actors, including Pax Christi Netherlands.<sup>45</sup>

This chapter will offer an overview of the various ways in which community initiatives, government measures, and civil society programmes have responded to the ongoing conflicts and to livestock raiding. On the basis of the analysis of these responses conclusions will be drawn for advocacy activities

#### **The role of civil society as peacemakers**

Till the 1970s the communities of the Karamoja Cluster were able to maintain relative peace. They could rely on traditional mechanisms to stop escalation of conflict when the situation became too destructive. The 'Fathers of the Land', the oldest surviving generation, were in charge of war and peace and possessed sacred power. Their curses were feared and had the power to stop hostilities. In the more isolated areas of Toposa the curse of the elders is still powerful, though it is rarely if ever applied to cattle raiders. From some appearances the elders have now lost

their grip on society, although this is disputed by Knighton.<sup>46</sup> The responsibility to resolve conflicts and maintain peace is now shared between the government and the civil society.

CBOs act as ambassadors of their communities and have played a key role in managing and de-escalating conflict. The relative peace between the Jie and the Dodoth is to a large extent attributed to the contacts between the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) and the Dodoth Agropastoral Development Organisation (DADO). The Lokichoggio Oropoi Kakuma Development Organisation (LOKADO) act as ambassadors of the Turkana and manage their rocky relationship with the Dodoth and Jie on whose pastures the Turkana have depended during recent drought years. The contributions of these CBOs to peace are recognised by external observers.<sup>47</sup> Similarly in Sudan, the community peace committees established by the Losolia Relief and Development Association (LRDA), a Toposa CBO, was responsible for mobilising the Toposa in the peace process between Narim (Larim, Buya), Didinga and Toposa that addressed the legacy of the Ngauro (Lauro) massacre in 2007 in which 54 women and children were killed.

The understanding between civil society leaders of different, sometimes hostile, communities is far better than that between the politicians that the respective communities have elected to represent them in parliament or local councils. Elected people's representatives are always under pressure to keep their electorate happy and therefore profile themselves as champions of their communities particularly during the election campaign phase. The CBO leaders in Kaabong and Kotido counties sneeringly call the district leaders 'our warlords'.

Because of that understanding, partner CBOs in P&S are able to play a conflict-mitigating and conflict-preventative role. There have been several instances where through a last minute intervention they were able to stop the outbreak of conflict in the bud. As far as early warning is concerned, the CBO network is far more effective than the costly intergovernmental cross-border network run by

<sup>44</sup> Muiruri John Kimani, , (Senior Researcher, Mifugo Project, ISS Nairobi Office), Cattle Rustling a Dirty Business, 2010, [http://www.issafrica.org/iss\\_today.php?ID=1010](http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1010)

<sup>45</sup> SNV & Pax Christi Nederland, 'Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building Local Capacity for Peace and Development in Karamoja, Uganda', Kampala, 1 March 2004.

<sup>46</sup> Knighton, Ben, The Vitality of Karamojong Religion: Dying Tradition or living faith, Ashagate 2005:Aldershot

<sup>47</sup> Jonah Leff, 'Responses to pastoral wars', Small Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment, no 8, Sept 07; p.5-6. Onyango, Pastoralists In Violent Defiance of the State: p. 320-323.

IGAD, the 'Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism' (CEWARN).<sup>48</sup>

Early warning contacts in P&S network are immediate, by mobile or satellite phone, the moment a piece of information or rumour is intercepted. The CEWARN reports are sent by email, at regular intervals, by observers in the field to coordinating agencies in the capitals of the participating countries. Their researchers compile, analyse and summarise the different reports and send them to the CEWARN office in Addis Abeba, where the different country reports undergo a comparative analysis from which the conclusions for action are drawn. By the time the office in Addis sends out a recommendation for a co-ordinated 'rapid' response, the respective conflict is likely to have run its full course. Some claim that CEWARN reports are full of inaccuracies.<sup>49</sup>

Apart from peace work, CBOs form the interface between the intergovernmental and international non-governmental relief and development organisations and the communities. They are mobilised by the international organisations in the distribution of relief food, in campaigns to combat diseases and in disseminating messages, for example on gender-violence etc. The CBOs harmonise their respective efforts in regional umbrella organisations: Riamriam in Karamoja and Riamriam in Turkana. In Eastern Equatoria, the international NGOs harmonise their efforts and security in the EES NGO forum. The CBOs so far do not have an effective umbrella organisation.

Despite the coordination by the umbrella organisations there is considerable competition between CBOs. With the expanding involvement of international organisations in the Karamoja Cluster, especially in Sudan and Uganda, there is a growing need for organisations that play a role as intermediaries between the INGOs and the communities. Enterprising citizens often politicians or ex-politicians register CBOs and offer their services to the incoming internationals. Often a new-fangled CBO may

be more attractive to them than the well-established ones, because the former are not yet set in their ways and more eager to meet demands of their sponsor. Incoming international NGOs often have exaggerated expectations as to what they will be able to achieve and are easily taken in by stories about what the new CBOs can do better than the old ones. Examples of these new CBOs on the block are the Kaabong Peace & Development Agency (KAPDA) – promoted by the District Chairman and supported by MercyCorps, and Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI). APEDI developed programmes which overlapped with those of LOKADO, in the field since 2003, without preliminary consultation. Latest reports indicate that the situations is being resolved and collaboration between the last two during a cross-border Peace & Sports tournament held in Lokkichoggio in November 2010 became a fact. New CBOs are mushrooming in Eastern Equatoria<sup>50</sup>, some quickly go under.

### **Eaton's attack on peace NGOs**

In 2008 a Canadian PhD student made a frontal attack on peace organisations working along the Kenya-Uganda border in a leading international journal on African political affairs.<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately much of the evidence of the argument is based on complaints reflecting frustrations of community actors. These complaints are uncritically accepted and not analysed against the interests of his interviewees and the facts.<sup>52</sup> It seems Eaton can only sing one tune - that the NGOs are to blame for the continuation of conflict. Yet, in his article, there are some points that NGOs could take at heart.

#### **a. The disconnect between peace processes and ongoing warfare**

Peace meetings are sometimes ('very frequently' according to Eaton) held away from the scene of conflict; they do not involve the raiders and ignore divisions within the community for example the gap between 'elders' and 'warriors'. Eaton points at several peace meetings which seem to have been occasions for staging raids, apparently by groups that were left out and wanted to send a message

<sup>48</sup> CEWARN, established in 2002, targets three border areas: the Karamoja Cluster covering the cross-border areas of Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, the Somali Cluster covering the borderlands of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and the Dikhil Cluster on the borders of Djibouti and Ethiopia. It has particular focus on pastoral conflicts. The mechanisms link field monitors and country-based Conflict Early Warning Units (CEWERU) and research institutions. More on [www.cewarn.org](http://www.cewarn.org).

<sup>49</sup> (Bevan, Blowback, p. 70-1).

<sup>50</sup> For instance the Holistic Community Transformation Organisation (HOCTO), initiative of a pastor of the Africa Inland Church in Kapoeta. They have worked with Constituency Development Funds in Kapoeta South County. 'Mission Fruits' is another organisation linked to AIC in Narus.

<sup>51</sup> African Affairs, The Business of Peace: Raiding and Peace Work along the Kenya-Uganda Border 107/426 p. 89-110 & 107/427, p.243-259

<sup>52</sup> Eaton mentions for example that 33 million dollars were given to KARLIP, the Karamoja Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace. KARLIP was a creation of MONARLIP, KOPEIN and Pax Christi Netherlands to form an umbrella body that could coordinate peace action of all church denominations and Muslims in Karamoja. The organisations only existed for a short period. A donor willing to bring in this amount of money could not have escaped Pax Christi's attention, or that of the national newspapers in that regard, some of the some evidence from the communities may have been fabricated.

in this way. The experience of a peace meeting coinciding or followed by a raid is known and undoubtedly significant. In 2002, after a peace meeting, facilitated by Pax Christi in the Kidepo Valley in Eastern Equatoria, the warrior age grade of one the peacemaking communities staged an attack on the 'ex-enemy' a day later. This is a matter that needs more systematic investigation. By the way the meeting did not take place in a comfortable hotel in a capital but right in the middle of the battlefields of the cattle-raiders and in a country that was at war.

b. The fact that community-based organisations are handicapped as peace builders

By virtue of being linked to particular communities in conflicts it means that these CBOs may be compromised when it comes to impartiality in resolving crises. However this is not always the case. The close friendship between DADO and KOPEIN for example has been very helpful in managing conflicts between the Dodoth and the Jie, and in recovering stolen livestock.

c. The fact that the agenda of peace NGOs and CBOs is often determined by the political ambitions of its leading personality

This is a correct observation also confirmed by some of the stories collected for this research. Often a career as NGO-leader or CBO-founder is a stepping stone for a political career. But CBOs can also be a counterweight to the power of the politicians, as the role of KOPEIN and DADO, discussed earlier, shows.

d. The emphasis on root causes

This may be Eaton's most important observation because the fixation on root causes often works as an excuse to stay at a distance from the bitter realities of conflict. This chapter will discuss this notion below.

**State response to inter-communal conflict & cattle raiding**

Historically, governments have acted as if they had only two options when faced with conflicts between subject communities that is either mediate between the parties and enforce the agreement reached or punish the party that is deemed to have broken the peace first. Depending on the situation and the priorities of the government, a mix of both approaches is practiced by the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Eastern Equatoria. However in terms of sustainable peace and in order to build trust, a mediated solution is most effective.

Since the end of the war in Eastern Equatoria a considerable amount of time of payam, county and state-



*Young warrior*

level administrators is spent on conflict resolution. Attendance of these conflict resolution meetings is sometimes backed up by force – as in the Ikwoto County. If groups suspected of involvement in violence or raids do not show up at peace meetings, their village should expect a punitive raid by the army.

The Uganda government's policy is to assert the government's power, either by meting out collective punishment, or by arresting the suspected initiators of violence, and taking them to court.

In contrast the Kenyan government seems to be rather passive in responding to community conflicts and cattle raiding. The Practical Action/ITDG report for example lists 8 interethnic conflicts in which Samburu fought Pokot, Turkana and Rendille in the period, 1970-2002. Only in one case was a conflict resolution process initiated.<sup>53</sup> No mention of arrests or collective punishment. If the army or police had staged a punitive expedition, the report would certainly have mentioned it.

**Disarmament: As a Peace Strategy?**

During the last 10 years the governments of Kenya and Uganda have presented civilian disarmament as their main strategic response to inter-communal conflict. The undertaking to disarm the pastoralists was very popular with civil society groups. In the late 1990s there was a great deal of optimism that the removal of firearms would open an era of development for the marginalised people of the Karamoja cluster. However after 10 years of this strategy, the military disequilibrium caused by the

<sup>53</sup> Practical Action/ITDG report Conflict in Northern Kenya, p.28.

operation has instead ignited additional conflicts thus bringing the conclusion disarmament has hardly succeeded in bringing peace.

### **The MIFUGO project**

This important initiative focuses on livestock theft - cattle rustling, as it is commonly called,<sup>54</sup> and the principle of revenge is the most important engine in fuelling conflict in the Karamoja cluster. Livestock theft is the most important driver for the warriors involved in the war and for those who spiritually (diviners, elders) or economically (gun-owners, cattle traders) support the raids. If 'revenge' were the only motivation, a final resolution of all the fighting would be reached more rapidly.

The *mifugo* protocol aims to prevent, combat and eradicate cattle rustling. It has been drafted by the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) in collaboration with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS). The novelty and keystone of the project is the marking and registration of individual livestock ('Livestock Identity and Traceability System' or LITS). Once registered cattle will only be sold after the identity of the owner and the animal are verified. Law enforcement agencies will be able to trace stolen cattle without mistake. The registration will be international. The *mifugo* protocol focuses on the adjoining pastoral areas of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda.

To operationalise the protocol internationally a number of preliminary activities are still necessary:

- Harmonisation of legislation - rustlers in the five countries subscribing to the protocol should face the same sentences. The participating countries should have a common procedure in dealing with livestock that is confiscated because of illegal ownership<sup>55</sup>. Amazingly, the penal code of some countries does not unequivocally define theft of livestock as a crime. In some countries MPs from pastoralist areas have been reported to oppose a change in the law, allegedly to protect their interests in the raiding business. Once a government has made the necessary adjustments to its national law, it will ratify the protocol. It is expected that Uganda will be the first country to ratify.
- The participating countries will have to reach agreement on the technical aspects of the identifica-

tion and registration procedures; one pilot project in Garissa was concluded recently. There are several options: the insertion of electronic chips, branding, and others. The electronic option meets resistance from pastoralist and is relatively expensive;

- Public education- communities in the Karamoja should have full understanding of the *mifugo* protocol; pastoralists' first association is that the purpose of identification and registration of their cattle is to extract taxes<sup>56</sup>.
- Training - of a regional anti-stock theft police that can handle the LITS and operate across international borders.

### **From root causes to circular causality**

Conflict management principles imply that just stopping the violence is not enough. To achieve sustainable peace one should get to the heart of the problem, identify and address the root causes. Stopping the fighting is responding to symptoms only. In a joint SNV-Pax Christi study<sup>57</sup> of the causes of conflict and small arms proliferation in Karamoja, the question of the root causes was central. The researchers came up with 3 sets of root causes:

- Political and economic marginalisation of the Karamojong;
- Emasculation of the modern system of justice administration
- Ecological crises and resource degradation in Karamoja.

And 4 sets of proximate or intermediary causes were identified:

- Accumulation of wealth through cattle raiding where the researchers made a distinction between the practice of replenishing one's herds sanctioned by tradition and the raiding and racketeering for self-enrichment started since the 1980s
- The relatively high bride-wealth ( usually cows) that young men need to pay often at once, combined with the continued need for bride wealth for polygamous elders
- The unbalanced reliance of the state on home guards (community based security force) of particular communities

<sup>54</sup> Other livestock -camels, goats, sheep- are also targeted in raids. Rustling de-emphasises the criminal character of live-stock raiding. Mifugo is Swahili for livestock.

<sup>55</sup> Mr. Erasmus Twahurukwa of ISS advises EAPCCO/ISS on harmonisation of legislation. He works from ISS office in Nairobi. His is a complicated job as he deals with different ministries in different countries and different procedures to draft and pass a bill in parliament.

<sup>56</sup> Ms Abeba Berhe Amene is the adviser of the public education project of ISS.

<sup>57</sup> SNV&Pax Christi, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, Building Local Capacity for Peace and Development in Karamoja, Uganda, Kampala 2004.

- Lacking law enforcement capacity (150 policeman in an area the size of Belgium)

The list has some arbitrariness. The underlying philosophy is that conflict is a reaction to abnormalities, insufficiencies and distortions in the political and economic order. The research of the Centre of Basic Research in Kampala, which has been looking at Karamoja for the last 20 years, adopts this approach arguing that the decreasing resource base -grazing and water- pastoralism caused by population growth and the gazettement of large tracks of lands as nature reserves and game parks, is the main factor causing conflict.<sup>58</sup> Their argument is contradicted by the fact that most armed confrontations are about revenge and livestock, not about access to pastures and ponds.<sup>59</sup> Taking Karamoja again, the population of humans and animals has never been so high, yet vast stretches of grassland remain unused because it is not safe to use them.<sup>60</sup>

In other studies (Mirzeler, 2000, 2007) small arms proliferation ranks high as a cause of conflict. But is it the engine of conflict? Areas with comparable density of small arms may have a widely different incidence of conflict (eg. Karamoja in Uganda vs. Southwest Ethiopia). A fresh note in this debate is the work of the Oxford based anthropologist Ben Knighton who has intermittently over a period of 25 years been carrying out research in Karamoja. He debunks the talk about 'marginalisation' and 'erosion of cultural values and traditional authority' and 'the destructive impact of the proliferation of small arms'. In his view it is the Karamojong who have been marginalising the state. The Karamojong successfully continue their age-old lifestyle and stick to their old-time religion. The state is regarded as an enemy. According to Knighton, it is not the Karamojong who are obsessed with guns, but the army, the researchers and the NGOs. He attacks the work of Mustafa Mirzeler who argues that the gun has been the most important change agent in Karamoja (Mirzeler&Young 2000). There is an acrimonious debate in the journal 'History in Africa' in which Knighton argues that the only real problem for Karamoja is the Ugandan post-colonial state to which the British has left the awkward job of pacifying the Karamojong. We take note of Knighton's input since it may reflect -as he claims- the thinking of the Karamojong community leaders with whom he associated.

The 'root-cause' terminology is probably more seductive than real. It suggests that once the root causes are addressed, the proximate causes will lose their rationale, and the reasons for fighting will evaporate. In the 'root-cause discourse' the most important causality in conflict is overlooked: the reactive character of conflict. The dynamic of: 'I hit you because you hit me'. This causality is 'circular', not 'linear' as suggested by the image of the 'root'. Conflict goes on because it is not easy to stop it. Not because we need pastures, or we are lucky enough to carry a gun to help solve our problems, or because we feel it is time to get married, but because it is almost impossible not to hit back when we have been hit. The challenge for the new generation in Karamoja is to escape from this deadly circularity. Among the different causalities that perpetuate conflict, the interminability of revenge plays the leading role. It not only determines interactions between different communities but also between the UPDF and the raiders, and wider -as we learnt from Knighton- between the traditional leadership of Karamoja and the Government.

Among the organisations dealing with different causes of conflict, P&S choose to engage with the motivational complex sustaining conflict: the unstoppable intrinsic circularity of conflict determined by the duty and desire to revenge. Other organisations can deal with the extrinsic causalities such as the dams that will make fighting over water less likely, the reform of the police, the design of transitional mechanisms for the administration of justice and so on.

The priority of the P&S network should be to engage with specific groups of conflict actors to help them find ways to escape the circularity of conflict and to find ways not to hit back when hit, rise above the compulsion and the law to revenge and settle conflicts amicably. Helping adolescents from both sexes of communities affected by conflict to avoid the conflict trap is -and should be - the core business of the P&S Programme. The refusal of revenge is at the heart of the spirituality from which the movements of IKV and Pax Christi originate.<sup>61</sup>

## Conclusions

1. The P&S experience in the Karamoja Cluster teaches that CBOs can play a key role in maintaining peace between the communities whose interests they hold

<sup>58</sup> Ocan 1992 a & b, Muhereza, 2002

<sup>59</sup> This point is also made by Dave Eaton; more extensively in the first part of his article (Eaton, 2008:99-102).

<sup>60</sup> Longole, 2007:p1

<sup>61</sup> IKV is the 'Inter-church Consultation on Peace', established in 1966 by nine major churches in the Netherlands to coordinate the churches' thinking and action on issues of international security. Pax Christi is an international peace movement originating in the Catholic communities in France and Germany at the end of the World War 2.



- dear. Considering they are not dependent on the favours of an electorate they are more likely to transcend the logic of tribalist political mobilisation.
2. CBOs are not ‘naturally’ peace organisations. The inclination of communities to deal with groups subscribing to different cultural identities according to ‘enemy stereotypes’ is powerful, especially in conflict situations. Many politicians in the Karamoja Cluster build their careers on tribal political mobilisation. Connecting community-based organisations with a mission to promote peace and combat tribalism, is therefore of great strategic importance, and deserves the support of international peace organisations.
  3. Among the range of causes of conflict, addressing the typically human propensity to revenge is most compatible with the vision and mission of IKV Pax Christi, SOPA and P&S.
  4. The MIFUGO programme will create an information base that will make mistake-proof tracking and recovery of cattle a reality and so remove a major incentive for raiding.

## **Recommendations**

### a. Grassroots level: CBOs and karacuna

1. CBOs participating in a cross-border network such as P&S should continue to pursue their historical mission to address the motivational dimension of inter-communal conflict, by working as agents of mentality change among the karacuna.
2. The role of CBOs (including local churches) in mobilising karacuna is unique to them, and should find increasing recognition in peace-building work by governmental and inter-governmental organisations.

### b. Inter-communal relations at the regional level

1. Governmental actors should recognise that CBOs are sometimes better positioned to resolve inter-communal conflicts than they themselves. The clash of interests that arises at elections and is focused on winning votes makes government less attractive brokers.
2. Member CBOs of P&S should continue to identify potential counterparts among neighbouring communities thus weaving a regional safety net and building a buffer against the outbreak of conflict.
3. Member CBOs of P&S, inspired by an ethnically inclusive vision of peace, should continue to combat tribalism, at the level of the communities, the civil society and the government.

### c. Regional civil society in relation to CBOs

1. In their support to P&S member CBOs, SOPA and IKV Pax Christi and possible other peace organisations should strengthen the CBOs in their capacity to play a pro-active role in conflict resolution to resist tribalist pressures.
2. P&S, SOPA and IKV Pax Christi should actively explore the possibility of extending their programme to include more CBOs especially in the adjoining areas of Sudan -in particular the Kidepo Valley, the main battleground of cattle raiders of EES- where IKV Pax Christi is already active with its involvement in the local governance programme centred on the role of monyominji.
3. In creating partnerships P&S has an interest to include organisations of similar magnitude, with similar constituencies and with a similar vision and mission. The partners in Sudan (CDoT, LRDA, Holy Trinity Peace Village of Kuron) are entities of different magnitude and accountable to different kinds of constituencies, some ethnic, others non-ethnic and religious. The roles of the church members of the network and the roles of the CBOs should be differentiated so as to draw optimal benefit from their specific strengths, the church having the capacity and credibility to act as a mediator while CBOs can mobilise their communities for peace. For a possible outreach into the Sudanese part of the Kidepo, the possibility of cooperating with MANNA in Bira, Kamlach and Ikotos is worth exploring.
4. P&S network should further encourage collaboration between the CBOs and the MIFUGO programme. P&S partners can play an important role in having the tracing mechanism accepted by cattle owners and kraal leaders.

### d. Advocacy targeting international donors

1. In the context of its Sudan programme IKV Pax Christi should raise interest with coalition partners and other peace CSOs in the peace building role of CBOs, especially those involved in P&S.
2. IPC and SOPA should help to find ways to diversify financial support to P&S and the CBOs participating in it.

## IV CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

For a while, disarmament seemed to be the panacea for all the ills –inter-communal conflict and under-development- of the people of the Karamoja cluster. Some of the experts now feel that the idea that proliferation of small arms could successfully and rapidly be addressed by disarmament programmes was part of post cold-war optimism.

After Pax Christi International organised the historic Brussels conference ‘Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development’, that became the springboard for the ‘United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’, it was natural that Pax Christi Netherlands was open to the invitation from Ugandan Church Leaders and Parliamentarians to accompany the disarmament campaign in Karamoja. For IKV Pax Christi the involvement was a valuable experience, informing its advocacy work and a stepping stone for work on security and disarmament elsewhere.

As advocacy topics for CSOs small arms control and small arms disarmament have been a great success, and still are. Significant progress has been made in raising awareness of the destructive effects of small arms proliferation and in controlling the illegal arms trade. But when it comes to tackling the problem on the ground, in communities that are swamped with small arms and the rapid availability of ammunition, progress is very problematic. This is the case in the Karamoja Cluster.

This chapter will give a brief overview of efforts to control the use and distribution of small arms in the three countries in which the P&S Programme is carried out. All three countries are party to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects, the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Proliferation of the Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, the Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, and the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating, and Eradication of Cattle Rustling of the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation

Organisation (EAPCCO), the so-called ‘Mifugo Protocol’ discussed in the previous chapter. All are members of the now 10 year old Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) which assists governments in implementing the Nairobi declaration. In 2006 all three countries joined the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). One of its objectives is better border management. This includes the borders between Uganda and Kenya, Sudan and Kenya, and Sudan and Uganda. The ways the three countries -where the P&S network is implemented- have taken up the challenge of disarming their civilians differ considerably.

### **Sudan: Eastern Equatoria State**

In South Sudan, the arming of communities and the formation of community based auxiliary troops was part and parcel of the conduct of the civil war. There is a general belief in Southern Sudan that such processes are still going on to disrupt the outcome of the referendum, the establishment of the new state of South Sudan per 9<sup>th</sup> of July 2011. Gun possession is very high. A survey by Small Arms Survey in Ikwoto County in EES between November 2009 and January 2010, reported that 63% of households owned one or more guns. In Torit County the figure was 53%. In Ikwoto county 31 % of the households reported the use armed violence against one of its members during the year 2009. In Torit this figure was 28%.

Following the Presidential decree of May 2008, the governor of EES launched a disarmament campaign. Disarmament committees were established in 7 out of 8 counties and a campaign of sensitisation was conducted. When the SPLA started to disarm the *monyomiji* of the warring Lotuho villages of Iloli and Loguruny, a move they resisted, 8 soldiers and 11 civilians lost their lives and 4300 people were rendered homeless. SPLA ransacked and burnt both villages as a punishment. The 2008 civilian disarmament was poorly planned, highly decentralized, and launched before the Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau (CSSAC; in the GoSS Ministry of Internal Affairs) was operational. It was generally considered a failure.<sup>62</sup> However, practical measures such as prohibition to carry guns in public places, towns, along the main roads have an effect. With the CSSAC in the driving seat of small arms disarmament a ‘middle-of-the road’ policy orientation is emerging with an emphasis on non-violent, voluntary disarmament. Now the outcome of

<sup>62</sup> O’Brien, 2009,p.11

the referendum has been implemented, South Sudan becoming a separate state, the SPLM can difficultly afford the local upheavals that might accompany a drastic disarmament policy.

#### **Kenya: Dumisha Amani**

While the Kenyan government has played a leading role in putting small arms disarmament on the regional political agenda, its domestic disarmament policies have been hesitant and inconsistent. In the years after the Nairobi Declaration in March 2000, a good number of arms (ca 17.000) were handed in by individuals in response to ultimatums issued by the government. The public burning of the arms received wide publicity. However the majority of arms are held by pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya. They are estimated at between 170.000 and 500.000 arms.

Finally in May 2005, the Kenya Army, in collaboration with the provincial administration in North Rift districts launched the *Dumisha Amani* ('Restore Peace') disarmament campaign. It specifically targeted pastoralist populations the Pokot of Baringo district and Turkana from the area surrounding Lokitaung. The *Dumisha Amani* campaign had a voluntary and forcible phase and collected 2433 guns and 5260 rounds of ammunition. It offered infrastructural incentives to both communities, altogether 6 boreholes, 8 dams and 65.4 km of road. Human rights violations have been reported but not on the scale of the current disarmament operations in Uganda. Evaluators point at the cooperation between the army and CBOs as a factor that prevented excess brutality by the army. Many arms owned by Kenyan Pokot were rumoured to have been moved to Pokot communities in Uganda, bringing home the importance of internationalising disarmament campaigns. The government now seems hesitant about the follow-up (*Dumisha Amani 2*) which has been in the pipeline for the last two years.

The focus of disarmament campaigns has been on guns while the ammunition which enables a gun to work is often overlooked. A recent study by Small Arms Survey (James Bevan) in Turkana shows that more than half of the ammunition used in inter-community fighting and high-way robbery in Turkana has been acquired through the intermediary of the Kenya Police. The ammunition is mainly channelled through the KPR system. The police justifies the transfers of ammunition to the communities by claiming incapacity to protect the local

communities against cross border attacks by Dodoth, Toposa, Nyangatom, and Dassanetch. By combining statistical material on types of ammunition from police and community sources with information obtained in interviews with the police and community leaders, the study convincingly demonstrates the role of the Kenya police in sustaining cross-border conflicts. Interestingly, Bevan and Small Arms Survey do not primarily use this material to advocate for more attention to ammunitions during disarmament campaigns, but to call on the Kenyan state to improve the protection of its pastoralist citizens through the expansion and upgrading of the police. Incidentally, Bevan's recommendations converge with those made in the sections on protection of this report.

In Uganda, the disarmament operations have been more systematic, sustained and dramatic than in the other two countries. As far as civilian disarmament per se is concerned, there is more to learn here than from post-conflict Sudan or from the half-hearted way Kenya has gone about disarmament.

#### **Uganda: Karamoja from disarmament to re-armament**

When the first disarmament of small arms was launched in 2001, there was a general consensus that this was the way to go. Community leaders, civil society, government and parliamentarians were towing the same line. Only the young men, the warriors or *karacuna*, were expected to resist.

The first disarmament programme had two phases, a voluntary and coercive phase. During the voluntary phase, cooperative gun owners received an incentive in the form of ox-ploughs and corrugated iron sheets – although many missed out. During the voluntary phase 9560 arms were collected. During the subsequent, coercive phase, which lasted much longer, less than 1314 guns were collected.<sup>63</sup> For some communities the disarmament was drastic. Estimates from the Bevan report indicate that 44% of Bokora arms were handed in, 27% of those of the Jie, and 20% of those of the Dodoth.<sup>64</sup>

During the second, coercive, phase, UPDF used heavy-handed methods, confiscating cattle from owners with whom they should not have had a quarrel, sometimes keeping the confiscated animals for themselves or not returning them to the rightful owner. Serious human rights violations were committed by the UPDF. In one of

<sup>63</sup> Mkutu, 2008:131-2

<sup>64</sup> Bevan, 2008:540

these incidents, in Panyangara (Jie County), two children were killed and eight women raped. The Irish Mill Hill Father Declan O'Toole who happened to appear on the scene, protested. He was beaten on the head which led to another protest at higher level. He was later murdered by UPDF soldiers. Two soldiers were accused of the murder and summarily executed.<sup>65</sup> The campaign ended abruptly when the UPDF contingents involved in disarmament were needed to fight the LRA. This further weakened the initial consensus that was already shaken by the violence that accompanied the forceful phase. The withdrawal of UPDF led to intensified raiding and to re-armament. The communities that had been disarmed, including Kenyan communities, now became targets of raids by those that had held on to their weapons. Especially the Bokora who had more than others given their support to the campaign, now suffered raids.

The CBOs that had mobilized their communities to cooperate with the disarmament exercise – among them IKV Pax Christi partner KOPEIN- became alienated from their constituencies who blamed them for being UPDF collaborators and contributing to their new vulnerability. Valuable social capital that could have underpinned the completion of the disarmament process was destroyed during the first disarmament operation, especially because of the sudden withdrawal of the UPDF. For the communities the message was clear: the government's interest was not the protection of the communities, but a demonstration of its military and political sovereignty.

After the debacle, the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs, assisted by the Human Rights and Democratisation Programme of DANIDA, designed the KIDDP mentioned earlier in the report, in which the concept of human security was central and development inputs would be timed in such a way that they would reinforce the disarmament process and vice-versa.

### **Re-disarmament**

In 2005, when the LRA threat was reduced, UPDF had its hands free to continue disarming the Karamojong. This time the voluntary phase was short. Central to the operation was the concept of 'cordon and search'. The army was equipped with armoured vehicles and tanks.

Two helicopter gunships were at its disposal. Militias from Acholi and Teso were to assist the operation. For a while rumours had circulated that Teso generals were responsible for masterminding the operation. This made the Karamojong uncomfortable. It looked as if the government wanted to give the Teso and Acholi an opportunity to take revenge on them for the many years they suffered humiliation, for the theft of their cattle, and displacement. When Karamojong attacks were at their height, around 2002, more than 100.000 Teso had been displaced.<sup>66</sup>

Before launching the operation UPDF called the elders and kraalleaders for a meeting to be assured of their cooperation. The meeting sparked an emotional response from the kraalleaders. They blamed the UPDF for leaving them without protection after the first operation, and they consequently appealed to the army to cancel the disarmament.<sup>67</sup>

The Riamriam civil society network then called a meeting with the following agenda:

- Review the cause of the failure of the first disarmament;
- Formulate recommendations from lesson learnt;
- Create an entry point for CSOs to be represented in the disarmament committees that had been formed by the government;
- Alert the attention of the International Donor Group to the concerns of the CSOs and communities concerning the proposed disarmament, with the aim of identifying a non-violent, sustainable methodology of disarming Karamojong civilians.<sup>68</sup>

The UPDF took the meeting as an affront, but the Donor Technical Group took the signal seriously and intervened. It was agreed that the Donor Technical Group commission the Centre for Basic Research – which had a great deal of experience in Karamoja- to draw up a three year plan in which the interests of the communities and civil society would be safeguarded. The extent to which the original UPDF plan and CBR plan differ is unknown but it is clear it did not take away suspicion between the army and the communities. The implementation of the operation soon turned violent. The consultative organs (Civil

<sup>65</sup> Onyango, 2010:222-225, Knighton, 2003:439-442

<sup>66</sup> Over 100.000 Teso were displaced by the Karamojong raids and were forced to stay in displaced camps, mainly in Katakwi district

<sup>67</sup> Onyango 2010, p.226. Eria Olowo Onyango, is a sociology lecturer at Makerere University. He carried out field work for his doctoral thesis while the disarmament was going on. His thesis "Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State, The Case of the Karimojong in Northeastern Uganda" was defended at Bergen University in 2010.

<sup>68</sup> Mkutu: 2008,p.133

Military Coordination Centres) were not attended by civilians because according to the CSOs they were biased.

The Human Rights Watch report 'Get the Gun' has a long list of human rights violations such as beatings, torture, killings, looting during cordon and search operations. Those who couldn't produce a gun were kept in detention till one of his relatives would bring a gun – often specially bought at an exorbitant price because of the ongoing disarmament - to ransom the family member. These and similar human rights violations were confirmed in the 2007 annual report of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights. The report was particularly critical of the disproportionate use of force that included bombardment of civilian positions from helicopter gunships. The primary response of the *karacuna* who had managed to keep their guns was to take revenge on the army. Dozens of soldiers, warriors and civilians were killed in the resulting fighting. On its side the army estimates that every month on average it kills 13 warriors.<sup>69</sup>

In August and September 2008, partners in the cross-border P&S network witnessed similar bombardments of UPDF helicopter gunships just on Kenyan territory. Factual research done by local partners confirmed 11 deaths.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, parliamentary questions were asked in the Netherlands which was giving large-scale budget support to Uganda at the time. The Dutch Minister denied these facts reported in the OHCHR report.<sup>71</sup> This is exemplary for the important role CSOs and CBOs play in connecting intergovernmental and national state actors to communities and vice-versa and existing gap between policy makers in capitals on the one hand and experience at grassroots level on the other.

There are indications that many of the arms that were confiscated by the Ugandan army found their way back into the society, and into the local conflict. Onyango looked carefully at the figures for the number of confiscated guns and the number of guns registered. The last number proved to be far lower than the first indicating to Onyango transfers and possibly sales to

civilians. Onyango further observed that many of the AK47s that were confiscated had the typical adjustments that Uganda's State Gun factory routinely makes on guns before they are used by UPDF, undeniable proof that they originated from the army.<sup>72</sup>

As Bevan proved for the ammunition used by Turkana civilians, most guns in civilian hands in Uganda, originate from the state's security forces. These observations call for a drastic re-adjustment of the accepted view that most of the military hardware in the hands of Ugandan and Kenyan civilians comes from Somalia, Ethiopia or Sudan. On the basis of his statistical data, Bevan calculated that only 15% of the ammunition used in Turkana originates from across the border.<sup>73</sup>

### Protected kraals

As the men whose guns had been confiscated, were no longer able to effectively protect their cattle against raiders, the UPDF agreed to make soldiers available to provide protection of livestock in the night against raiders who had managed to keep their guns. Dispersed over Karamoja there are about 30 protected kraals.<sup>74</sup> The centripetal movement at dusk of hundreds of herds each of several dozens of animals in the direction of the single protected kraal, is a most impressive sight.<sup>75</sup>

The system has obvious disadvantages. There is persistent conflict between UPDF and kraal leaders over the control of the protected kraals. Soldiers, for their own convenience prefer the kraals to be close to the road and to boreholes. Kraal leaders prefer the kraals to be close to grazing areas and watering places for their livestock. The fact that livestock has to be inside before dark, in the same kraal, limits the radius of grazing. Never in the history of Karamoja some areas have been so thoroughly overgrazed while others remain unused. This has reached a point that in order to keep the roads clear of grass labourers have been recruited to cut the grass. In a paranoid twist, the system of protected kraals also exposes livestock owners who do not bring their animals to the protected kraal to being suspected of holding on to their illegal guns.

The protection offered by the army is not theft-proof.

<sup>69</sup> Onyango, 2010, p.230 and 234.

<sup>70</sup> IKV Pax Christi & partners, Updates Peace & Sports Program: UPDF kills Turkana pastoralists- civil society being denied to mediate, Nairobi, 22nd August 2008 & UPDF strikes again: Turkana kraal bombed on Kenyan territory, Nairobi, 5th September 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Answers to written parliamentary questions raised by Ferrier, Voordewind en Gill'ard on the attack of cattle herders by the Ugandan army. Questions send on 15th of September kenmerk 2008Z02345/2070829650.

<sup>72</sup> see also The Monitor, 28-03-2008

<sup>73</sup> Bevan, Blowback, p. 22

<sup>74</sup> <http://ext-ftp.fao.org/TC/Data/TCE/TCER/ECHO/Uganda/Annex%201%20-20Thematic%20Maps/Karamoja%20Kraals.pdf>

<sup>75</sup> Witnessed by author in Kotido on September 1st, 2010.

Herds are also stolen from the protected kraals, by thieves pretending to be the owner of someone else's animals. In August 2010 UPDF re-evaluated its strategy and announced that it would no longer protect kraals that house more than ten thousand cattle.<sup>76</sup>

The willingness of UPDF to reach an understanding with the people of Karamoja seems to be decreasing. Step by step, the UPDF way of dealing with gun owners is becoming more merciless. For example, an amnesty used to be given to gun-owners who were found out during cordon and search operations but who handed their guns without resistance. This has now been abolished. The announcement on the maximum number of animals that can be protected in a kraal also included a statement that section 266 of the Uganda Penal Code is currently in force and has become operational. This section of the law prescribes life-long imprisonment for cattle rustlers who use deadly weapons or whose action results in death of serious injury to others.<sup>77</sup> According to an IKV Pax Christi source, implementation remains a challenge. It might result in more cases of delayed justice of suspected cattle raiders, since a Court of Appeal has not yet been established in Karamoja.

Despite a number of deep humiliations at the hands of the colonial and post-colonial governments, the peoples of Karamoja have, in their own perception been able to strike back and maintain a balance with the forces that attempted to impose themselves on them. The stubbornness of the *karacuna* to continue resisting the UPDF is in this tradition. Since the first disarmament they have been a feared opponent to the UPDF despite its helicopter gunships and armoured vehicles. The withdrawal of the UPDF in 2003 must have felt like a victory. With 17000 soldiers deployed in Karamoja, it is highly unlikely the *karacuna* will win this match, or even play equal. What is at stake now, is the maintenance of a minimum of community cohesiveness and trust in the structures of the state that will enable the younger generation to build a new post-disarmament existence.

### **Practical disarmament**

It is gradually becoming clear that campaigns and operations to disarm civilians in communities entangled in endemic conflict do not contribute to peace. In most cases disarmament makes things worse.

It upsets the existing balance of forces, thereby triggering new conflicts. It provokes resistance, especially from communities that are used to acting in an independent fashion. The intergovernmental body, the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA) that coordinates action of 12 member-states in the Horn and Great Lakes of Africa in the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Protocol on Small Arms, has also drawn this conclusion. In order to combat small arms proliferation it advocates a comprehensive approach that not only targets the collection of arms, but addresses the economic and social context of arms proliferation. A wider package of interventions aimed at improving the general wellbeing of the targeted communities is now being worked out. This comprehensive strategy has been baptised 'practical disarmament'. It could include the following:

- A multi-actor approach (community, CSOs, government),
- Trust and confidence building
- Ensuring public safety for civilians to be disarmed
- Security sector reforms
- Tolerance vis-à-vis disarmed communities
- Improvement of livelihoods, social cohesion, justice, and good governance, etc.

### **Cross-border disarmament**

The *Dumisha Amani* experience has again shown that a policy of 'disarmament in one country' has severe limitations. Governments have been talking about cross-border cooperation for a long time. The Karamoja Cluster was included as an area of concern in the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, concluded by the International Conference on The Great Lakes Region (IC-GLR) of December 2006. In its meeting in November IC-GLR of November 2009 in Bujumbura a budget for the 'Disarmament of Nomadic Pastoralists and the Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3' was approved.<sup>78</sup> Zone 3 is ICGLR parlance for the Karamoja Cluster. Implementing agencies are RECSA, IGAD/CEWARN, ISS, EU, GTZ UNDP, EAC and others. The IC-GLR, RECSA and ISS have formed the Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM or REDCOM) focused on 'Zone 3'. Each of the participating countries (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia<sup>79</sup>) sends two delegates to REDCOM. Oxfam and Amani Forum, a regional

<sup>76</sup> New Vision, 5-10-2010, 'Karamoja still insecure'; OCHA, Uganda Humanitarian Update, July-August 2010

<sup>77</sup> OCHA, Uganda Humanitarian Update, July-August 2010.

<sup>78</sup> \$11.500.000, Round Table IC-GLR, Regional Programmes of Action 2010-1014, Bujumbura 5-6 November 2009: 10 - [www.icglr.org](http://www.icglr.org).

<sup>79</sup> The participation of Ethiopia is so far not clear.



*Group of Turkana warriors, karacuna, from Kenya sitting together in the shade*

peace forum of parliamentarians, represent the civil society.<sup>80</sup> The Government of Uganda, through the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) was appointed as the lead agency of the programme. In the first half of 2010, KIDDP has invited the partner-countries for a planning meeting. Southern Sudan responded positively but wanted to wait till after the referendum. Kenya, according to the KIDDP coordinator, was lukewarm, downplaying the importance of coordinated disarmament and preferred to wait till after the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. Ethiopia had not responded.

REDICOM already has a ‘road map’ for its disarmament plan. The programme includes cross-border radio programmes, cross-border meetings of elders, and the promotion of cross-border trade. Before engaging itself in a disarmament process, RECSA and ISS have developed best practice guidelines<sup>81</sup> on the basis of an

analysis of past disarmament processes.

For effective cross-border disarmament, coordinated action is necessary not only between the governments but also between communities at different sides of the border. Here lies an important role for cross border CSO networks as P&S. The East African Network on Small Arms (EAANSA) has not developed the capacity to deal with such cooperation. EAANSA brings together civil society organisations from the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa –the same coverage as RECSA to which it acts as its regional civil society interlocutor-which IKV Pax Christi supported in its infancy.

### **Conclusions**

1. Because armies are trained to win battles, therefore forceful disarmament polarises the action into a struggle for military superiority between the state and the armed community, especially if the target

<sup>80</sup> Ambassador Jean Kimani, the Director and National Coordinator of the Office of IC-GLR in Nairobi confirmed that IC-GLR supports the idea of civil society participation in REDICOM but could not confirm whether the door was open for other organisations. The person responsible for the civil society interface in her office is Mr. Nguli

<sup>81</sup> Approved for publishing by the technical advisory committee, published while printing this report.

- communities are hardened by conflict; In the absence of trust, disarmament can be self-defeating and destructive for the communities targeted.
2. Because they have been in charge of their own protection and defence for most of their history, the communities in the Karamoja Cluster should be expected to respond with defiance to the arrogance of a state that comes to disarm them without offering any tangible long term or short term benefits in return.
  3. In the three countries where P&S operates the main source of illegal arms and ammunition is from the security forces inside the respective countries; therefore before addressing cross border trafficking governments should stop the arming of civilians by their own security forces. Otherwise any attention for cross-border transfers has no other value more than that of a diversionary tactic.
  4. The contribution of the regional civil society to new regional policies on civilian disarmament in terms of 'practical disarmament' opens new entry points for CSOs and CBOs, especially in connecting intergovernmental and national state actors to communities and vice-versa.
  5. if there is a willingness within the community to clear the community of illegal arms, then CBOs should consider it their duty to organise for the safe and peaceful transfer of the guns to the responsible authorities;
  6. with regard to the ownership and use of small arms, the behaviour of leaders, personnel, and members of CBOs including young men of the warrior age grade participating in the CBO programme should be consistent with their professed ideals so that they are credible role models for the rest of the community;
  7. if the state unilaterally initiates a disarmament campaign, CBOs and community leaders should ensure that they are part of the decisions on the modalities and timing of state initiated disarmament campaigns;
  8. in case only limited or nominal participation of local CSOs in the disarmament operation is allowed, they should ensure that they can on national and international civil society networks to support their demands;
  9. if involuntary disarmament operations escalate into fighting between the military and civilians, the priority of CBOs should be to keep the trust of the members of their communities even if they risk to be closed down by the authorities; without the support and trust of the community, they will stop to be effective intermediaries with the government, and useless for their communities.
  10. CBOs should document and follow up on human rights violations during disarmament operations; and should ensure they have adequate reporting capacity;
  11. In seeking redress for human rights violation CBOs should, where they can, collaborate with other organisation in the network.

## Recommendations

### a. Grassroots level: CBOs and karacuna

1. CBOs participating in the P&S network should continue and expand their work with members of the warrior age grade promoting non-violent modes of behaviour in achieving their objectives and reducing their dependence on the use of force. Besides sports other models of transformative action could be explored
2. CBOs participating in the P&S network should promote the idea of a division of roles between an impartial, democratically controlled, and appropriately armed police and unarmed citizens who are free to go about their business without worries about the safety of their family and property;
3. CBOs in cooperation with other CSOs from marginal areas, if possible on a national level, should advocate and campaign for adequate security arrangements for their communities;
4. CBOs should remind communities that it is commendable to dispose of their illegal arms;
5. CBOs should discourage any sale of illegal arms,
6. CBOs should agree with the police on a protocol regulating the transfer of illegal arms, ensuring an amnesty from prosecution, and, under specific circumstances, an incentive;

### b. Inter-communal and cross-border network in the Karamoja Cluster

1. P&S member CBOs should in their advocacy work resist an international cross-border disarmament operation as long as communities at different sides of the border are in conflict. They can help build cross-border peace and understanding that is a precondition for a successful disarmament.
2. P&S member CBOs should build a common, cross-border, understanding on issues of disarmament in the Karamoja cluster, and share this with governmental and intergovernmental stakeholders in disarmament (IC-GLR, REDICOM, RECSA, EAC, IGAD, CEWARN, AU-IBAR, EAPCCO).





*Penalty taken during a tournament in Lokkichoggio between Turkana and Toposa warriors*

c. Regional civil society network

The P&S and the regional civil society networks in which it participates should explore the creation of a medium that effectively represents the interests of the communities in the interface with international and regional governmental organisations concerned with disarmament such as RECSA, IC-GLR, UNDP, IGAD, and EAC. P&S, possibly in co-operation with the Working Group on Small Arms<sup>82</sup>, should look for new ways to have community and civil society concerns taken into account in the design and execution of ‘practical disarmament’ strategies. The role of community voice could be taken up through this working group.

d. Advocacy targeting international donors

SOPA and IKV Pax Christi have accumulated a unique experience in the special challenges posed by civilian disarmament in an environment of endemic, inter-communal conflict. It should connect with civil society actors working in similar environments and help develop and refine a set of strategies that match the complexity of the problem.

<sup>82</sup> In the Working Group on Small Arms cooperate FECCLAHA (the Fellowship of Christian Councils in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa), AMECEA (Association of Member Episcopal Councils in Eastern Africa), Africa Peace Forum, NCA (Norwegian Church Aid), and IKV Pax Christi.

## V. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

So far young men had little economic perspectives outside the cattle economy. The cultures in the Karamoja cluster value competition. Wealth is measured by the size of one's household, the number of dependents, especially children, a man commands. To have children one needs to marry. To be able to marry one needs cattle. The cattle are controlled by the head of the household in most cases one's father. It is up to the household head to decide for whose weddings the available cattle will be used either his sons, nephews, younger brothers, or for marrying an extra wife himself. So, apart from the prestige of confirmed warriorhood, ambitious young men also have a powerful economic incentive to raid cattle as a shortcut to full manhood. The alternatives to the cattle economy have so far been in politics, the church, and the army. These jobs require formal education which very few men in this area have.

Government authorities sometimes assume that pastoralists could easily switch to agriculture. Because of the unpredictable rains in the Karamoja Cluster such a scenario is only available in a few places with permanent water supply. Traditionally agriculture does not carry prestige. Cultivation could become an alternative if it would enable a young man to earn the money necessary to marry and establish a family like his brothers who are successful herdsmen. Apart from irrigation in the places where it is possible, it would need the growth of local markets, and/or access to the national and regional markets.

This section offers some observations on economic alternatives in the Karamoja cluster. Though they cannot be exhaustive, they may be more optimistic than five years ago. The following topics are discussed:

- The on-going debate on the adaptability of traditional pastoralism to the current economic context;
- The access to international meat markets if the origin of the meat from the Karamoja can be certified;
- The creation of national and regional markets and cross-border motorised road access to these markets;

### **The adaptability of pastoralism**

There is a sharp divide between policy makers. One group believes that the old-time pastoral mode of production is doomed. The sooner a shift is made towards capitalist

ranching – as in Botswana or Argentina- the better. Another school argues that the mobility of the pastoralists is a time-tested adaptation to an environment where rainfall is often local and unpredictable.

The debate is confused. When representatives of the two positions meet, their discussion quickly polarises in the opposition between 'backward looking romantics' and 'the shock troops of capitalism and proletarianisation' to use the stereotypes they throw at one another. Arguments of 'economic feasibility' or 'competitiveness', 'ecological adaptation', 'cultural rights', 'mobility' ('nomadism'), 'conflicting systems of land rights' and 'propensity to conflict', are inextricably entangled. There seem to be no comprehensive policies that, after taking all pros and cons into account, propose alternatives for a way forward. The advocates of ranching normally do not take the social consequences into account. Ranching normally implies private ownership of land, outside investors, capitalist labour relations. Privatisation of land results in traditional herdsmen losing access to grazing land, and looking for employment.

In Uganda, the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) tries to walk a 'middle road' proposing transitional scenarios between 'nomadism'<sup>83</sup> and ranching. A key group of policy makers to which the president and the first lady belong are in a hurry and believe in settling the pastoralists as soon as possible, and in the capitalist model of livestock keeping.<sup>84</sup> They point at the relative success of ranching in Ankole. The KIDDP proposes transitional scenarios, not the shock-wise misappropriation of pasture that drove some Ankole herdsmen to graze outside their home area and others to seek jobs in the town.

The discussion is complex, and the positions taken by stakeholders are often one-sided. For actors whose priority focus is on the 'human security' aspect, the 'Security in Mobility' (SiM) initiative is a welcome development. A number of prominent international organisations - UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) - cooperate in a campaign advocating for a 'normative framework' to guide policy on pastoralism and other

<sup>83</sup> I put 'nomadic' in quotation marks because the communities of the Karamoja are not 'nomadic'. All have fixed villages where agriculture is practised. Grazing involving considerable mobility takes place during the dry season.

<sup>84</sup> 'Govt to help Kjong pastoralists settle down', New Vision, August 1st, 2010. Address by Janet Museveni at the launch of the 'Dry Lands Initiative' of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Centre in partnership with COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).

mobile lifestyles. Organisations in the P&S network have an interest to closely follow the debate triggered by this group, and participate in any conferences this group may organise.<sup>85</sup>

In this context the efforts of the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Advocacy Project (REGLAP) should be mentioned. A collaborative effort of Oxfam-GB, CARE, Cordaid, Vétérinaires sans Frontières (VSF) – Belgium, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Reconcile (Nakuru, Kenya) and Centre for Minority Rights Development (Cemiride) also in Kenya, coordinated by Save the Children UK, with funds from the Humanitarian Office of the EU (ECHO). REGLAP published a number of pamphlets that should help to improve the poor image of pastoralists (*'Pastoralists get a bad press. Why?'; 'Get to know pastoralism – It works; A handbook for journalists', Pastoralists have rights too!'*).

A study by Reconcile, carried out under REGLAP<sup>86</sup>, reviews the inappropriateness of existing policies on pastoral livelihoods in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. The negative stereotypes surrounding the pastoralists are identified as the main cause of these unhelpful policies. The report does not dwell on peace building. It advocates donor-government coordination in integrating development and humanitarian aid, investment in infrastructure, credit and savings facilities to kick-start a local private sector. It urges pastoral parents to send their children to school so that they may have access to alternative livelihoods. It has a handy list of land policies and land laws in the three countries and shows how they work –or are abused - to the disadvantage of pastoralists. To base the debate on the possibility, appropriateness, advantages and disadvantage of ranching in Karamoja, on a more empirical footing, a pilot project of trying out different ranching models in different types of environment would be helpful.

### **Karamoja cluster to become an international beef exporter?**

The joint EAPPCO-ISS initiative to introduce a cross-border identification system for tracing cattle under the *mifugo* protocol, as discussed in Chapter 2 as a conflict prevention mechanism, not only serves the purposes of security and peace. Once it is operational it will help the countries of the Horn of Africa to take a crucial hurdle

in gaining access to the international meat market (Europe, Middle East). Most European countries have rules that require meat-sellers to be able to trace the owner of the animal from which the meat was cut. It is expected that meat from the Horn will be competitively priced and that the access to European markets can give a major boost not only to the marginalised economies of the pastoralist areas, but also to the national economies.

On the ground few people are aware of the economic perspectives of the successful implementation of the *'mifugo* protocol'. So far the emphasis in the dissemination of the *mifugo* protocol has been on the Livestock Identification and Traceability System (LITS) which is met with suspicion by the herd owners in the cluster. In the framework of the P&S programme *karacuna* groups could be trained as dissemination teams and concentrate on the ultimate spin-offs of LITS.

Traditionally cattle are mainly valued for their aesthetic value and for their exchange value. Impressive bulls and oxen served as symbols of individual male identity, and are praised in songs devoted to them. Culturally fixed numbers of cattle were transferred from the family of the bridegroom to the family of the bride (bride-wealth or bride-price) as a precondition to marriage, and in the settlement of murder and man-slaughter (blood-wealth) to the family of the victim from the family of the person responsible for the death. While the use value –milk, meat, leather, and traction- are not ignored the other values usually take the upper hand. A project (*'Happy Cow Project'*) by the Justice & Peace Commission of the Catholic Diocese of Moroto, as a contribution to curbing cattle raiding, tries to reorient cattle-owners' valuation of their animals towards a greater appreciation of the animals as a source of livelihood emphasising the health and well-being of the animals.

### **Creation of markets**

The current climate in Sudan and Uganda is one of euphoric interest in markets. The peace in Sudan and the improved safety on Ugandan roads are making an important difference. With the markets of Ikotos, Torit, Kapoeta, Kaabong and Kotido of 5-10 years ago still in mind, there is an amazing change. There is a lively cattle market between East Africa and Sudan, Toposa bulls being traded with Dodoth heifers. There is wide

<sup>85</sup> SiM was launched in June 2010 with a call to action and the publication of a report based on field research in a number of East African pastoralist areas including the Karamoja Cluster 'Advocating for Safe Movement as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Pastoralist in the Horn and East Africa'. SiM published an internet-periodical 'Pastoralist Voices' on the website of the participating organizations.

<sup>86</sup> Pastoralism, policies and practice in the Horn of East Africa, A review of current trends, by Sar Shadrack Omondi, & Michael Ochieng Odhiambo, 2009: London, Humanitarian Policy Group



*Elder Jie woman from Uganda appeals to government to help find her stolen cows*

range of commodities originating from the Sudan, Ethiopia and East Africa. In all three countries informants took great interest in the roads that were being built or resurfaced to improve connections between the countries (Sudan-Uganda: Lotukei-Pirre, Bira-Karengak, Uganda-Kenya: Kaabong-Kamion-Oropoi, etc) and to create access to cross-border markets. The road between Uganda and Kenya is partly built with voluntary labour coordinated by KOPEIN. Earlier this year a meeting of MPs of EES, Uganda and Kenya took place in the lodge in the Kidepo National Park. The agenda included raids, protection of wildlife, cross-border grazing, security of Didinga students crossing the park when going home for school- breaks, arms trafficking, a rape case of which two Toposa women were victims. The meeting agreed that a market be established north of the border near Lotukei. A follow-

up meeting in the presence of Toposa, Didinga and Dodoth community leaders has been planned in Lotukei<sup>87</sup> to determine the exact location of the market.

Only very few cross-border roads in the cluster have immigration and customs facilities. This means that only members of border communities are allowed to legally cross the borders when using these roads. This places limits to the development of cross-border trade. Once border posts established<sup>88</sup> it should be possible to run them from the revenues collected on the spot.

### Conclusions

1. Once security is restored the future for the Karamoja Cluster is not bleak. Apart from the possible development of a mining sector (about which unconfirmed rumours continue to circulate), there

<sup>87</sup> No information whether this has taken place.

<sup>88</sup> Uganda-EES: apart from the crossings with Magwi county near Nimule (Bibia) and Parajok (Puge) only one official crossing between Ikwoto county and Kitgum district on Madi Opei-Ikotos road at Tsertenya. For full operation of the Lotukei market, border posts need to be created between Ikwoto county and Kaabong district and between Southern Kapoeta county and Kaabong county; there are no border posts at all between EES and Ethiopia; there is only one border post between Sudan and Kenya; west of Lake Turkana there is only a presence of Ethiopian immigration and customs (no Kenyan) on the road from Todenyang to Ethiopia; no border posts on either side between the different districts of Karamoja and Turkana.

are opportunities in the modernisation of livestock keeping that can absorb the competitive energies of the younger generation.

2. There is no reason to cling to the traditional pastoralist mode of production as long as human, cultural and land rights are respected. The 'normative framework' developed by the 'Security in Mobility' advocacy initiative could be an important instrument in this process of change.
3. Karamojong should be enabled to test new ways in making livestock production a competitive economic pursuit. A scenario in which opportunities are limited to Karamojong becoming the employees of outside investors should be avoided.
4. Young men and women should be exposed to the new economic perspectives in training and exposure programmes and in participating in pilot projects.
5. The markets that are now emerging in different places in the Karamoja Cluster are locations that are favourable to the development and dissemination of new ideas. For change agents like the CBOs participating in P&S they are appropriate springboards of action.

## Recommendations

### a. CBOs and grassroots

1. P&S CBOs should take responsibility for exposing the young men and women in their communities to the workings of the modern economy so that they are better able to defend themselves in the changing economic situation and satisfy their competitive drive without recourse to cattle-raiding. Initiatives in the spirit of 'Happy Cow' could possibly fit in this context.
2. CBOs should find ways in associating their 'warriors' with the emerging regional markets. Different forms of association can be envisaged: (i) in a protective role since market will be focal point of inter-communal tension; (ii) as change agents raising awareness on the issues that touch on pastoralists' participation in the market economy; (iii) as organisers of sports tournaments between different communities.

### b. Regional inter-communal relations

1. CBOs should use the opportunity that market

centres offer to establish 'inter-community centres' in which CBOs of different communities as well as churches participate. These multi-ethnic centres can act as information hubs on compliance with human rights, cultural rights, the 'normative framework' of the 'Security in Mobility Initiative', on the ins and outs of the mifugo protocol. It can also send early warnings to competent authorities for a rapid response in the case of imminent conflict.

2. CBOs should form a common regional, cross-border platform, that can interact with the (inter)governmental and international non-governmental development organisations intervening in the Karamoja Cluster (IC-GLR, REDICOM-RECSA, ETC.)

### c. Regional civil society

1. P&S CRegional CSOs, with P&S in the lead, should stimulate the debate on the future of pastoralism, feeding in the experiences of their partner CBOs, connect it with the results of relevant research and pilot-projects.
2. P&S CAny outcomes of these debates should be shared for validation with partner CBOs whose reactions will be a new input in the debate.
3. P&S CRegional CSOs including P&S should continue to oppose any hurried adoption of policies that deal with the 'pastoralist problem' 'once and for all' and seek regional international support in case any of the governments in the Karamoja Cluster makes such a move.

### d. Advocacy targeting the international donor community

1. P&S CPastoralist conflict and underdevelopment in East Africa are one of the manifestations of state fragility. Now that European countries, including the Netherlands, develop 'state-building' strategies to reduce fragility, IKV Pax Christi, should lobby for appropriate strategies that effectively transform pastoralists into citizens.
2. P&S CIKV Pax Christi should actively participate in the Coalition of European Lobbies on Eastern African Pastoralism (CELEP) knowing it has a precious information link to the grassroots. It should ensure that the issues of protection, conflict and disarmament that are a major problem for East African pastoral communities are included in the agenda of CELEP.

## APPENDIX 1: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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## Appendix 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Date	Person interviewed	Job title interviewee / activity
02-08-2010	Joseph Lopaga	Losolia Relief and Development Organisation, Kapoeta
06-08-2010	Paul Napwon	Speaker EES Legislative Assembly
07-08-2010	Peter Bosco Lotiang & Hon. Aringole	MPs EES, BuDi constituencies bordering on Uganda
07-08-2010	Paul Ukac	Pact Sudan – Kapoeta office
11/13-8-10		First EES County Commissioners' Forum
12-08-2010	Titos Lokwachuma, Martin Lorika Lojam, James Lokuuda Kadanya	Commissioners Kapoeta South and East & Pastor AIC & chairman Holistic Community Transformation Organisation (HOCTO)
12-08-2010	F. Andrew Madrana	Peace&Justice Coordinator CDOT
18-08-2010	Camlus Omogo	Security advisor, IKV Pax Christi Horn of Africa Programme
27-08-2010	Edwin Rutto	Coordinator Practical Action
27-08-2010	Abebe Berhe	Institute of Security Studies, portfolio community sensitization
28-08-2010	John Munyes	Minister of Labour & Community leader Turkana
28-08-2010	Augustin Kai	Coordinator LOKADO
31-08-2010	Peter Amodoi	Karamoja Disarmament & Development Programme, Min. Karamoja Affairs
01-09-2010	Romano Longole & David Modo	KOPEIN, Kotido
01-09-2010	Bishop James Nasak	Bishop Karamoja Diocese, Church of Uganda
01-09-2010	Ogole	Senior Superintendent of Police, N.Karamoja
01-09-2010	With Romano Longole	Visit to the market
01-09-2010	Benjamin Ateu	IRC Civil Society Development Officer
01-09-2010	With Romano Longole	Visit to protected kraal
02-09-2010	With Simon Lomoe	Trip Kotido Kaabong
02-09-2010	David Lobolia & Simon Lomoe	Chairman board DADO
02-09-2010	Robert Osbert Okello	District Security Officer
02-09-2010	Christina Achii	County Community Development Officer
02-09-2010	Bonaventure Okoyi	Inspector of Police, Kaabong County
03-09-2010	F.Charles and F. Samuel	Kaabong Mission
03-09-2010		Flight Kaabong- Kajjansi
03-09-2010	Frank Muhereza	Centre for Basic Research
07-09-2010	Erasmus Twahurukwa	ISS, legal asvisor
08-09-2010	Camlus Omogo	IKV Pax Christi Report on RECSA meeting Mombasa
08-09-2010	Edwin Barasa	Africa Peace Forum/ CEWARN unit
13-09-2010	Amb. Jean Kimani	ICGLR

